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Intelligence after the Cold War

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The three years following the election of President Bush in 1988 saw profound changes in the world that had enormous impacts on the Intelligence Community. In the fall of 1989, the Berlin Wall came down and Germany began the process of reunification. The Communist regimes of Eastern Europe gave way to democratic rule. The Soviet Union began to break apart with many former Soviet Republics declaring independence. In late 1991 Communist rule ended in Russia.

Some began to question whether an intelligence capability was needed any longer, others urged significant retrenchment. Leaders within the Intelligence Community began streamlining their agencies and re orienting toward new missions, with greater focus on transnational threats.

The collapse of the Soviet Union resulted in U.S. troop units in Europe standing down. The inactivation of VII Corps in Europe, and a number of Divisions in Germany and the United States, led to the corresponding inactivation of their assigned intelligence units. INSCOM closed down three major field stations in the European Command's area of responsibility.

Even as the drawn down was happening, INSCOM was building up in other ways. The Regional SIGINT Operations Center was established at Fort Gordon Georgia. Sites at Bad Aibling Germany and Menwith Hill England were revitalized.

After years of training and preparation, INSCOM?s ability to support the U.S. Army in a tactical environment was tested on two different continents in rapid succession. On 20 December 1989, President Bush responded to Panamanian dictator General Manuel Noriega's campaign of physical harassment against U.S. citizens by ordering the use of military force under Operation JUST CAUSE. The U.S. forces successfully seated pro-Noriega strongholds, cornered Noreiga, and forced him to surrender on 3 January 1990. The 470th Military Intelligence Brigade received the Panama Battle Streamer for its participation and was recognized as the first INSCOM unit to participate in combat operations.

The Gulf War, brief though it was, had profound repercussions for U.S. intelligence. Never had so much information been conveyed so quickly from intelligence systems to war fighters with such devastating effect. The accuracy of U.S. precision guided weapons astounded the world. The war also highlighted the need for the United States to expand its own efforts to link intelligence systems with combat systems and to train military personnel to use these systems effectively. The U.S. recognized that the future of warfare was apt to be battles fought at a distance between opposing forces, placing a premium on the availability of intelligence on the nature and disposition of hostile forces.

Yet the Gulf War also demonstrated problems with intelligence. Initially, the Intelligence Community wasn't?t well prepared to support military operations in the locale, but given time in the fall and winter of 1990 to put together a capability, the job was done. The Joint Intelligence Center (JIC) was established during the war with representation from the key intelligence agencies and provided a model of providing crisis support to military operations. Indeed, a permanent National Military JIC was established shortly after the conflict at the Pentagon and later at all unified commands.

At the dawn of the 21st century, the United States remains unrivaled as a superpower, yet, its military supremacy is not preordained. In fact, today, many of America's adversaries are designing weapons systems specifically to counter the U.S. military--a force designed to counter Cold War threats--at its weakest points. Despite its stunning victories against such despots as Saddam Hussein in the Persian Gulf War, the U.S. military cannot adequately defend Americans against long-range ballistic missiles, advanced cruise missiles, chemical and biological weapons, or electronic and information warfare. Not surprisingly, these are capabilities that America's enemies aggressively pursue. Some also are intent on denying the United States access to overseas bases, military staging areas, and the unhindered use of space. Clearly, America's status as superpower may be challenged during the next few decades. THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY faces major challenges also, including a widespread lack of confidence in its ability to carry out its mission competently and legally. One consequence of this perception is that reform of intelligence policy and capabilities will not be left up to the intelligence community itself. Other parts of the executive branch and Congress will certainly be involved. It is no less true, however, that the intelligence community has been adjusting to the changed demands of the post-Cold War world for several years and, for the most part, appears to be providing reliable and useful information to its customers.

The need for intelligence and for a capability within the U.S. government to collect, produce, and disseminate it remains critical. The end of the Cold War has not ushered in an age of peace and security. Nor is the need for intelligence eliminated by new sources of open information. There are still important but hard to learn facts about targets-including the intentions and capabilities of rogue states and terrorists, the proliferation of unconventional weapons, and the disposition of potentially hostile military forces - that can only be identified, monitored, and measured through dedicated intelligence assets.

Let us hope that the future shines bright for our brothers and sisters in today?s intelligence community.

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