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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, FAR EAST COMMAND
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SECTION, GENERAL STAFF

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A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE G-2 SECTION, GHQ, SWPA AND AFFILIATED UNITS

GENERAL INTELLIGENCE SERIES

This series consists of volumes prepared by G-2, GHQ, Far East Command for intelligence training purposes, pursuant to directive from the Intelligence Division, General Staff, Department of the Army.

These volumes are theater reports and not historical monographs as defined in D/A Circular 302, 1948.

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A BRIEF HISTORY
OF THE
G-2 SECTION, GHQ, SWPA
AND AFFILIATED UNITS

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INTRODUCTION TO
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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND

Tokyo, Japan
8 July 1948

The *Brief History of the G-2 Section, GHQ, SWPA and Affiliated Units*, serves as an introductory volume to the General Intelligence Series and is in fact a condensation of its nine basic volumes. All material within the text and all inclosed documents are declassified to "Restricted," regardless of current classification at date of publication.

The need for such a documented, historical series in our Service Schools is amply illustrated in comments by Lieutenant General S. J. Chamberlin, GSC, now Director of Intelligence, Department of the Army, who also served brilliantly on the staff of MacArthur as Chief of Operations during the campaigns of the Southwest Pacific Area: ".....The scarcity of intelligence source material at the Service Schools was one of the greatest hindrances to proper intelligence training in the period between the World Wars. It is my hope that the record of World War II will be preserved in such form that this handicap will be eliminated. Future students of intelligence specialties should have at their disposal not only summarized accounts of intelligence organizations and activities such as may be included in general historical studies, but also background material for study and analysis which will challenge them to do research on the evolution of those organizations, their advantages and their weaknesses and arrive at their own conclusions as to the adaptability of our solution to different situations that may lie ahead. To this end I am encouraging all efforts to collect and preserve the records of intelligence operations.

The Southwest Pacific Area produced a number of intelligence agencies and techniques required by the special geographical conditions in the theater. In many respects they could have served as models for other areas of operations....."

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL MacARTHUR:

PAUL J. MUELLER
Major General, GSC
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

C. A. WILLOUGHBY
Major General, GSC
AC of S, G-2

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In addition to Volumes I-IX listed above, there are one or more companion volumes for each main subject, entitled "Documentary Appendices," which contain war-time documents, orders, plans, reports, etc., illustrating operational procedures.

Officers and men in responsible positions will be listed, with their activities, in appropriate paragraphs within the volume.

The basic manuscript of Brief History was prepared by Col J. P. Craig, G-2. Subsequent edit, expansion and revision: Maj General C. A. Willoughby, Lt Col C. H. Goddard, Maj H. N. Bowen, and Miss B. E. White, G-2, SCAP.

PREFACE

This study, an abbreviated history of the operations of G-2 in the Southwest Pacific Area, is in fact, a condensation of the following more detailed series of intelligence monographs, expressly written for the needs of our Service Schools in order to salvage our war experiences and record field expedients and practical solutions, viz :

- Vol I The Guerrilla Resistance Movement in the Philippines*
- Vol II Intelligence Activities in the P. I.: Japanese Occupation*
- Vol III Operations of the Military Intelligence Section*
- Vol IV Operations of the Allied Intelligence Bureau*
- Vol V Operations of the Allied Translator & Interpreter Section*
- Vol VI Operations of the Allied Geographical Section*
- Vol VII Operations of the Technical Intelligence Unit*
- Vol VIII Operations of the Counter Intelligence Corps*
- Vol IX Operations of the Civil Intelligence Section*

The purpose of the general series is to record the important work done by intelligence agencies in the prosecution of the war against Japan. Each volume presents the essential features of the particular agency or group which it describes. Every volume—excluding the abbreviated history and Volume VII, which retain all of their documentary appendices between the covers of the basic publication—has one or two companion volumes of documentary appendices containing original documents, reports, orders, plans, etc., in order to show wartime operational procedures. The series is expected, in some measure, to fill the gap which has heretofore existed in military literature on the practical aspects of intelligence in war.

The G-2 structure was generally in keeping with the pre-war teachings of the Command & General Staff School, Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas, which were considered sound and were proven adaptable for any situation. Every effort was made to maintain and defend basic staff principles.

G-2 fought consistently for centralization of intelligence through operational control of all related intelligence agencies or affiliates. This doctrine has now found national acceptance in the recent formation of a National Intelligence Agency. It is one of the keynote findings of the Pearl Harbor Investigating Committee. It is reiterated in the latest directive letter of the Chief of Staff on "Intelligence Functions and Responsibility," W. D. 3 March 1947.

This inflexible position became doubly important as the special geographical and political characteristics of the vast Southwest Pacific Area required the early establishment of many Allied Intelligence Agencies or Bureaux, to handle such diverse functions as interrogation of prisoners of war, translation of captured enemy documents, research for and publication of geographical material, radio surveillance, Air, Ground and Navy liaison, counter-intelligence, counter-espionage and extensive clandestine operations behind the enemy lines and in enemy-held territory.


These agencies were integrated into the general structure of theater intelligence but from their faltering infancy, all possessed an incurable trend toward independence. Except for the Commander-in-Chief, it became apparent, too, that there was sometimes insufficient appreciation of the techniques of intelligence in support of combat operations. It would appear that the general intelligence coverage in the pre-war curricula of our Service Schools had failed to establish general recognition and frank acceptance of the importance of intelligence activities in war. This abbreviated history is expected to reveal the kaleidoscopic range of intelligence operations in a theater which was a wilderness compared to the European theater, where professional armies, in existence for centuries, had left a rich heritage of general military information.

Many officers and men served creditably in these enterprises. However, only certain selected personnel, in more responsible command and staff positions are listed below:

Maj. Gen. C. A. Willoughby.....ACofS, G-2, SWPA (1941/48)
 Maj. Gen. Spencer B. Akin.....Dir., Cen. Bureau, SWPA (1942/46)
 Air Vice-Marshal J. E. Hewitt.....Dir., Intell., RAAF (1942/45)
 Brig. Gen. Courtney A. Whitney.....Chief, Phil. Reg. Sec. (1943/45)
 Brigadier John R. Rogers, AMF.....Dir., Mil. Intell., AMF (1941/45)
 Brig. Gen. Elliott R. Thorpe.....Chief, CIC, USAFFE (1942/46)
 Brig. Gen. Joseph J. Twitty.....Comdg. Gen., JICPOA (1942/45)
 Brigadier K. A. Wills, AMF.....Contr., AIB/G-2 (1944/45)
 Col. Van S. Merle-Smith.....Exec., G-2 (1942/44)
 Col. A. Sinkov.....Chief, SIS, SWPA (1943/45)
 Col. W. V. Jardine-Blake, AIF.....Chief, AGS/G-2 (1942/45)
 Capt. R. B. M. Long, RAN.....Dir., Nav. Int. (1941/45)
 Col. H. V. White.....G-2, Sixth Army (1942/46)
 Col. G. A. A. Jones.....G-2, Eighth Army (1943/48)
 Capt. A. H. McCollum.....Dir., Nav. Int., 7th Fleet (1942/45)
 Col. B. Cain.....A-2, Fifth Air Force (1943/44)
 Capt. G. B. Salm, RNN.....Dir., NEFIS III (1943/44)
 Col. S. H. Spoor, RNIA.....Dir., NEFIS (1944/45)
 Col. P. J. E. Chapman-Walker, U. K.Dir., SRD/G-2 (1943/45)
 Capt. R. Kendall, RNR.....Dir., SIA (1942/45)
 Capt. J. C. McManus, RAN.....N. E. Sec., AIB/G-2 (1943/45)
 Group Captain H. F. Malley, RAAF.....Dir., COIC (1942/44)
 Col. Sidney F. Mashbir.....Chief, ATIS/G-2 (1942/46)
 Col. C. G. Roberts, AMF.....Contr., AIB (1942/44)
 Col. R. Bratton.....Dir., CIS/G-2 (1946/48)
 Col. Collin S. Myers.....Dep. Contr. AIB (44/45), Exec., G-2 (46/48)
 Col. Paul Cooper.....Theater Intell., G-2 (1944/46)
 Col. J. Paul Craig.....Chief, Operations, G-2 (1942/46)
 Col. F. B. Dodge.....Theater Intell., G-2 (1946/48)
 Col. R. G. Duff.....Chief, Operations, CIS/G-2 (1946/47)
 Col. J. K. Evans.....G-2, Phil. Dept. & USAFFE (1938/41)
 Col. Stephen M. Mellnik.....Chief, Phil. Sec., G-2 (1943/45)
 Col. H. E. Pulliam.....Chief, PSD/CIS/G-2 (1945/48)
 Col. W. B. Putnam.....Chief, CCD, CIS/G-2 (1946/48)
 Col. Ronald L. Ring.....Dir., Hist. Sec. (1946/47)
 Col. F. H. Wilson.....Dir., Hist. Sec. (1947/48)
 Col. S. Wood.....G-2, USAFIP & USAFFE (1941/42)
 Col. W. S. Wood.....Chief, WDI/G-2 (1945/46)

Col. E. H. F. Svensson.....Dir., ATIS/G-2 (1946) WDID (1947/48)
 Col. P. H. Bethune.....Chief, WDID (1946)
 Comdr. C. Parsons.....Dir., Supply, AIB & PRS (1942/45)
 Comdr. E. A. Feldt, RAN.....N. E. Sec., AIB/G-2 (1942/44)
 Comdr. J. C. R. Proud, RANVR.....Chief, FELO/AIB/G-2 (1942/43)
 Wing Comdr. C. A. Brewster, RAAF.....RAAF Liaison G-2 (1943)
 Wing Comdr. H. Roy Booth, RAAF.....Cen. Bureau, SWPA (1943/45)
 Lt. Col. Evan Mander-Jones, AMF.....Chief, AGS/G-2 (1942)
 Lt. Col. E. H. Manley.....GCS, CO, 5250 th Tech. Intell. Co. (1944/45)
 Lt. Col. G. E. Mott, Brit. Army.....Chief, SOA/AIB/G-2 (1942/43)
 Lt. Col. R. P. McQuail.....CO, 5250 th Tech. Intell. Co. (1946)
 Lt. Col. C. F. McNair.....CO, ATIS (1947/48)
 Lt. Col. R. I. Foster.....CO, 5250 th Tech. Intell. Co. (1947)
 Lt. Col. A. W. Sandford, AMF.....Cen. Bureau, SWPA (1943/45)
 Lt. Col. M. K. Schiffman.....CO, 5250 th Tech. Intell. Co. (1947)
 Lt. Col. Allison W. Ind.....Dep. Contr., AIB/G-2 (1942/44)
 Lt. Col. J. C. Mullaley, AMF.....Dir., COIC (1944/45)
 Lt. Col. H. A. Campbell, Brit Army.....Dir., SRD (1943/45)
 Maj. E. A. Williams.....Phil. Sec., G-2 (1942/45)
 Maj. N. W. Raymond.....G-2, Phil. Dept. & USAFFE (1939/42)
 Maj. J. W. Schneider.....Chief, Jap. Liaison (1947/48)
 Maj. S. C. Williams.....CO, GHQ, Tech. Intell. Det. (1948)
 Capt. B. B. Beck.....Chief, Targets Br. (1947/48)
 WOJG M. E. Lee.....G 2, USAFFE (1941/42/47)

Other officers and men in responsible positions will be listed, with their activities, in
 appropriate paragraphs within the volume.



A Study in Strategic Distances :

The magnitude of the Southwest Pacific Theatre can best be appreciated against a background of comparative geographical distances. If a map of the United States is superimposed on one of the Southwest Pacific, the continental area of the United States will fit roughly between Australia and the Philippines. The distance from Washington to San Francisco is approximately the same as from Rabaul to eastern Java. With Miami located off the coast of eastern Australia north of Brisbane, Hollandia will fall near Milwaukee. Biak will be near Duluth and Halmahera near Regina across the Canadian border. Leyte and Mindoro in the Philippines will be located far to the northwest, on the border between Alberta and Northwest Territories.

The inherent tactical and strategical problems of a land and sea advance from Australia and Papua, directed from Headquarters at Port Moresby and Brisbane, through New Guinea and the Moluccas to Manila, are comparable to those of a hypothetical American Headquarters stationed 2000 miles south of New Orleans, with its advance echelon in the vicinity of Charleston, charged with air strikes on Boston, New York, and Washington, to points west of Denver, and an advance by land and sea from Charleston (Milne Bay) via Chicago (Hollandia), Duluth (Biak), Regina (Halmahera), and northern Alberta (Leyte), to a point just east of Juneau, Alaska (Manila).

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Advon - Advance Echelon
 AGS - Allied Geographical Section
 AIB - Allied Intelligence Bureau
 ATIS - Allied Translator & Interpreter Section
 CCD - Civil Censorship Detachment
 CCS - Civil Communications Section
 CENFAC - Central Pacific
 CIC - Counter Intelligence Corps
 C in C - Commander in Chief
 CIRCPCAC - Commander in Chief, Pacific
 CIS - Civil Intelligence Section
 CNI - Chief, Naval Intelligence
 COIC - Combined Operational Intelligence Center
 COMNAVJAP - Commander, Naval Activities in Japan
 DI - Director of Intelligence
 DMI - Director, Military Intelligence
 DNI - Director, Naval Intelligence
 ESS - Economic & Scientific Section
 ETO - European Theater of Operations
 FEAF - Far East Air Forces
 FEC - Far East Command
 FELO - Far Eastern Liaison Office
 GS - Geographical Section
 ISD - Inter-Allied Services Department
 JAMIS - Joint Army-Navy Intelligence Studies
 JICPOA - Joint Intelligence Center, Pacific Ocean Areas
 LGEM - Liaison Commission, Japanese Demobilization Ministries
 MG - Military Government
 MIS - Military Intelligence Section
 MIS-X - Military Intelligence Service - X Section
 NEI - Netherlands East Indies
 NRS - Natural Resources Section
 ONI - Office of Naval Intelligence
 OSS - Office of Strategic Services
 OWI - Office of War Information
 PRS - Philippine Regional Section
 PSD - Public Safety Division
 PWB - Psychological Warfare Branch
 RAAF - Royal Australian Air Force
 RAN - Royal Australian Navy
 RANVR - Royal Australian Naval Volunteer Reserve
 SCAP - Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers
 SCAPIN - SCAP Instruction
 STB - Special Intelligence Bulletin
 SID - Strategic Intelligence Digest
 SI(s) - Secret Intelligence (Service)
 SITREP - Situation Report
 SO - Special Operations
 SOA - Special Operations, Australia
 SCUPAC - South Pacific
 SRD - Services Reconnaissance Department
 SWPA - Southwest Pacific Area
 TIC - Technical Intelligence Company
 TIS - Translator & Interpreter Service
 USAFFE - United States Army Forces, Far East
 USAFIA - United States Army Forces in Australia
 USAFIK - United States Army Forces in Korea
 USASOS - United States Army Services of Supply
 WDI - War Department Intelligence
 WDIIT - War Department Intelligence Targets

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Chapter I

INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION, PHILIPPINE DEPARTMENT AND USAFFE
July 1941 to June 1942

1. Intelligence Organization of the Philippine Department:

The pre-war Philippine Department, exercising operational control of all tactical units (prior to the formation of USAFFE and assumption of overall command by General Douglas MacArthur) was a normal military command with the usual General Staff Sections, including G-2.(1) The advent of war was seriously considered. Staff planning comprised every contingency. G-2 naturally developed its own plans.

The Postal Telegraph Service, the Philippines Civil Service, the Postmasters, the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company,(2) etc., not only had all been drawn into an interlocking network, primarily for air-raid warning and spotting, but also represented a collateral framework of information, transmission, rendezvous and intelligence contacts. Many American businessmen, miners and plantation owners were enrolled secretly, with a view to forming a nucleus of information and a potential "underground," in case the Japanese were successful in overrunning

(1) General (then Col) C. A. Willoughby was G-4 of the Department, from 1939 to 1941. In this capacity he developed and expanded the supply and defense establishments on Bataan, the West Road to Bagac, the Mariveles Cut-off, the warehouse area in the forests near Km. 129, the docks at Cabcaban and Limay, which enabled the Fil-American forces to engage in the protracted defense which is now history. When General MacArthur assumed overall command, General Willoughby became G-2 of the newly formed GHQ, USAFFE.

(2) Col Joe Stevenot, the American manager, who joined MacArthur's headquarters on Corregidor, maintained a telephone line into the main Manila switchboard (via the Yacht Club cable-terminal) and received reports on the Japanese in the city from his intrepid chief-operator until the middle of February, when it was felt that it was too risky to expose this faithful woman to an obvious death penalty.

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- 1 -

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the Islands, a pessimistic possibility envisaged but not publicly admitted.(3)

Several FBI-trained operatives, of Japanese ancestry (Nisei), had been imported from Hawaii, in the pre-war months, to keep the Japanese population in the Philippines under discreet surveillance. These men later rendered most important services on Bataan in the interrogation of prisoners of war, in the translation of captured documents and as CIC agents. It called G-2's attention to the linguist potential of the American Nisei. This was the modest beginning of a later famous institution: ATIS.(4)

Close liaison was always maintained with the Philippine Constabulary. Many of its best secret operatives were later to appear again in our counterespionage and in the guerrilla movement. G-2 Philippine Department employed many special intelligence agents, including a narcotic expert of the U.S. Treasury Department.

Under the impact of the Japanese occupation, the initial American network disintegrated; the men were either killed or interned. Many Filipino agents, however, managed to survive and formed nuclei of resistance and a skeleton for the "underground." A typical pre-war agent, Miss Yay Panlilio, the brilliant woman-journalist, survived the Jap occupation and later became the main-spring of the Marking guerrilla group.(5)

2. Intelligence Operations: 7 Dec 1941/9 May 1942:

The territorial losses in the early stages of the war in

(3) Col Joseph K. Evans, on the staff of G-2 Phil. Dept, able intelligence operator, was very active in the development of this clandestine service. In December 1942, Col Evans, then in Washington, was one of the first to establish radio contact with the guerrillas in the Philippines: Station WYY: Maj Praeger, in northern Luzon.

(4) Allied Translator and Interpreter Section. See Vol V, General Intelligence Series, "Operations of the Allied Translator and Interpreter Section, GHQ, SWPA."

(5) See Vol I, Gen Intell Series, "The Guerrilla Resistance Movement in the Philippines," Chap. III, p 19.

the Philippines disrupted the functioning of the regular intelligence agencies of USAFFE and of the Philippine Department. In preparation for siege conditions, as on Bataan, an interim intelligence service was improvised. In the early part of January 1942, Brig. Gen. Simeon de Jesus, PA, organized the Military Intelligence Service (MIS) as the nucleus of clandestine intelligence activities operating initially on Luzon. Mission of the MIS was to collect, evaluate, and disseminate military information obtained in Bataan, Zambales, Pampangas, and other occupied areas, operating principally behind the enemy lines.(6)

Based on Bataan, de Jesus had under his direct charge about 60 agents, most of whom were former Constabulary officers and enlisted men. These experienced agents crossed the Japanese lines either on foot or by cutting across the northwestern corner of Manila Bay in "bancas", and proceeded on their missions; the system was crude, the main difficulty being communications. It took the agents sometimes a week to reach their destination and another week to come back, after several days' stay in their locality of interest.

To expedite communications, de Jesus established a radio station in Manila, located in the projection room of a movie theater. The noise in the projection room masked the sounds of the transmitter, and the crowds in the theater made possible the movement of agents to this focal point without attracting attention. This radio station was in operation about six weeks prior to General MacArthur's departure (11 March 1942) and continued operations undetected until sometime after the fall of Bataan.

It was anticipated that an increase in radio stations

(6) See Vol II, Gen Intell Series, "Intelligence Activities in the Philippines during the Japanese Occupation," Appendix XIX.

might jeopardize the existence of those already established. To safeguard against leakage of information, the following plan was evolved by American intelligence officers working with de Jesus: (7) It was the "blueprint" for the subsequent underground intelligence nets and the guerrilla resistance movement.

Four main surveillance areas were established:

- 1) San Fernando (Pampanga), north to the foothills of the Mountain Province.
- 2) From San Fernando (Pampanga), south, including Manila, with a southern boundary at the town of Las Pinas.
- 3) The southwest end of Luzon, including the provinces of Cavite, Batangas, and Laguna.
- 4) The southeast end of Luzon, including Tayabas, Camarines Norte, Camarines Sur, and Sorsogon.

Each of these areas was in charge of a district agent, the only one to know both the position of the transmitter and of the connection with de Jesus; the transmitter was to be located in some secure spot but relatively close to the center of operations in the area. For example, in Area No. 1, it was to be located in San Fernando itself, because through this town all vehicular and railroad traffic had to pass on its way from Manila to Lingayen, which was the only base in the north being used by the Japanese.

The district agent would have with him the radio operator and, at the most, one other person from Bataan; all other personnel was scoured locally. The organization was formed on the "cell principle," in groups of three; and the district agent was expected not to go beyond this number.

In order to cover every possible field of information, the three agents working under the district agent were chosen, if

(7) Ltr, Maj J. R. McMicking, G-2, to Col Roberts, (ATB) SWPA, 4 Oct 42, subj: "Intelligence Net in the Philippines." Phil files 322.19. Maj McMicking, life-time resident of Manila, P.I., business associate of the firm of Ayala y Cia, expertly familiar with conditions and personalities of the Philippines, was in the small, hand-picked group which came out of Corregidor with General MacArthur and handled Philippine intelligence affairs until April 1943.

practicable, from different classes of society: a laborer, a government clerk or small shopkeeper, and a land proprietor or political figure, in the area. Each of these three would in turn employ three other men well-known to him; and those three would select still others, etc.

It was anticipated that some of the people would not prove faithful, and under pressure or for personal gain would divulge information to the enemy. The "cell" organization would limit the possibility of detection and capture of the senior agent and the transmitter. The Government Postal & Telegraph Service and certain selected groups of the Phil. Army Signal Section were earmarked to go underground, with radio equipment, and await orders. The general surrender order worked havoc with this carefully co-ordinated system.

MIS did not, however, cease functioning after the surrender. Although scattered, its members went underground and slowly began to rebuild their disrupted organization. General de Jesus issued secret instructions: a) to carry on the mission of the MIS by underground activities, b) to contact guerrilla leaders for professional advice, c) to give them aid and comfort whenever and wherever an opportunity presented itself, d) to accept "cover" employment in Filipino agencies under Japanese Occupation if such would be means to achieve the desired end, and e) to make all reports to a central agency handled by himself.

While in a remnant status, this organization set the general pattern which was followed in subsequent intelligence penetrations and is covered more fully in Vol. II, General Intelligence Series. Many of these brave men died ultimately at the hands of the enemy, the Japanese Military Police, the dreaded "Kempeitai," generally under torture. The orders of the Japanese 5th

Division are characteristic of the barbarism of Japanese methods.(8)

Among the intelligence procured on Bataan during this period were early and important clues to the enemy's field organization, order of battle, code names of units, and personality of Commanders. The initial operations in N. Luzon and S.E. Batangas, the withdrawal on Bataan and its protracted defense were fought on such a restricted area, that it became a miniature theater in which every technical and military phase became strangely accentuated and clear-cut. The Nisei operators were parcelled out to the I and II Corps to interrogate prisoners of war and translate captured documents; we thus secured identifications, at an early stage, and broke into the code system of the enemy, in his numerical designations of troops: this was the genesis of ATIS and the beginning of enemy order of battle records.

One of the signal officers, Maj. L. Brown, inducted into the service in the Philippines, was the long-time manager of McKay Radio in Shanghai. He was soon able to identify the principal enemy air-signals, and air-ground communications, and pick up major air raids and movements: this was the opening wedge for the operations of the Central Bureau in Australia and Brig. Gen. Carter Clarke's brilliant service in Washington.

3. Conditions after the Surrender:

After General MacArthur's Staff arrived in Australia in March 1942, radio contact was maintained with Corregidor for a short time, but no information from other parts of the island beyond Corregidor was then received in Australia. It is now known,

(8) See Appendix XXVI, Vol II, Gen Intell Series, "Intelligence Activities in the Philippines during the Japanese Occupation." Reference is to the 16th Japanese Infantry Regiment. The story of these loyal and courageous agents is also told in an abbreviated: "History of the Military Intelligence Service, USAFFE," included as a Documentary Appendix in Vol II, General Intelligence Series.

however, that radio contact was actively maintained by Corregidor with Brig. Gen. A. F. Christie on Panay, Brig. Gen. B. G. Chynoweth on Cebu, and Brig. Gen. C. O. Fort and Maj. Gen. W. F. Sharp on Mindanao until the surrender. These forces surrendered on and after 9 May 1942 in various degrees of completeness. More often than not, the Filipino rank and file were permitted to leave and only the American personnel and senior Filipino officers were taken and held prisoner. The Filipinos and a number of Americans who took to the hills, with weapons and equipment, were later to play an important role in the development of intelligence coverage of the Philippines.

The surrender on Corregidor cut off all communication with the Philippines except for a radio station operated by Lt. Col. Guillermo Nakar, PA, who was leading an unsundered group of Filipinos and Americans in the province of Nueva Ecija. The last message received from Nakar was dated 22 August 1942. He was captured in early September 1942 and was executed in Fort Santiago. This cut off all radio contact between American forces and the Philippines, for the time being.

The first direct personal information from the Philippines was brought by Capt. William L. Osborne and Capt. Damon J. Gause, who escaped from Corregidor after surrender and came to Australia by way of Palawan, North Borneo, Tawi Tawi, and Makassar Strait and arrived off northern Australia 11 October 1942.(9)

More significant information was obtained at a later conference interrogation in Brisbane 20 December 1942 with Capt. (then Lt.) Frank H. Young and Mr. Albert Klestadt. Capt. Young,

(9) They were interrogated in a conference of G-2 officers, 16 October 1942. They brought initial information on guerrillas then forming in western Batangas, Brooke's Point (Palawan), and Tawi Tawi.

as special messenger, brought the first information of guerrilla groups existing in central Luzon. He came from Col. Claude Thorp in Pampanga. Remnant personnel from this group later became important in intelligence procurement in the central Luzon area.(10) Young left Colonel Thorp in July 1942 and traveled via the Bicol, Samar, Leyte, Cebu, and Negros to Panay. There he joined Albert Klestadt, a German civilian, and came to Australia via Zamboanga, arriving in Darwin 12 December 1942. They brought important and lucid information of the enemy and guerrilla activity in the areas through which they had passed.

While the total information on the Philippines accumulated to this time was not immediately impressive, the interrogation of these few escapees revealed the existence of guerrilla organizations throughout the Islands. Leading personalities had not yet been clearly identified. However, several radio contacts were being established with the Philippine guerrillas at this time(11), and it was already clear that loyal organizations were forming everywhere and that in many places friendly persons could be contacted. The chief problem then confronting intelligence penetration was the lack of knowledge of the Japanese police and counterespionage methods, coverage, and the extent of their subversion of Filipinos. This dictated caution. However, these initial fragments of information gave a decisive impulse to the immediate planning for intelligence penetration in the Philippines. The groundwork was started in earnest.

(10) See Vol I, General Intelligence Series, "Guerrilla Resistance Movement in the Philippines," Chap. III, pages 9, 10, 16.
(11) Station KFS (San Francisco), in November/December 1942, intercepted radio calls from Maj Praeger, a guerrilla commander in northern Luzon, operating station WYY. Col Evans, formerly G-2 Philippine Department (see footnote 3), was instrumental in developing a secure cryptographic system with Praeger. First message on file: 4 Nov 42. The presence of Evans in Washington was fortuitous, but his expert background was the calculated fruit of G-2 intelligence planning, on the pre-war Philippine Department staff.

Chapter II

THE MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SECTION, GHQ, SWPA

1. General:

The Military Intelligence Section of the Southwest Pacific Area had its official beginning with the formation of GHQ, SWPA, on 18 April 1942 in Melbourne, Australia. On that date General MacArthur published General Order No. 1 and created the command structure of component forces, Ground, Air and Navy, assigned to SWPA. General Order No. 2 designated MacArthur's General Staff, with Maj. Gen. (then Col.) Charles A. Willoughby as AC of S, G-2. (1)


A tentative G-2 organization was set up, using as a nucleus a small intelligence group which Col. Van S. Merle-Smith (2) had assembled at USAFIA (3) Headquarters before the arrival of MacArthur's staff from the Philippines. Structural changes were made, as need arose for the organization maintained elasticity which permitted adaptation to novel situations. (Plate 1) In general, the initial organization followed the pattern set in U.S. Army Staff Manuals and taught in our Service Schools; in fact, G-2 made strenuous efforts to maintain and defend basic staff principles, particularly the absolute centralization of intelligence and

(1) This officer had held the same staff position in USAFFE in the Philippines in 1941 and during the crucial operations on Luzon and Bataan, where he was decorated twice for gallantry in action, in the Japanese landing attacks at Aguloma Point, P.I., 24 and 25 Feb 1942. He served previously as G-4, Philippine Department, February 1940 to August 1941.

(2) A brilliant staff officer, previously U.S. Military Attache to Australia; he transferred to USAFIA and later became Executive and Deputy G-2, SWPA.

(3) U.S. Army Forces in Australia was originally constituted from reinforcements en route to the Philippines when the Japanese struck Pearl Harbor and rerouted, at sea, to Australia. It included the initial Air Force units to operate in the ABDA (American - British - Dutch - Australian) Area.

ORGANIZATION G-2, SWPA MELBOURNE - BRISBANE
MAY - SEPTEMBER, 1942



the operational control of all GHQ intelligence agencies.

The selection of Melbourne as the city in which to establish GHQ was influenced by the fact that it was the initial Headquarters of USAFIA, Lt. Gen. George H. Brett commanding, and thus offered a logical site for the new SWPA organization. The area soon proved to be too distant from the potential theater of operations: Northern Australia and New Guinea. Brisbane presented a more suitable location for GHQ activities, and a move of 1500 miles to that intermediate point was promptly made. The next forward displacement of GHQ was undertaken in November 1942 in another thousand-mile jump to Port Moresby, Papua, with G-2 operating an advance section for the duration of the critical Buna-Gona campaign. After about two months in this location, the small group rejoined rear echelon GHQ in Brisbane in mid-January 1943. In August 1943 a G-2 advance section was established, for the second time, at Port Moresby in connection with the current Lae, Salamaua, and Finschhafen campaigns. On completion of these operations, GHQ Advance Echelon returned briefly to Brisbane in November. Later a third and final advance section was established in Port Moresby, December 1943 - January 1944.

In August 1944, Advon GHQ displaced to Hollandia, with the usual proportion of the G-Sections. This was followed by a move to Tacloban (P.I.), to which advance units proceeded 20 October 1944, rear echelons joining toward the end of December. There GHQ remained until mid-April 1945, when it made its final shift to Manila where, in the following August, it was to conduct the important surrender negotiations with the Japanese Delegation.

A brief summary of the G-2 Section's war-time evolution is presented in an outline of functions of the many sub-divisions which progressively constituted the framework of G-2. Against


intermittent opposition, indifference, or lack of understanding of the intelligence process, the G-2 structure was developed and maintained in keeping with U.S. Army Service School teachings, which were considered sound and were proved adaptable to any situation. G-2 fought consistently for centralization of intelligence and control of all related intelligence or affiliated agencies through combined operational intelligence procedures. This position became doubly important as the characteristics of the vast Southwest Pacific Area required the early establishment of several Allied Agencies or Bureaux (4) to handle such functions as interrogation of prisoners of war, translation of captured documents, publication of geographical material, radio surveillance, Air and Navy liaison, counter-intelligence, espionage, and extensive clandestine operations behind the front lines and in enemy-held territories. These varied agencies were integrated into the general structure of theater intelligence, but all possessed an incurable trend toward independence. Except for the C in C, it became apparent, too, that many commanders and staffs had insufficient appreciation of the organization and techniques of intelligence in support of combat operations. It was obvious that intelligence coverage in the pre-war curricula of our Service Schools had failed to establish a general recognition and acceptance of the importance of intelligence activities in campaign.

2. G-2 Sub-Sections:

a. Executive Section

The Executive Section, though not then specifically named, began to function with the initial formation of GHQ, SWPA,

(4) Allied Intelligence Bureau (AIB); Allied Translator and Interpreter Section (ATIS); Allied Geographical Section (AGS). These subdivisions are more fully covered in Chapter III and in the basic monograph series.



BRIG GEN C. A. WILLOUGHBY, TACLOBAN, P. I., 1945

General Headquarters, SWPA, Adv. Echelon, was a field-type headquarters with meager accommodations. Field offices consisted of portable Australian huts, standardized field types, with corrugated tin roofs, local material for walls and partitions (asbestos sheets, nipa, press-board, sawali), portable tables, field-type miscellaneous equipment. It was only in Brisbane, Manila and Tokyo that modern, city-type offices and billets were available.



G-2, TACLOBAN, P. I., 1945

L to R: M/Sgt Benedetti, Lt Woolyhan, Col Lambert, Lt Alley, Col Bask, Maj Spiegel, Gen Willoughby, Maj McGaughey, Maj McCampbell, Lt Col Dunkin, Maj Barker, Col Burns, WO Venn, Pfc Burich.

and was designed to coordinate the several sub-sections of G-2 in matters involving operational intelligence as contrasted with those purely administrative in character, such as problems of organization, personnel, and inter-staff relations.

Colonel Merle-Smith (5) functioned as Deputy G-2 and Section Chief from the time GHQ, SWPA was organized in Melbourne until his untimely death in 1943. Over this entire period, his small group continuously handled a work load heavily disproportionate to its size. When the advance echelon of GHQ moved forward, a small portion of the Executive group was split off and incorporated in the forward element.

b. Administrative Section

This Section was charged primarily with matters relating to personnel and general administration. These called for the maintenance of a comprehensive filing system, chronological message records, and the usual mechanisms of office management. Control of confidential intelligence funds also fell within the purview of this Section a responsibility which broadened as theater operations (support of guerrilla movements) expanded. Each forward movement of GHQ called for a considerable amount of planning and internal adjustment to balance personnel in forward and rear echelons. All forward moves, to Brisbane, Port Moresby, Hollandia, Leyte, Luzon and finally Tokyo, were executed without friction.

c. Operations Section

When GHQ opened in Melbourne, a small organization which was to be the forerunner of the Operations Section was set

(5) This officer had broad intelligence background as former U.S. Military Attache in Australia. An important corporation lawyer in civil life, the great executive ability of this brilliant officer contributed heavily to the G-2 Section. He was particularly effective in the development and coordination of all inter-Allied organizations and the initial penetration into the Philippines.



G-2 EXECUTIVE INTELLIGENCE GROUP, TACLOBAN, P. I., 1944

L to R: Maj McCampbell, Capt Jensen, Cpl Sanford, Maj Robbins. This group kept up-to-the-minute reports and maps of the enemy situation and helped in the preparation of the Daily Communique.



G-2 ADMINISTRATION GROUP, TACLOBAN, P. I., 1944

L to R: TSgt Monzeglio, Pfc Burch, T4 Glubka, WO Venn, Col Burns. Readiness for any emergency is shown by the carbines hanging close by.

up with Lt. Col. J. P. Craig as Chief. The formal establishment of the Operations Section as such took place in December 1942. By that time it had undergone considerable expansion, embodying Ground, Air, and Navy sub-Sections, with branch officers, trained to handle intelligence in their specialties, assigned to each. This grouping, though on a modest scale, is the essence of a combined intelligence center.

The Operations Section prepared and published periodical Intelligence Summaries, developed and posted situation maps, carded and indexed all operational material, maintained initial control of Special Intelligence (Radio) and of the Battle Order Section, consulted with and advised other GHQ staff sections on the current situation, and participated in a joint G-2/G-3 daily situation review.

The Section's outstanding contribution was maintenance of the "Daily Summary," which had begun on 7 December 1941, in Manila, P.I., as a daily continuous intelligence publication. It contained (One) summaries of enemy intelligence from ground, air and naval reports, and operational radios; (Two) a section outlining the G-2 estimate of the enemy situation; and (Three) a final section of miscellaneous information. Illustrated with maps and charts and subdivided according to operational areas, the "Daily Summaries" provided intelligence information of such value to Army, Corps, and Division Staffs, that they played an important part in the conduct of operations, a fact freely recognized by the recipients.

As an example, the itinerary and progress of the Japanese 18th Army in New Guinea, following the Allied occupation of Hollandia and Aitape, was completely developed in fragmentary intelligence reports appearing in the "Daily Summary" during the two



G-2 OPERATIONS, AIR, TACLOBAN, P. I., 1944

Col Lambert, Capt Bacus, T/R Murphy, T/4 Fletcher included. Waterbag hanging from rafters made drinking a community affair.



G-2 OPERATIONS, NAVY, TACLOBAN, P. I., 1944

Lt Alley, T/Sgt Lee included.

months prior to the actual Japanese attack. The original estimate of the enemy situation, published during April 1944, had forecast a counterattack against Aitape as an enemy capability.(6)

The usefulness of the "Daily Summary," not only in cases such as the above, but also in day to day operations, soon developed an urgent demand from other staff sections which necessitated a special Publications Group to fill increasing requests. Circulation grew constantly until nearly 200 copies were being produced daily for dissemination to major staff and troop units, from armies to divisions and equivalent air and navy commands. The editorial structure of the "Daily" was so sound that it continued under all operative situations, including the current Occupation of Japan. As of 15 October 1947 the serial number of its Tokyo edition was No. 1930.

d. Order of Battle Section

This Section, organized in August 1942, was responsible for the preparation of detailed Japanese order of battle lists and pertinent information on the command structure, combat organization, unit location, strength and armament of enemy forces. Its original source material consisted of a mere trickle of information flowing from operations on Luzon and Bataan and later from the battlefields of New Guinea. Through the brilliant work of ATIS, a tremendous volume of information was subsequently developed from the minute examination, screening and translation of thousands of captured enemy documents, diaries, reports, etc. Working in conjunction with the Australian Staffs, the Section early built up extensive indices of Japanese code names, numbers and histories of officers and units. At that time, available information from the War De-

(6) See Example 2, Intelligence on Japanese Attack Against Aitape, p 22.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SECTION, GENERAL STAFF

I-III: DAILY SUMMARY OF ENEMY INTELLIGENCE
IV: G-2 ESTIMATE OF THE ENEMY SITUATION
V: MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATION

No.
855

DATE
24/25 Jul 1944

I GROUND:

1. Manokwari: 23 Jul: Stores obsvd Amberiawar beach (a/c). 24 Jul: Light MT activ Saowi-Manokwari (a/c).
2. Noemfoor: 23 Jul: 10 Japs moving N on trail 2,000 yds SE Bawe; 2 enemy capt'd near Inasi, 3 capt'd at Swaporbekpef. 24 Jul: 4 Japs killed 1,000 yds S Inasi.
3. Biak: 23 Jul: 7 enemy killed 4½ mi N Parai; total enemy cas for day 33 killed, 50 found dead. 23/24 Jul: Nil enemy activ rpt'd.
4. Maffin Bay-Sarmi: 23 Jul: Jap MG fire rcvd 1-¾ mi S Woske R mouth; light enemy sm arms fire fr vicin 1,000 yds SSW Woske R mouth; est 2 enemy squads attacked perimeter (1,000 yds S Woske R mouth), repulsed; scattered contacts, Maffin a/d & 500 yds S.
5. Aitape: 21 Jul: 7 Japs (patrol) detected Tadj area. 23 Jul: Cavalry unit regained Afua; 2 company bivouac, recently used, found 2,600 yds SSE Driniumor R mouth; 15-20 dug-in Japs contacted W Yakumul; sm groups enemy S Afua, 1 mi N Afua, between Hill 56 & Driniumor R. 23/24 Jul: Night, Minor enemy activ. 24 Jul: 2 Japs 2½ mi SW Raihu R mouth; enemy MG fire fr E Driniumor R, 2½ mi S Chakila, silenced; sev patrol contacts vicin Afua.
6. Wewak-Aitape: 23 Jul: Ammo dump, stores, 1 MT dest, 7 MTs dam, Boiken-Boram (a/c). 24 Jul: Signs troops marching W near Niap, MTs Brandi Pltn dam (a/c); personnel supplies E Anumb R mouth (a/c).

II AIR:

1. Wewak-Aitape: 23/24 Jul: Mod, inacc MG fire only rpt'd opposn to 57 Allied a/c raiding area & sm shipping 23 Jul; nil rpt'd opposn to 52 Allied planes 24 Jul.
 2. Geelvink Bay: 23 Jul: Nil rpt'd opposn to B-24 & P-39 raid on Moemi & shore posns.
 3. Manokwari: During attack on barges in vicin, 1 P-40 dest by A/A fr Manokwari; pilot rescued; 0830K.
 - *4. Halmahera: 21 Jul: 8 Fs obsvd aloft near Lolobata, crs NE, by P-38s; 1053K.
 5. Morotai: 22 Jul: Prob result ship A/A, 1 B-25 crashed (nil survivors) during attack; 1120K.
 - *6. Kavieng Area: a) Photos: Kavieng & Panapai r'ways serv. b) Night, 22/23 Jul: Mixed A/A encountered by 2 B-25s.
 - *7. Rabaul: Photos: Lakunai, Tobera & Vunakanau r'ways serv.
 8. Guam: 23 Jul: Nil rpt'd air activ against our land advance.
 9. Tinian: 23 Jul: Nil rpt'd air opposn to Allied landing.
 10. Pagan: 22 Jul: Intense A/A dam 2 P-47s.
 11. Woleai: 23 Jul: Mixed A/A to 3 recce B-24s bombing r'way; 1058K.
 - *12. Truk: 22 Jul: 2 Fs aloft but did not attempt interception of Cenpac B-24s; only slight A/A encountered; daytime.
- COMMENT: (4) Shipping vicin Halmahera continue to receive no air support. (6-7) No change. (12) Note declining defense, both air and grd fire.

partment was meager; only the Chinese were then in close contact with the Japanese Armies in the field and their information eventually proved to be spotty. Intelligence procured on Bataan, 1941/42, however, gave early and important clues to the enemy's field organization, order of battle, code names of divisional units, and the like.

In May 1943 the Section had a windfall in the capture of the official Japanese "Register of Army Officers," dated 15 October 1942. This War Ministry publication, in three volumes of 900 pages each, listed all officers and their assignments by date and unit, and presented for the first time a complete picture of the Japanese Armies in the field. The translation, in record time, of 2700-odd pages of complicated Japanese text by ATIS, was notable tour de force. Printed in Australia within a few weeks of its capture, it appeared as ATIS Publication No. 2(7) and was immediately distributed to all Allied intelligence staffs from Ceylon to Alaska. It was an invaluable document and formed the original basis for all subsequent battle order studies in the Pacific, by all Allied components, Ground, Air and Navy.

On the basis of this authentic material, the Order of Battle Section commenced an encyclopedic card index of Japanese Army Officer personnel and units. The Section immediately issued fragmentary battle order lists; this series culminated in the monumental "Organization of the Japanese Ground Forces,"(8) the most complete presentation of the subject at the time.

This type of intelligence activity made an indelible impression on the Japanese commanders who faced the U.S. Army in

(7) "Alphabetical List of Japanese Army Officers," May 1943. Short "Amendment Lists" were published by ATIS in August 1943 and October 1944.

(8) A document of 353 pages, published 22 December 1944. Copy in files of G-2 Library, GHQ, FEC.

combat. "I was surprised at the completeness and effectiveness of the American intelligence system and the accuracy of their reports," said Lt. Col. Shinohara, Masaru, Senior Intelligence Officer, Japanese Eighth Area Army. "At the end of the war, I was amazed to find that American Intelligence possessed the name, rank, and unit of almost every Japanese Officer in New Guinea."(9)

Meanwhile the Section had set up files on the characteristics of Japanese arms and equipment and logistics tables on Japanese field forces. Other projects involved the compilation of miscellaneous data on enemy ration requirements, morale, casualty and disease rates. As a result, a well-rounded overall picture of the effective state of the Japanese forces began to take shape. This information proved to be of constantly increasing value in operations and was liberally shared with associated theaters and services, Air and Navy.


e. Plans and Estimates Section

Prior to its official activation, a Plans and Estimates Section had, in effect, existed for some time. Estimates of the enemy situation had been developed by designated Ground, Air, and Navy specialists in the Operations Section. Their several contributions were subsequently assembled, evaluated, and published as single documents.


The Chief of Plans and Estimates Section, in addition to his usual duties, was to steer G-2 Estimates into the correct G-3 channels and to participate in G-3 planning. This ideal relationship, unfortunately, did not always prevail. G-3 had a tendency to "blanket" associated staff sections.

The Section produced formal "Estimates of the Situation," G-2 Annexes to "Operations Instructions," a "Monthly

(9) Interrogation Files, G-2 Historical Section, GHQ, FEC.



G-2 PUBLICATIONS GROUP, TACLOBAN, P. I., 1944
T/Sgt Curtis, Pfc Theobald, and Cpl Morris see to it that even if the electricity fails or the ink thins from the heat the Daily Summary goes to press.



G-2 OPERATIONS, GROUND, TACLOBAN, P. I., 1944
Col Dunkin, Capt Spiegel, Lt Woollyhan, T/3 Wohlheiter, T/4 Jagerson included. Kerosene lamp was standard equipment under conditions where there was no guarantee of constant electric power.

Summary of Enemy Dispositions," and a series of "Terrain Estimates." It also edited the releases of the "Special Intelligence Bulletin," a compilation of radio intelligence obtained through monitoring, intercepting, and decoding enemy communications.(10)

The Section accompanied GHQ in its move to Hollandia. There it worked at top speed to prepare its Leyte, Mindoro, and Lingayen Estimates and Annexes, and other important operational intelligence studies, viz.: "Trends in the Reinforcement of Luzon," and "The Japanese Defensive Organization of Luzon." Other special studies included "Enemy Naval Capabilities," "Enemy Activities: Halmahera - Morotai," "Enemy Strength: Palawan," and "Enemy Strength: Zamboanga-Sulu."

In view of continued American successes in the Philippines, secondary projects were abandoned by this Section and ground-work for planning the invasion of Japan was laid in the estimates of the proposed invasions of Kyushu(11) and Honshu.(12) The Section had now reached its peak of efficiency, only to pass into a "standby" state practically overnight when, in mid-August, the enemy indicated his willingness to surrender.

The Plans and Estimates Section, through its publications, predicted with uniform accuracy the size, composition, and location of the opposing Japanese forces and proved the importance of the role played by G-2 in the promotion of successful combat operations. Invariably positive knowledge of the enemy's strength

(10) War-time samples of these publications are contained in the Documentary Appendices to Vol III, Gen Intell Series, "Operations of the Military Intelligence Section, GHQ, SWPA," and Vol II, General Intelligence Series, "Intelligence Activities in the Philippines during the Japanese Occupation."

(11) GHQ, AFPAC, Staff Study "Olympic": Operations in Southern Kyushu, Annex 2a, G-2 Estimate of the Enemy Situation, 25 April 45.

(12) GHQ, AFPAC, Staff Study "Coronet": Operations in the Kanto Plain of Honshu, Annex 2a, G-2 Estimate of the Enemy Situation, 31 May 45.

and disposition was one of the factors which enabled General MacArthur, with initially weaker resources, to neutralize and by-pass strong Japanese forces, to save American lives, and to carry out his three-dimensional warfare at maximum efficiency. G-2 not only carried on positive intelligence successfully but was able to keep the Japanese behind an effective counter-intelligence screen. To obtain a clearer understanding of this vital service, the following examples are cited:

Example 1

Intelligence in the Admiralty Islands (Manus) Operations:

The "Alamo Force," under General Walter Kreuger, was assigned the seizure of the Admiralty Islands. Seeadler Harbor was named as the invasion objective and the target date was set for 1 April 1944.

During February, the decisive Allied successes in New Guinea and the Bismarcks caused a progressive deterioration in Japanese naval and air potential in those areas. G-2 estimates that enemy air power in the Bismarcks had dropped over 200 planes in a single week. In New Guinea, Allied raids on Wewak were meeting reduced opposition, and air strength there was estimated at about 200 serviceable planes. A G-2 Bulletin of 23 February noted that a SOUPAC destroyer team swept the waters off the Admiralties without interception by either naval or aircraft. From prisoners of war G-2 had ascertained that aircraft personnel were being moved out of the Bismarck area.

All general information pointed to the conclusion that in the entire Admiralties region there was little to fear from the enemy's sea and air arms. On the question of enemy ground dispositions, however, intelligence reports differed sharply. Several air observation flights over Manus and Los Negros at the end of February,

reported a total lack of activity. Momote airfield was reported to be entirely unused.(13) Tree-top reconnaissance had disclosed that bomb craters in the runways were still unfilled. Surrounding buildings and installations were reported unattended and in bad disrepair. It was inferred that the islands had been evacuated altogether. G-2 flatly contradicted this assumption: "Cumulative intelligence does not support air observer reports that the islands have been evacuated."(14)

With information derived from interception and ground intelligence, tabulated over a long period of time(Plate 7), G-2 stubbornly insisted that the area was strongly defended and predicted heavy fighting for the air strip, viz.:

COIC Sitrep, 24 Feb 44:

Air Attack 23 Feb, on Salami Plantation. Aircraft flew low but nil A/A fire encountered. Nil signs of enemy activity. The island appears deserted.(15)

COIC Sitrep, 26 Feb 44:

Observations: The wrecked aircraft and trucks are untouched and bomb craters still unfilled. Villages on Los Negros Islands appeared deserted and roads have not been used lately. Damage in Lorengau town has not been repaired. No activity of any kind observed.(16)

G-2 Daily Intell Summary, 19/20 Feb 44:

Manus: Lorengau unserviceable. Momote serviceable; enemy installations on Pahi Island.(17)

G-2 Daily Intell Summary, 24/25 Feb 44:

A situation similar to Madang is encountered here in that no enemy activity is apparent. This is regarded as a case of passive anti-aircraft defense necessitated by dwindling reserve ammunition. Our intelligence indicates that the enemy plans to defend the Admiralties with the forces at present located there. The revised estimate of enemy strength in this Sector is now four thousand.(18)

(13) "The Admiralties" (Operations of the 1st Cav. Div.), Hist. Div., U.S. War Dept., p. 17; "Daily Summary of Enemy Intelligence and G-2 Estimate of the Enemy Situation" (hereinafter cited as "G-2 Daily Intell Summary") No. 703, 23/24 Feb 44, p. 1.


(14) "G-2 Daily Intell Summary," No. 706, 26/27 Feb 44, p. 4

(15) "COIC Sitrep," No. 55/44, 24 Feb 44, Advon 5-4023 (c).


(16) Ibid., No. 57/44, 26 Feb 44, Advon 5-4408/2 (b) (ii).

(17) "G-2 Daily Intell Summary," No. 699, 19/20 Feb 44, p. 2

(18) Ibid., No. 704, 24/25 Feb 44, p. 4.








- U/I (200)
- 51 (800)
- 51 (50)
- 101 PNR (100)
- 17 (1000)
- 1 IMR (600)
- 38 (300)
- OITA S. SEA (1000)
- HEAVY A/A GUN
- MEDIUM A/A GUN
- LIGHT A/A GUN
- SUPPLIES
- BUNKERS, ETC.
- M G
- BARGE-LANDING POINT
- RADIO

MANUS-LOS NEGROS IS.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
 Military Intelligence Section
 General Staff
 ENEMY INSTALLATIONS
 29 FEBRUARY 1944



G-2 Daily Intell Summary, 26/27 Feb 44:

From a practical point of view the Admiralty Islands are blockaded except for submarine traffic. The garrison is in a state of siege. Possibly A/A guns heretofore active have been damaged, and cannot be repaired because there are no spare parts. Perhaps, ammunition for these guns have been exhausted, or the remaining is being withheld for the final defense of the islands. Aerial observers report a complete lack of activity in the Admiralties. Summary 704: It will be recalled that prior to the Allied landing at Cape Gloucester a similar situation was reported, but resistance was encountered to the landing and to the subsequent offensive moves.

In view of the deteriorated state of the logistical situation in the Bismarcks, it is believed that the enemy will 'hold his fire' until the final defense of the Admiralties is imminent.(19)

G-2 Daily Intell Summary, 27/28 Feb 44:

From past experience, the enemy has found that static installations are in a sense out-moded wherever we have superiority in the air and on the sea. We always seize the beachhead. It may be that the Garrison Force C.O. has decided to withhold his men and ammunition under cover in reserve, awaiting a propitious moment to counterattack; hence the seeming lack of activity.

Obviously enemy capabilities remain (1) defend with forces present, (2) evacuation. The first appears to be the more probable line of action considering the precedent set in other campaigns, as well as the current acute shortage of water transportation.(20)

G-2 Daily Intell Summary, 28/29 Feb 44:

Late reports state that Allied forces had captured Momote air strip and dispersal areas; opposition continues at the harbor entrance, probably Hyane Harbor. That the enemy forces are scattered is suggested by air observer reports of the 28th that A/A fire was encountered at Lorengau and Papitalai Mission.

Enemy capabilities are: (1) Surreptitious withdrawal via small craft; (2) typical desperate counterattack, probably at night.(21)

Headquarters took cognizance of the views of G-2; it was decided to probe the islands in a "reconnaissance in force;" the balance of the 1st Cavalry Division was kept in a position of readiness at Finschhafen, while on 29 February, a reinforced squadron of the Division consisting of about 1,000 troops, landed

(19) Ibid., No. 706, 26/27 Feb 44, p. 5.

(20) Ibid., No. 707, 27/28 Feb 44, p. 5.

(21) Ibid., No. 708, 28/29 Feb 44, p. 3.

in a heavy rain on Los Negros, to the east of the main island group. Their immediate objective was the Momote airstrip. General MacArthur personally accompanied this diminutive force to make a first hand appraisal of the situation. It may be observed that he took a grave personal risk.

G-2 estimates were entirely confirmed: initially surprised by the morning landing of the 1st Cav, the enemy put up a weak local opposition, but he rallied quickly: That very night, Japanese troops attacked with suicidal fury. Note the order dated 29 February, of Colonel Ezaki, the Japanese commander, to the battalion defending Hyane Harbor:

Tonight the battalion under Captain Baba will annihilate enemy who have landed. This is not a delaying action. Be resolute to sacrifice your life for the Emperor and commit suicide in case capture is imminent. We must carry out our mission with the present strength and annihilate the enemy on the spot...(22)

The initial perimeter defense established by the American landing force was thinly stretched; hospital personnel, mechanics, cooks, and kitchen crews had to be thrown in to fill dangerous gaps in the line. One Japanese unit broke through to within 15 feet of General W.C. Chase's Headquarters before it was stopped.(23)

Strong attacks continued until American reinforcements reached the beaches on 2 March. The continuous resistance of the Japanese called for additional troops. On 4 March, the 2nd Sqn of the 7th Cav. was brought ashore. On 6 March the 12th Cav. arrived. The Allies then gained control of the situation and Momote airstrip, their first objective, was ready for Allied use a week after the landing.

When the last pockets of resistance had been wiped out on 13

(22) "The Admiralties" (Operations of the 1st Cav. Div.), Hist Div., U.S. War Dept., p. 33.

(23) Ibid., p. 34.

May, the accuracy of G-2 initial forecasts on enemy ground strength was clearly substantiated, despite negative air reconnaissance, in the following:

....Air reconnaissance had indicated that not only the air strip was unused at this time but that there had been no noticeable activity on Los Negros Island for the preceding two weeks. According to information gathered before Feb 27, from some 40 natives(24) who had come at various times from the islands, about 2,450 Japanese were present in the Momote-Salami plantation area; for reserves 750 in the Papitalai Lombrun region could be counted on and possibly 1,100 more on Manus Island, in the vicinity of Lorengau.(25)
(After the battle)

Although the official count of their dead did not include those removed by the enemy for burial, the total was 3,280 Japanese killed and 75 captured, which almost equalled the original G-2 estimates of the Garrison's size..., viz.:(26)

<u>Admiralty Islands</u>		<u>Combat</u>	<u>Base</u>	<u>Service</u>	<u>Total</u>
El 17th Div	1/44	1000			1000
1 Bn 1st Ind Mixed Regt	1/44	600?			600
El 38th Div	1/44	300			300
Oita S. Sea Det	1/44	300?			300
U/i AA	?		200		200
51st Tpt	4/43			600	800
El 51st Div Pd Hosp	1/44			50	50
Aggregate		2200	200	850	3250

Example 2

Intelligence on Japanese Attack Against Aitape

The Allied Occupation of Hollandia and Aitape in May 1944 left a large Japanese force isolated in the Wewak area. With the capture of Madang and Alexishafen in June, the enemy realized he was being trapped in a narrowing ring. Horned in on all sides, cut off

(24) Procured by joint operations of AIB (Allied Intell Bureau. See Vol IV, Gen Intell Series) field agents and the so-called "Alamo Scouts", a Sixth Army special unit, trained in jungle warfare, composed of young men of spirit and resourcefulness, to operate thru and behind the enemy-lines in the immediate combat area. AIB had operators in the New Guinea area, in the Ramu Valley, along the Madang and Raii Coast for several months past.

(25) "The Admiralties" (Operations of the 1st Cav. Div.), Hist. Div., U.S. War Dept., pp. 17, 148.

(26) "G-2 Daily Intell Summary," No. 695, 15/16 Feb 44, Appendix. p. ii.

from direct relief and supply, Lt. Gen. Hatazo Adachi, Commander of the 18th Army, issued an order for a break-through attack against the Allied positions at Aitape.

On 11 July the Japanese struck in force. It was a hopeless effort, conceived in despair, born of frustration, and ending in almost complete annihilation.


The slow and painful development of General Adachi's counter-offensive against Aitape, beginning with the westward displacement of the enemy behind the Sepik River and culminating in the assault of 10/11 July, had been continually observed and reported by G-2. Cumulative intelligence from native sources, aerial reconnaissance, prisoner of war interrogations, radio analysis, perusal of captured documents, and information from ground and PT boat patrols built up in advance such an unmistakable picture of progressive enemy intentions that Allied forces were able to take complete counter-measures weeks in advance of the actual attack.

In the period June 15 to July 3, special studies(27) were made available to staffs and troops concerned, fixing the date of attack and a forecast of dispositions, strength and identity of enemy units involved. The general conclusions were that an attack was planned, that the deployment of at least two divisions with the 13th Garrison was contemplated. Known supply difficulties and shortages would affect adversely the fighting capacity of these troops.

The attack was slated for the first part of July, probably between 5 July and 10 July; the formation was two regiments abreast, the third regiment in rear and advance elements of the 41st Division, available in the forward areas, (Plates 8 & 8A) The attack was expected in two phases:

- a) The seizure of the Driniumor River Line; (the enemy appeared to have overestimated this line).

(27) Dates of reports were: June 16 (G-3); SIB 413 June 23, par. 2 & 3; SIB 414 June 24, par. 1; SIB 417 June 27, par. 1; SIB 420 June 30, par. 1; TS-4 July 3.




PLAN OF AITAPE ATTACK
AS DISCUSSED IN SECTION V
OF SUMMARY NO. 843


ASSEMBLY
AREAS


ENCLOSURE NO. 2
YAKAMUL AREA


GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA
Military Intelligence Section
General Staff
PLAN OF ATTACK XVII ARMY CORPS
(COMPOSITE INFORMATION)
RECCO TO 18TH JUNE
P. O. W. TO 1ST JULY
MISCELL INTELL JUNE/JULY
FOR SUMMARY NO. 843

DEVELOPMENT









b) The main attack on Aitape.

The infantry strengths of the units involved (as of March-April) was as follows:

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Infantry</u>	<u>Over-all</u>
20th Div	6,000	11,500
41st Div	5,500	9,500
51st Div	2,000	5,000

Certain provisional service elements, converted into combat units, were added to the latter Division on a defensive mission.

The enemy maneuver began at dawn on 11 July, and followed substantially the course predicted by G-2. The Japanese attack, deployed in suicidal waves, was doomed from the start. Their jungle lines of communications were bombed and strafed, their few supply vessels were sunk. U.S. Artillery, in position and ranged-in beforehand, wiped out the enemy assembly areas. Prior to the attack, the three divisions of the 18th Army had numbered 20,000 - 30,000 troops; within six weeks, one-third of these had been killed or captured. The remainder, forced to flee into the jungle hills without supplies, eventually fell prey to starvation, disease, and exhaustion. Only a handful survived. General Adachi, Commander of the Aitape operation, said later: "The story of the 18th Army is tragic. We lost 10,000 men killed when we decided to attack the Allies at Aitape."

A conclusion from the "G-2 Daily Intelligence Summary" of 23/24 July 1944 accentuated the futility of Japanese attacks against our forces forewarned by alert intelligence:

...The enemy has made another attempt to breach the Driniumor River line, in a frontal assault, combined with an envelopment of the Afua flank, in greater strength. The main attack broke down under our artillery fire; footholds gained by the infiltration by isolated detachments are being liquidated in local counterattacks now in progress; the fighting near Afua is sharp.

In these successive assaults on narrow frontages in column of companies over a period of days, the pattern of the enemy effort is one of piece-meal attacks,

probing for soft-spots in the Driniumor area, and being destroyed in localized combats. In a conservative ratio of killed to wounded, the enemy may already have dissipated one-third of his available battalions. In his rear, every bivouac and supply point has been pounded by air bombardments and his carrier lines, absorbing the bulk of his service elements, have been strafed incessantly. PW's give a vivid picture of deterioration on the line of communications and the starvation level of his supplies; in the meantime, the relentless interdiction of Allied light surface craft has destroyed the bulk of his coastal barges and reduced his truck traffic. His vaunted attack is already abortive and will fail with dwindling numbers and resources.(28)

Example 3

Role of G-2 in the Hollandia Operations: A Deception Plan

General MacArthur had tentatively planned to strike at Hansa Bay - an advance of about 120 miles from Saidor - the farthest point reached by the Allied spearhead in New Guinea. After the capture of the Admiralties and the consequent improvement of the Allies' strategic position, he decided to shift his attack to Hollandia, 450 miles west of Saidor.

Occupation and development of Hollandia would not only pocket and neutralize some 50/60,000 enemy troops but also provide an ideal needed base from which to launch operations on Mindanao.

G-2 Intelligence reports for February and March showed that the Japanese were hurriedly strengthening their bases at Hansa Bay and Wewak. Intercept information on their planned defense positions indicated that an Allied attack was expected by them at either or both of these places.(Plate 9)

G-2 suggested that this "belief" should be encouraged in order to further draw enemy strength from the Hollandia area. On 7 March, G-2 submitted to G-3, a comprehensive deception plan to strengthen the enemy's belief and lure him into diverting his forces from the Hollandia-Aitape area. The interpretation of the Jap intercept

(28) "G-2 Daily Intell Summary," No. 854, 23/24 July 44, p. 3

led to the following recommendations:

1. Your attention is invited to the attached map and summary which set forth the probable plan for defense (Japanese) of the Madang-Wewak Sector of the Northern New Guinea Coast as indicated by top-secret intelligence.

2. Study of this plan suggests an attractive opportunity for the effective use of deception in connection with the Hollandia operation.

3. It will be noted that the enemy expects an Allied thrust against the Madang-Hansa Bay area, probably in the vicinity of Ulingan, and has disposed 3 divisions for mobile defense, in the hope of trapping and destroying our attacking forces. Pursuant thereto, he has created strongly organized defensive localities on both flanks of the assumedly threatened area - to the south with elements of his 41st Division and to the north with elements of his rebuilt 20th Division. Behind these strong localities he has presumably disposed strong mobile reserves of both divisions with which he plans to crush an Allied landing in the Ulingan area, which apparently, has been purposely left lightly held.

4. An application of sound tactical doctrine then points to measures designed to add to his apprehensions and strengthen his convictions as to the soundness of his estimate of our intentions and of his plans to meet them. The following are suggested:

a. Frequent aerial reconnaissance over the Madang-Hansa Bay area, including extensive photographic missions. Particular attention to the Madang-Alexishafen and Ulingan areas. This for the purpose of confirming enemy fears of our interest in the area and focusing his attention on the area south of the Sepik River. Possible results might even be to hasten movements of troops not yet arrived into this area, and reduced interest in areas contiguous to our objectives.

b. A strong Allied feint in the Ulingan area (see solid blue arrow on map) carried out a suitable time in advance of the Hollandia operation and in such show of strength as to influence the enemy to commence displacement of reserves to, or to points nearer to, the Ulingan area. Best results might be accomplished by accompanying this effort with some demonstration toward Madang, or just south thereof in the hope of further confusing the enemy, and influencing him to draw on the reserves of the 20th, possibly even of the 51st Division (Wewak area) rather than those of the 41st to the south. This latter division is estimated to be the best of the three (41st, 20th and 51st) and what is known of his plan points to early employment of the bulk of it against a landing at Ulingan, in that provision is made for the Nakai Det., 20th Division to hold the Madang area, should the 41st be employed to the north. Thus, from our viewpoint, best results would be obtained if the reserves of the 20th on the north flank, and possibly elements of the 51st could be put in motion southward. A raid between Hansa Bay and the mouth of the Sepik River (see broken, blue arrow on map) might further assist in draw-

ing a portion of the 51st away from our actual objective.

5. The Air Factor:

The enemy's defense and concentration plan clearly indicates that air reinforcements, based on Hollandia and western fields, are poised for intervention. Thus, a fake landing between Madang and Hansa Bay should have the effect of drawing enemy air forward. This convoy movement will be detected and if it be skillfully coordinated in time with our great western movement, the enemy reaction can be accurately gauged as follows:

- a. Designated air reinforcements will attempt to intercept the convoy.
- b. If they believe Madang is threatened they may stage forward into the Wewak area.
- c. They may be caught in attacking the convoy.

The execution of deceptive measures along the New Guinea Coast was ordered. The Air Force intensified its attacks on Madang and Wewak. Dummy parachutes were dropped in the Hansa Bay area. Increased and conspicuous reconnaissance flights were sent on ostensible mapping and photographic missions. The Navy was directed to make suitable demonstrations along the same lines. PT boats were ordered to stage isolated operations against coastal spots in the Hansa Bay region. Empty rubber landing boats, indicative of disembarked scouting and intelligence parties, were spotted along the Bay shore. AIB parties, then operating in the Ramu Valley, converged openly toward the coast and made certain that the natives would report them.

On 30 March 1944 the Allied Air Force began its concentrated attack on Japanese airfields in the area of projected operations. In four days over 450 enemy planes were shot down or destroyed, wrecking his air potential almost entirely. Feints made at Hansa Bay and Madang actually succeeded in drawing enemy strength from the Hollandia area. On 22 April, an amphibious invasion force, approaching by a circuitous route, made a landing at Hollandia and at Aitape 120 miles to the East. Until that convoy would pass Wewak, the enemy had no reason to suspect that the real Allied

To Accompany Plate 9

Japanese Defensive Plan - New Guinea (Intercept)

Since the receipt of the radio messages (intercept) from MOTOZAN dated 28 Feb and 29 Feb, various members of this staff (G-2) have endeavored to piece together the enemy plan, to meet an expected Allied landing along the coast between MADANG and WEWAK. The attached sketch shows diagrammatically the results of our investigations.

It is desired also to make the following comments:

The Japanese "HA" operations are believed to be his withdrawal from the RAI coast and the subsequent reorganization of his divisions.

The Japanese appear to anticipate that sometime after completion of operations in the ADMIRALTY ISLANDS, Allied forces will attempt to land between HANSA and MADANG, at URA (place code name - thought to be in the vicinity of ULINGAN). He does not overlook the possibility of an Allied landing at TONE River (code name? - thought to be SEPIK River).

In either case his formations will then be ready to close in on the Allied landing. The enemy looks upon his dispositions as an 'ambush'.

Areas of responsibility for each Div appear to be as shown on diagram (Code names are used for areas). This indicates that -

WEWAK area (EBI) is the responsibility of 51 Div.

HANSA BAY area (GETA) is the responsibility of 20 Div. (see notes below).

ULINGAN-MADANG (KUTSU) is the responsibility of 41 Div.

MADANG-BOGADJIM (KUTSU) is the responsibility of 20 Div.

NOTES: (a) NAKAI Detachment (20 Div Inf) part of which now faces Australian troops South of MADANG will continue to be responsible to hold that area. In addition, should 41 Div, be committed in the counterattack against an Allied landing near ULINGAN, the NAKAI Detachment will be responsible for holding KUTSU area (hence on sketch both 41 Div. and NAKAI Detachment of 20 Div. are shown to be responsible for KUTSU area).


(b) 20 Div. re-organized units (transport and reinforcements?) will be used as a mobile reserve, and meantime held at BUT.

It looks as though 20 Div. coastline area will be thinly held with auxiliary units assisting Infantry units not absorbed elsewhere.

(c) Jap proposed key positions are plotted.

(d) Jap reconnaissance covering inland routes between these key positions is believed to have carried out recently.(29)

(29) Memorandum to AC/S, G-3, CHQ, SEPA, MIS, GS:
7 Mar 44.



MADANG-TADJI

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SOUTH WEST PACIFIC AREA
Military Intelligence Section
General Staff

JAPANESE DEFENSIVE PLAN
29 FEBRUARY 1944

MILES

"HA" OPERATION—BELIEVED TO BE THE
WITHDRAWAL FROM RAI COAST TO HANSA
& REORGANIZATION

(GO ? RU ? URA ?
POSSIBLY CAPE GOURDON)

TONE R.(?)

GETA
20 DIV.
(ASA)

HIRAME
(IN THIS AREA)


DEPLOYMENT TO BE COMPLETED
BY MIDDLE OF MARCH

TAMOAN
POSSIBLY
DEMOAN R.

KUTSU
41 DIV.
(KAWA)

NAKAI
20 DIV. INF.

ECIATION



objective was further to the West. The invasion met with relatively little opposition. Within five days, the Allied force had captured the three enemy airfields. Within a month those same airfields were sending Allied bombers to Wakde Island, Biak, and Sansapor, on the road back to the Philippines.

The remarkable effectiveness of these measures was clearly proved by later evidence. As late as 21 April, one day before the Allied landings at Hollandia and Aitape and after the invasion fleet had been sighted steaming from the Admiralties, the enemy stated in his estimate of the Allied intentions:

The signs of an enemy plan to make a new landing in the New Guinea area . . . are clear. The probability of a landing between Madang and Hansa or on the Karkar Islands is estimated to be greatest.

According to the general situation a landing in the Wewak sector is next in probability. In the light of the recent bombings of Hansa, of reconnaissance and naval bombardment of Wewak, and the dropping of pamphlets by the enemy stating that they would land on Wewak on 24 April, precautions must be taken in the Wewak sector.

It is also possible that the enemy will land in the Hollandia sector . . . However, since there was no reconnaissance carried out in this region by submarines, destroyers or other means, and since air attacks were of a purely destructive nature, no signs of the usual prelanding operations are discernible. Furthermore, the enemy has no air base at present from which to neutralize our airdromes west of Sarmi. Therefore, the probability of a landing in this sector is thought to be minor . . . (30)

After the Hollandia operation and the consequent debacle resulting in flight, starvation, and slaughter of thousands of its troops, the Japanese High Command conceded certain points in an understatement so blatant as to be amusing:

It cannot be denied that our estimate of the enemy situation was too hastily concluded. . . Enemy tactics of deception and concealment of the actual landing points . . . were very effective. (31)

(30) Japanese First Demobilization Bureau (hereafter cited as "First Demob Bureau") Report, Southeastern area Operation Record Part III, "Operation of the 18th Army", Vol II, p. 39.

(31) Ibid., p. 40

The G-2 Summary of 21/22 April 1944 had estimated the Hollandia garrison strength at approximately 15,000 troops.(32) The actual number, including units of the Japanese 18th Army, 4th Air Army and Navy was 14,600.(33) Most of these were in the process of withdrawal when the landing took place, including the strong "South Sea Detachment," which was just previously moved to Wewak.(34)

For purposes of comparison, the G-2 Estimate and Enemy Garrison strength as revealed by enemy documents are set out below. It should be noted that G-2 generally considered "tactical combat units" only, without specific listing of "service elements," usually assessed from 40/75 percent:

<u>LOCALITY</u>	<u>G-2 EST.</u>	<u>SFRV ESTS.</u>	<u>ENEMY DOCS.</u>
Wewak.....	12,000	6,000	21,500
Madang.....	8,000	4,000	10,500
Iae-Salamaua.....	5,500	2,700	8,200
Gloucester.....	500	250	350
Gasmata.....	500	250	660
Arawe.....	200	100	1,000
Rabaul.....	30/60,000	30,000	101,167
Total.....	86,700	43,300	
Aggregate.....		130,000	143,017(35)

f. The Philippine Section

In 1942, when escapees from the Philippines were beginning to reach Australia, Colonel Merle-Smith, able G-2 Executive, had the foresight to arrange for thorough interrogations and interviews of all repatriates. He developed a Philippine Sub-Section, as a miniature G-2 concerned solely with Philippine intelligence, in contrast with the broad general interests and activities of its parent organization. In December 1942, the Sec-

(32) "G-2 Daily Intell Summary" No. 761, 21/22 April 44, p. ii.
 (33) First Demob Bureau, Southeastern area Operation Record Part III, "Operation of the 18th Army", Vol II, p. 48.
 (34) "G-2 Daily Intell Summary", No. 763, 26/27 April 44, p. 4.
 (35) From Soupac Estimates.

tion, with a few men on a part-time basis, began the publication of a "Monthly Combined (Philippines) Situation Report." Through out 1943 it built up an enormous backlog of carefully indexed material on Philippine affairs; these data began to attract increasing attention, and in February 1944 the Section was formally activated with a small but full-time staff. In April the impending invasion of the Philippines necessitated an increase in personnel to twenty-five. A "Who's Who" of Philippine personnel containing approximately 20,000 names was compiled and published. In addition to its "Monthly Combined Situation Report," the Section also issued daily and weekly summaries of Enemy Intelligence, a daily "Philippine Message Sheet," an "Intelligence Guide" for P.I. Guerrillas and clandestine intelligence parties, and seventeen P.I. Special Studies. Information of all sorts was processed and disseminated in great volume. Many AIB(36) and PFS(37) intelligence penetration parties were briefed and advice on policies prepared. This state of expanded production lasted until after the Leyte landing in October 1944. Thereafter the Section's activities steadily decreased, and by the time it moved to Leyte in November 1944, its strength had been halved. The downward trend continued; and when the Section opened in Manila in April 1945, its personnel was reduced to seven.

Early radio contact with the Philippines was limited to a few messages; only 22 were received in December 1942.

(36) Allied Intelligence Bureau, an organization developed by G-2 in Australia to operate behind the enemy lines from Sumatra to the Solomons and from New Guinea to the Philippines. It was ultimately divided into three geographical areas; Northeast Area (Australian), NEI (Netherlands East Indies) Area (Dutch, British) and the Philippines Area (American).

(37) Philippine Regional Section. Originally a sub-section of AIB (Phil Area) (1942/43), it expanded enormously and later became semi-autonomous (1944/45) under the able direction of Brig Gen Courtney Whitney, prominent lawyer and long-time resident of Manila, P.I. G-2 continued to evaluate and process the information collected by PFS.

However, the number began to increase through 1943 and 1944, reaching a peak of 3,700 at the time of the landings on Luzon in January 1945. The growth in volume is shown in the accompanying chart, "Monthly Total of Messages sent by Agents and Guerrilla Commanders." (Plate 10) Much valuable information would have been available had GHQ been able sooner to develop direct radio contact with Luzon.

The chart shows a breakdown of messages by sender and also indicates the steady increase in number of stations having direct contact with GHQ. No particular distinction is made between guerrilla commanders and AIB/FRS agents sent in by GHQ. Although they frequently maintained separate nets, both groups were mutually interdependent and closely associated, so that in some cases it is impossible to assign credit solely to one or the other.

The message totals do not include service messages, coastwatcher reports, air warnings, or weather messages, which were sent directly to the operating agencies most interested.

The earliest messages had only indirect intelligence value, but they revealed the widespread and spontaneous nature of the guerrilla movement and its great potentialities. Realizing this, GHQ began to guide guerrilla efforts, so that their reports became of increasing value.⁽³⁸⁾ General instruction laid stress on information of strategic character: enemy identifications; land, sea, and air movements; enemy activities, and dispositions; captured documents; etc.

One outstanding contribution of the Philippine Section was the comprehensive reference files to which additions were constantly made. Its monographs on the guerrilla resistance movement became standard; in 1948 they were still consulted by American and

(38) This was principally handled by FRS, at that time, while G-2 concentrated on the fighting fronts in New Guinea and on Japanese Order of Battle.

MONTHLY TOTALS of MESSAGES SENT AIB/PRS b

	1942							1943			
	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct
PRAEGER (Northern Luzon)	9	12	15	(a)			4	20	13	(c)	
PERALTA (Panay)	13	24	60	52	57	98	180	157	120	102	(f)
AUSEJO (Southern Negros)			3	5	(b)						
VILLAMOR-ANDREWS-BENEDICTO (S. Negros)			18	10	19	17	19	16	29	27	(g)
FERTIG (Mindanao)			16	51	30	36	31	30	50	185	50
HAMMER-YOUNG-SUAREZ (Tawi Tawi)							3	4	9	10	1
ABCEDE (Negros)									6	13	
PHILLIPS (Mindoro)											
INGENIERO (Bohol)											
SMITH (Samar)											
KANGLEON (Leyte)											
CUSHING (Cebu)											
ANDERSON (Central Luzon)											
BALL (Central Luzon)											
LAPHAM and TORRES (Central Luzon)											
ROWE (Mindoro)											
VOLCKMANN (Northern Luzon)											
CABAIS (Northern Palawan)											
CABANGBANG (Central Luzon)											
RAMSEY (Central Luzon)											
STAHL (Bondoc Peninsula)											
CORPUS-PLACIDO (Southern Palawan)											

- (a) PRAEGER off air due capture of radio
- (b) AUSEJO radio taken into VILLAMOR net
- (c) PRAEGER off air due capture of radio and personnel
- (d) PERALTA off air due enemy mountain campaign near headquarters
- (e) Ship sighting messages include in totals after this date
- (f) FERTIG's main radio bombed and destroyed
- (g) PERALTA back on air
- (h) PHILLIPS killed and party dispersed
- (i) INGENIERO off air due capture of radio
- (j) INGENIERO back on air with new radio from Leyte
- (k) Leyte landing: Oct. 1944
- (l) SMITH and KANGLEON turned radio net over to 6th Army
- (m) Aircraft sighting messages not included in totals after this date
- (n) Luzon landing: Jan 1945

MONTHLY TOTALS of MESSAGES SENT AIB/PRS by AGENTS and GUERRILLA COMMANDERS

	1942 Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	1943 Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep (e)	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	1944 Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct (k-n)	Nov	Dec	1945 Jan (n)	
	9	12	15	(a)			4	20	18	(c)																	
	13	24	60	52	57	98	180	157	145	102	(d)	15(g)	27	41	42	68	80	105	73	101	140	150	145	160	132	215	
			3	5	(b)																						
NEDICTO			18	10	19	17	19	16	20	27	40	29	25	10	8	19	10	10	10	12	12	17	20	30	32	20	
			16	51	30	36	31	30	50	185	53(f)	119	195	93	87	183	163	412	157	160	160	235	287	471	553	640	
Z (Tawi Tawi)							3	4	9	10	11	47	5	7	33	16	9	5	5	5	5	10	16	15	17	12	
									6	13	2	16	25	20	10	10	18	17	35	18	26	45	62	112	110	170	
												6	36	39	17	(h)											
														22	4	4	4	7	7	(i)	(j)	12	10	10	15	22	
														5	12	30	23	27	28	20	23	40	78	132	(l)		
																6	7	7	12	13	13	17	26	42	(l)		
																25	25	16	24	46	38	71	53	49	52		
																			20	37	32	20	45	68	68	130	
																					17	23	27	20	47	30	25
entral Luzon)																						17	22	10	10	17	
																						70	60	51	80	72	50
zon)																							45	130	125	260	350
																							14	12	25	21	26
on)																							32	50	77	205	856
																										60	
																				10	7	10	10	7	25	40	
n Palawan)																						7	12	6	7	5	15

apture of radio
to VILLAMOR net
apture of radio and personnel
nemy mountain campaign near headquarters
nclude in totals after this date
mbed and destroyed


rty dispersed
apture of radio
r with new radio from Leyte


44
N turned radio net over to 6th Army
s not included in totals after this date
45

Philippine authorities in the recognition of guerrilla units.

Intelligence coverage in the Philippines began when escapees from Bataan or USAFFE commenced sending messages from a few isolated stations. In November 1942 some of these were picked up by San Francisco and sent forward to Washington. GHQ in Australia was then informed of the situation and immediately began to develop the latent possibilities. Radio transmitters, ciphers, equipment, and technical personnel were smuggled into the Islands by PRS, in ever-increasing amounts. The factor of supply was naturally one of the most important considerations in the guerrilla enterprise. General Whitney, a top-flight executive, gave this his energetic attention. He was ably assisted by Lt. Comdr. Charles "Chick" Parsons, USNR, a member of the Manila/Luzon Stevedore Company, who handled supply-runs by submarine. A widespread guerrilla intelligence network developed. The extraordinary number of radio stations in existence just before the American landings on Leyte is shown in the accompanying map (Plate 11), "Philippine Communications, 15 December 1943." As initial invasion plans contemplated a landing in the south, coverage was especially heavy in Mindanao and the Visayas; but by reason of distance and lack of transport facilities, Luzon remained less developed. No extensive entry into the northern area was established until the spring of 1944; after that time, Luzon opened suddenly and completely. Some local intelligence nets were previously in operation and a radio station had been established as early as February 1942. Important Philippine personages were involved, including General Manuel Roxas (President of the Philippines following Sergio Osmena), Governor Alfredo Montelibano, Governor Tomas Confesor of Panay, and others.(39) Instructions were


(39) For complete details, see Vol II, Gen Intell Series, "Intelligence Activities in the Philippines during the Japanese Occupation."





SOUTHERN LUZON, VISAYAS
&
MINDANAO

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SOUTH WEST PACIFIC AREA
Military Intelligence Section
General Staff
PHILIPPINE COMMUNICATIONS
15 DECEMBER 1943



- STATIONS WITH GHQ CONTACT ARRANGED
- NET STATIONS; NO CONTACT WITH GHQ

- NOTES:
- 1 GHQ CONTACT STATION IS KAZ IN DARWIN
 - 2 NAMES AT SOLID CIRCLES ARE LOCAL COMMANDERS OR AGENTS WITH WHOM GHQ HAD DIRECT RADIO CONTACT

conveyed to the guerrillas via radio and by penetration parties; these parties also carried directives which called for specific information on various localities, for example, the feasibility of establishing an advanced B-29 base in western Mindanao. Eventually, a pocket-size "Philippines Intelligence Guide" (Plates 12 & 13) was compiled to acquaint agents with standard intelligence requirements. After its distribution in the Philippines, intelligence reporting and reliability improved greatly.

Files of messages received at GHQ were maintained by the Philippine Message Center in the Signal Office, by the G-2 Philippine Section, and by the Philippine Regional Section. G-2 Philippine Section processed its guerrilla messages thoroughly. As they were received, they were forwarded to the Commander in Chief with comments; the operational intelligence they contained was then periodically reviewed and printed in evaluated and condensed form in the following publications:(40)

Monthly Combined Situation Report (31 Dec 1942 - 15 Sep 1944) This was a secret resume of enemy and guerrilla intelligence. Sources included guerrilla radios and some ATIS documentary information. Data were generally old by the time of publication, because intelligence nets were initially served largely by runner. In due course, however, the summaries came to include more and more current information. Early issues were useful in tracing the development of the Philippine radio intelligence net up to and including March 1944. After that time they served as the basis for special intelligence coverage studies prepared in June and October 1944 and January and March 1945.

Weekly Summary of Enemy Intelligence (9/15 April 1944 -

(40) For war-time samples of these publications, see Doc. Appendices to Vol. I, II and III, Gen Intell Series.

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UNCLASSIFIED

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SOUTH WEST PACIFIC AREA

**PHILIPPINES
INTELLIGENCE GUIDE**

10 FEBRUARY 1944

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~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

Appendix 1.

ENEMY IDENTIFICATIONS

Information on the identification of Japanese Army units in occupied areas is desired. Below, in the order of its importance to the Enemy Identification Section of C.I.I.C., is set out the type of information desired. Comments below each section attempt to indicate the method and the relative ease with which it is believed the information can be obtained without arousing undue suspicion.

1. Actual Designation of the Units: Japanese Army Units, like other Armies are divided into numbered organizations, such as 5th Division, 21st Regiment, etc. If possible, obtain these designations or names. COMMENTS: In peacetime such information could be easily obtained, inasmuch as all ranks wore arctic numerals on their collar flaps, designating their regiments. Thus a member of the 21st Infantry Regiment has a brass "21" on his collar flap. It is possible that in rear areas this practice is still adhered to, although all troops so far observed have removed these collar ornaments. Nevertheless, it is believed that Japanese troops have the same falling as Allied troops, in not realizing the necessity of keeping the designation of their units secret. It is possible such information could be obtained during conversation by asking outright to what unit a particular Jap belongs.

2. Code Numbers and Names: Each Japanese Army unit (larger than a Battalion) has a code number. These numbers run from 1 to 10,000. The majority of numbers encountered in combat areas are of four digits (the numbers 1 to 1,000 are possibly assigned to various permanent garrison troops in Manchuria). The code numbers of organizations within a division would seem to be in blocks of twenty. These numbers follow in sequence beginning with "01" and ending with "99", for example, 8820-8839, or 4080-4099. Not enough identifications have been made to establish the above as a definite fact, but Divisional code numbers checked in SNRA seem to follow this rule. No set system for Independent Unit numbers has yet been noted.

The code name of a unit is not nearly so important as its number. The system of assigning code names is not fully known, but generally each Army and each Division has its code name, and subsidiary units take the code name of the ranking organization (for instance, the code name of the 17th Army is OKI and all units coming under the command of the 17th Army are known as OKI units, although previously they may have had other code names. Code numbers do NOT change. COMMENTS: It is believed that attempts to obtain this information from Japanese troops will arouse immediate suspicion. Code numbers and names of units receive a "most secret" classification in the Japanese Army and experience with prisoners has indicated that in a great many cases they actually do not know the code name or number of their unit. Officers, in all probability, do, and the same would apply to the old-time army men, but these men probably are more security minded than the newer recruits.

3. Names of Commanders: The next best way to obtain Order of Battle information is to obtain the FULL name and RANK of the unit commander. Japanese family names are not nearly so varied as in English. Therefore, it is necessary, if definite identifications are to be made, that the first,

- 1 -

CONFIDENTIAL

Philippines Intelligence Guide

Appendix 1

10/16 Sep 1944) This was originally an interim publication to bring recipients of the "Monthly Combined Situation Report" more frequent and detailed information than they received from that source. In June 1944, after the "Daily Philippine Message Sheet" was inaugurated to place enemy intelligence daily on the desks of interested parties, the "Weekly Summary" became for the most part a publication of selected and evaluated intelligence derived from special guerrilla messages.

Daily Summary of Enemy Intelligence (4 Aug 1944 - 31 Oct 1944) As the date for the Philippine operations approached, it became necessary to process daily the volume of intelligence received, to evaluate it rapidly, and to publish it in relatively unfinished form. The "Daily Summary" after September replaced the "Weekly," which was suspended entirely when operations in the Philippines gathered momentum. In the meantime Philippine enemy intelligence was taken over by G-2 Operations.

Daily Philippine Message Sheet (8 June 1944 - 10 April 1945) This publication was an edited and mimeographed selection of messages incoming daily from guerrillas. It saw use mainly in GHQ, as offering the best possible medium for disseminating to the various interested staff sections the wide variety of information then being received. As Sixth Army operations developed, however, areas covered by the "Message Sheet" decreased, and Eighth Army finally took over the remains of the Visayas-Mindanao net in March 1945. The "Message Sheet" had been most helpful to the Air Force in guerrilla liaison work and in the recovery of rescued airmen. It had more than served its purpose when it ceased publication in April 1945.

Other publications utilizing guerrilla intelligence reports included "Combined Situation Maps," reports on the "Organ-

ization of the Bureau of Constabulary," a monograph on "Friendly Airfield," and friendly areas in the Philippine Islands, and numerous special studies for planning and orientation purposes.

Guerrilla intelligence reports were of value because of their richness and variety; coverage was widespread throughout the Islands; contacts ranged all the way up the economic scale, from dock laborers unloading Japanese ships and mechanics working at Japanese airfields, to General Roxas, who had numerous pipelines to the highest Japanese councils and the Philippine Puppet Regime in Manila. Because of the overlapping coverage of the various guerrilla nets and the parallel coverage by separate penetration-party nets, the reliability of information could be cross-checked. Intelligence of all sorts continued to reach GHQ until the re-invasion of the Philippines. When American forces landed on Leyte in October 1944, the intelligence groups -- radio nets, coastwatcher stations, etc. -- could claim substantial credit for their contributions to the success of that campaign. After the Sixth and Eighth Armies took the field, the story of these nets as well as the achievements of the guerrilla bands in the actual fighting, became a part of the history of those two armies.

g. Special Intelligence Bulletin Section

The "Special Intelligence Bulletin" was a highly classified publication containing evaluated radio intelligence from Ground, Air and Navy sources both inside and outside the SWPA. (41) A small G-2 section was created to produce this important secret publication. Distribution was severely limited and recipients

(41) The material was furnished by a secret Allied organization, the "Central Bureau", under the direction of Maj Gen Spencer Akin, who was also Chief Signal Officer SWPA. This organization contained top-flight cryptanalysts, familiar with Japanese radio communications. The organization in Washington D.C. under Brig Gen Carter Clarke afforded parallel, interlocking service; his work must be considered as a major contribution to the war.

were especially "briefed."

War Department security officers were assigned to this Section to facilitate the transmission to and from adjacent theaters of this special material which was of great importance for future planning, as a complement to other intelligence data.

"Special Intelligence," which naturally dovetailed into the concurrent strategic "Estimates," proved extremely useful to high Allied echelons throughout the campaigns.(42) Our discreet but distinctly liberal dissemination of this highly classified material must be viewed in the light of the Pearl Harbor debacle when an extreme of secrecy so limited dissemination of similar material that responsible commanders were deprived of essential elements of information which, had they been in their possession, might well have averted this disaster.

(42) See "Role of G-2 in the Hollandia Operations" (Page 25 ff., Plate 9); the analysis of radio message MOTOZAN is a historical example of the immense practical value of this vital service.

Chapter III

ALLIED INTELLIGENCE UNITS

1. Allied Intelligence Bureau and Affiliated Organizations:(1)

In order to eliminate obvious duplication of effort and tighten operational control of G-2, GHQ, all activities of various intelligence agencies in Australia concerned with clandestine operations, were eventually merged under a single organization, the "Allied Intelligence Bureau" (AIB). On 6 July 1942, a GHQ directive established this organization to "obtain and report information of the enemy. . . weaken the enemy by sabotage and destruction of morale and to lend aid and assistance to local efforts to the same end in enemy occupied territories."(2) Its field of operations was in the Southwest Pacific Area, exclusive of the continent of Australia and Tasmania.

The Bureau was initially subdivided into four main sections(Plate 14); "Special Operations, Australia" (SOA), sometimes referred to as "Inter-Allied Services Department" (ISD) and still later entitled "Services Reconnaissance Department" (SRD); "Secret Intelligence, Australia" (SIA): "Field Intelligence"; and the "Far Eastern Liaison Office" (FELO). The Field Intelligence Section originally was subdivided geographically into the "Netherlands East Indies Area" (Dutch and British), the "Philippines Sub-Section"

(1) See Vol IV, Intell Series, "Operations of the Allied Intelligence Bureau, GHQ, SWFA."

(2) Ref Directive, GHQ, SWFA, Mil Intell Sec, G.S., Subj: Directive Covering the Organization, Coordination and Operation of Inter-Allied Units known as Special Operations, Australian Section, Secret Intelligence Service, Australian Section, Combined Field Intelligence Section and Military Propaganda Section, dated 6 July 1942, co-signed by Maj Gen R.K. Sutherland, Chief of Staff, and Brig Gen C.A. Willoughby, A.C. of S., G-2. The implementation thereof was charged largely to Col Van S. Merle-Smith, G-2 Exec.

AIB ORGANIZAT

16 APRIL

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SOUTHWEST F
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
Allied Army
Director of Military Intelligence
Allied Land Forces
ALLIED NAVY
Supervisor of Intelligence
Allied Naval Forces
ALLIED AIR
Director of Intelligence
Allied Air Forces
NETHERLANDS FORCES
Director, Netherlands Forces
Intelligence Service

ASSOCIATED
CO-ORDINATING
STAFF

CONTR
Responsible to C
functioning of t
the execution c
directed from

SECT


Chiefs of Sections responsible for



NOTE: All lines indicate operational control of activities within SWPA. Line marked (2) indicates control outside SWPA.

AIB ORGANIZATIONAL CHART

16 APRIL 1943



1 lines indicate operational control of activities within SWPA except lines marked (1) which indicate operational control outside SWPA. Line marked (2) indicates control through Director of NEFIS.

(American), and the "Northeast Area Sub-Section" (Australian) which included Papua and the islands north and east of New Guinea, down through the Solomons. Some of these units, such as FELO, led a semi-independent life of their own during the war, but in general, the composition of AIB remained fairly stable. However, it was found necessary to adjust the organizational structure on a geographic operational basis rather than a purely functional basis, primarily to protect and reconcile political sovereignties.

The chiefs of the various sections were placed under an Australian Controller who, in turn, was responsible to GHQ, SWPA. An American Deputy Controller was also the Finance Officer; thus, GHQ retained a double check upon the Bureau and its international components. A coordinating staff, consisting of a liaison officer from each Headquarters, was named to assist the organization.

Though ostensibly under a single directorship, each of the sub-sections attempted to remain more or less autonomous, and continuous readjustments were necessary during the lifetime of the Bureau in an attempt to achieve a more centralized control.

a. Coast Watchers

Australia, which had been at war since 1939, had organized through its Department of the Navy an efficient, though not perfected, coastwatcher system to cover all sea approaches from the northern tip of New Ireland southwestward through New Britain and the New Guinea mainland, and southeastward through Bougainville and the Solomon Islands. This organization had been established on 8 September 1939.(3) Notable progress had been made by the time GHQ, SWPA, came into being. There had been an integration of

(3) Full credit for the development of this valuable service must be given to Capt R.B.M. Long, RANF, the Director of Naval Intelligence in Melbourne.



Brigadier K. A. Wills, Contr, AIB (1944/45)



Brig Gen C. A. Whitney
Chief, PRS/AIB (1943/45)



Comdr E. A. Feldt
Chief, NEA/AIB (1943)



Col C. S. Myers
Dep Contr, AIB (1943/45)



Lt Col A. W. Ind
Dep Contr, AIB (1942/43)

civilian and naval organizations into a single working unit, according all personnel military status and tying old civil communications nets into military channels. G-2, SWPA, recognized the intrinsic value of this organization immediately and gave it prompt and continuous support for rapid expansion.

Coastwatcher stations were established along the New Guinea coast from Aitape to Samarai, along the southern coast of Papua, and in the Torres Straits area. There were two stations on the northern coast of New Britain, one on Tabar Island, one at Muliama on New Ireland, one at Buka Passage in the Solomons, and one at Buin. All of these reported to naval intelligence officers at Port Moresby, Rabaul, Tulagi, and Vila, who relayed the information to area command headquarters at Townsville.

The Coast Watchers, though its predominant interest originally was in naval targets, was by far the best organized and most productive of all intelligence agencies operating in the SWPA before the establishment of AIB. Integrated into AIB as the "Northeast Area Sub-Section", later becoming the "Northeast Regional Section," this unit continued to render increasingly spectacular service.

Some of the most amazing jungle treks of the war are credited to members of this Section engaged in watching not only the north coast of New Guinea, but in patrolling the rugged inland mountains and plateau country in order to keep tab on the movements of the Japanese as they aggressively fanned inward from the coast.

Later in the war the Australian Army, charged with eliminating the Japanese forces still in the New Guinea area, depended heavily on AIB-NEA for field intelligence, particularly for the routes of escape defeated troops were taking. In July 1945, the Commanding General of the Australian forces, while mopping up

in New Guinea and New Britain, reported that more than 50 per cent of his total field intelligence in that particular area came from AIB-NEA sources.(4)

As this stalking phase of operations became established, the NEA was permitted to organize an infantry battalion composed of Papuan natives, many of whom had served so faithfully on coast-watching assignments. Trained in Australia and in the field, these units, led by coastwatcher personnel, became strikingly efficient in tracking down, isolating and decimating units in Papua, New Britain, and the Solomons. Accordingly, the NEA Section of AIB along has to its credit 5,414 casualties in enemy killed and 74 captured. A total of 501 Allied military personnel was rescued, while 450 civilians were saved by this organization.(5)

b. Inter-Allied Services Department (ISD) & Services
Reconnaissance Department (SRD)

In mid-March 1942, Gen. Sir Thomas Blamey, the Australian Senior Commander, indicated to GHQ that a subversion-sabotage organization for special assignments would probably be useful in the SWPA Theater. London transferred a specialist, Maj. G.E. Mott who was formerly in Malaya, to assist in establishing an Australian Section of the British "Special Operations." Activation was authorized by GHQ as the "Inter-Allied Services Department." It was incorporated into the Allied Intelligence Bureau in the directive of 6 July 1942.

ISD corresponded roughly to the American Office of Strategic Services (OSS), which never was employed in the Southwest Pacific Theater. ISD, however, emphasized commando and sub-

(4) Statement made by Brig K.A. Wills to Lt Col A. Ind, then Commandant of AIB Advance Operational Camp, Morotai.

(5) See Vol IV, Intell Series, "Operations of the Allied Intelligence Bureau, GHQ, SWPA"; Documentary Appendix, "Enemy Casualty Summary."

version operations, whereas AIB was required to give first priority to intelligence. The evolution of AIB was such that with almost identical objectives there was not room enough for competitive or duplicatory agencies: SOA-ISD eventually was submerged.

It was difficult to fit the ISD organization into the AIB structure. In AIB reorganization plans, effected in March of 1943, a provision was made for the old Section A of the Bureau (ISD) to become a small, highly specialized sabotage-subversion unit, whose principal function would be to make itself available for special operations outside of SWPA. These "Empire" operations would be coordinated by Australian Land Headquarters. But it was intended that there would be a close inter-relationship between AIB and the new organization, known as "Services Reconnaissance Department" (SRD). There also would be an interchange of supplies and instructional facilities. SRD operatives could be called upon for training AIB personnel or assignment with AIB parties. It was stipulated that GHQ was to be minutely informed of all activities conducted by SRD. Channels of communication were rigidly specified as being through the Controller of AIB to GHQ, and the reverse. Proposals for operations within SWPA had to be submitted to G-2, GHQ. Missions and priorities were habitually controlled by theater operational requirements. Thus, it is seen that SRD never was accorded independence from AIB or GHQ. In fact, during the latter part of the war, SRD came completely under the Controller of AIB as the coordinating agency for GHQ, and LHQ (Australia).

Initially, the ISD-SRD organization operated in Timor; but since GHQ was completely committed in New Guinea, the considerable potential of the Timor development had to be abandoned. Other ISD operations were scheduled for points in Papua. The personnel of these Papuan parties eventually were transferred to

the control of the Northeast Area Sub-Section. They maintained watches over such vital places as Lae, Sidor, Vanimo, and Madang.

One of the most successful and spectacular SRD exploits outside SWPA concerned the penetration of Singapore Harbor and the destruction of more than 45,000 tons of Japanese shipping. Special magnetic mines were employed. The party escaped and returned to Australia. Subsequently, another party, led by the same agent, was lost.

The efforts of SRD came into great prominence during 1945, when the Australian Headquarters was in urgent need of detailed information concerning the mainland of Borneo and the islands adjacent thereto. During this period of intense activity in 1945, LHQ, in preparation for the attacks, received much of its field intelligence from SRD operatives, most of whom had been dropped by aircraft. More than 150 penetrations were successfully carried out. At the same time, SRD trained and operated native guerrilla units, whose activities resulted in the destruction of more than 1,500 enemy killed and 66 being taken prisoner. Eleven Allied airmen were rescued.

c. Far Eastern Liaison Office (FELO)

Authority for the formation of a section to prepare and disseminate propaganda among enemy troops and natives under enemy influence was issued on 19 June 1942 by LHQ. It was called the Far Eastern Liaison Office (FELO). The personnel were drawn from all three Services.(6)

FELO was separated from AIB after a short time, when

(6) FELO, essentially a propaganda outfit, actually was put under the policy control of the Australian Chiefs of Staff shortly after AIB was organized. Operationally, it came under G-2 supervision. Whenever called for, FELO and AIB operated together: either FELO personnel were attached to AIB parties, or FELO parties were instructed to obtain intelligence. Late in the war FELO operations again came under AIB purview.

Retranslation from Japanese
of
FELO Leaflets, J-104 and J-73

Top: FELO Leaflet, J-104

A JAPANESE SOLDIER'S CONFESSION

Text to right of note:

This is a photograph of a Japanese soldier's note, found on the battlefield by the Allied Forces after their crushing defeat (of the Japanese Army) at SANANANDA.

Men of the Japanese Forces! Watch the conduct of your superiors. Who shall say that in the hour of crisis your officers will not again abandon you?

Text of note:

On the night of 21 Jan, the scores of men including His Excellency ODA and down to NCOs departed on a large MLC leaving us behind.
We, Road Construction BUTAI, were left behind.
We are filled with bitterness and disappointment.

23 Jan

BUNTAI leader, YANO.

Bottom: FELO Leaflet, J-73

"Cherry Blossoms in the Home Country"

Text to right of picture.

(Proverb) "Three brief days, and lo!
The world is full of cherry blossoms".

Text to left of picture.

We live now in a place where no cherry blossoms bloom, where the water cannot be drunk, and where we cannot be off guard for a single moment. Nevertheless we are told this useless war will go on for a hundred years. Truly, it is paradise turned into hell!

it became apparent that the scope of FELO policy, particularly with reference to political propaganda, was beyond that encompassed by the GHQ-AIB directive. The Section then was operated under the auspices of the Australian Chiefs of Staff at Canberra, although its physical headquarters was at Melbourne. In all instances, FELO remained responsive to the needs of G-2, GHQ. The linguists were supplied by ATIS, a theater unit. Whenever it was necessary to employ FELO propaganda and FELO field operatives on AIB projects, personnel of the propaganda unit were attached to AIB units. Late in the war, FELO again came under AIB's operational control at Morotai.

The first Japanese leaflets were dropped by the U.S. Air Force in August 1942. They gave the story of the Coral Sea Battle. More intensive use of propaganda against the Japanese occurred at Buna and Sananada, when a FELO officer flew over the enemy lines scattering leaflets on the Japanese positions. Thereafter, practically all combat missions flown carried along bundles of subversive literature for drops on enemy areas. These latter activities occurred after FELO's physical separation from AIB, but were carried out in consequence of G-2 policy suggestions.

The morale of the Japanese Air Force was disparaged. Japanese troops were reminded that large scale raids by their air force appeared to be a thing of the past, and that this seemed true despite removal of Allied strength to other areas. The latter was not true, of course, but was spread by native rumor.

The Japanese rose to the bait. On 12 April, a large force attacked Port Moresby in daylight. Warned in advance by AIB Coast Watchers, the Allied Air Force was waiting aloft. The Japanese definitely lost 25 planes, with ten more on the probable list.

(7)

(7) G-2 Folder No. 322, titled "F.E.L.O." G-2 (SCAP and FEC) Administrative File.



FELO Leaflet J-115, Lanterns with Warnings to Soldiers

Retranslation from Japanese
of
FELO Leaflet, J-115

LANTERNS WITH WARNINGS TO SOLDIERS

- Central Lantern :** "Beware of a planless, bungling command and of useless fighting."
- Lantern at left :** "Beware of the propaganda of the Military Clique and their lying radio."
- Further to the left :** "Beware of false shame, of the importance of life. Heed against dying a useless death."
- Lantern at top right :** "Be on your guard against military officers who leave you in the lurch."
- At bottom right :** "Beware of being left behind to die from starvation."

The scribbled note reads :

"File regarding arms, Hashimoto Unit Headquarters."

(This inscription has no relation to the propaganda text and has been used simply to arouse added curiosity and induce careful reading.)

NOTE: This leaflet is an adaptation of a Japanese poster depicting five Japanese fire-guard lanterns with inscribed warnings against spies in cafes, factories, on vehicles, etc.

Over 50 million leaflets, in eight different languages (Japanese, Pidgin English, Malay, Dutch, Portuguese, Chinese, Tetum, Yabim) were dropped during the war-time existence of FELO. During the final stages FELO leaflet drops, urging natives to action against retreating Japanese units, were made in conjunction with AIB efforts. They were very effective. FELO also operated some notable intelligence parties under AIB direction, particularly in north-central New Guinea and the Celebes area.

d. Philippines Sub-Section (PSS)

As was pointed out at the beginning of the present chapter, Section "C" of Allied Intelligence Bureau was divided into three regional sub-sections for the collection of field intelligence. One of these was the Philippines Sub-Section (PSS). This was primarily a training, supply, and operational unit, and is not to be confused with the Philippine Section of G-2, GHQ(8): in 1942, however, the two agencies were in intimate collaboration.

In October of 1942, the Commander-in-Chief issued instructions, through G-2, that the Philippines Sub-Section of Allied Intelligence Bureau should be activated.(9) Operations and communication plans for the penetration of the Philippine Islands were developed and approved. Originally, these provided that espionage parties would be completely self-contained and self-sustained, each to establish a secret wireless station for communication with Aus-

(8) The Philippine Section, an inherent part of the office of the AC of S, G-2, GHQ, was initially established to consider many phases of Philippine matters including the planning for eventual re-establishment of intelligence communication channels with the Islands. Intimately connected with the Section was Lt Col J.R. McMicking, long-time resident of Manila and expert on Philippine affairs, one of the 13 men in the handpicked group accompanying General MacArthur from the Philippines. The G-2 Philippine Section is discussed on page 21 of this volume, and in greater detail in Vol III, Intell Series, "Operations of the Military Intelligence Section, GHQ, SWPA."

(9) Maj Allison Ind was named Chief.

tralia. Radiating from this would be an intelligence net, some key members of which would have small radio transmitters feeding into the central control station. These initial AIB parties were to be highly secret and the nets developing from them as nuclei actually would have no physical connection with them or even knowledge of them.

Before the initial party could be dispatched, however, imperfect and uncertain radio contact had been established with several guerrilla organizations on Luzon, Panay and Mindanao. Accordingly, a policy decision was made that this and subsequent AIB parties, in addition to their purely secret Intelligence functions, would arrange for contacting certain guerrilla chieftains for the purpose of smuggling to them secure cypher systems prepared at GHQ, some personal instructions from the Commander-in-Chief and ultimately supplies of money, medicines and arms. The first of these parties was dispatched by submarine 27 December 1942.(10) One month later the first intelligence was transmitted from a secret radio station established in a secure place on the coast of Negros Island.

Altogether, five parties of this type were organized, trained, supplied, and dispatched by the Philippines Sub-Section of the Allied Intelligence Bureau, operating under G-2 directives. In addition to Negros, Mindanao, the Sulu Archipelago and Panay were penetrated successfully. The Mindanao party was under the general leadership of Lt. Comdr. Charles Parsons, USNR, destined to become one of the most successful agents during the Philippine operations.(11)

(10) This was the "Planet" Party, under the leadership of Maj J. Villamor, A.C., Philippines patriot and hero. He was considered the "Pathfinder;" his nets eventually became exceptionally well developed.

(11) For the relationship of these and other AIB agents with guerrilla leaders and the guerrilla intelligence nets, see Vol I, Intell Series, "The Guerrilla Resistance Movement in the Philippines," and Vol II, same series, "Intelligence Activities in the Philippines during the Japanese Occupation."

Largely in consequence of his observations and recommendations, GHQ decided upon a very much extended program of activities in the Philippines. This program was to have a dual nature; intelligence, and guerrilla coordination and supply. It was believed necessary to place in charge an individual having a very broad knowledge of the Islands and the personalities involved. This was important because as communication developed, all types of political, social, economic, as well as military problems were included in the radio traffic from the Islands. It was at this time that Col. Courtney A. Whitney, then on duty in the United States, was selected and took over the Philippines Sub-Section, 24 May 1943, at Brisbane. Lt. Col. Ind became advisor on operations and communications, in addition to his duties as Deputy Controller and Finance Officer of the Bureau.

The Philippines Sub-Section of AIB became known as Philippine Regional Section (PRS). The new Section soon embarked upon an impressive program of penetration, intelligence net organization, guerrilla supply and control, political direction, and coastwatching. Initially, PRS made use of the existing supply and communication facilities of AIB, as well as AIB key personnel. It soon became necessary, however, for PRS to develop and greatly expand its own facilities, in addition to the use it made of AIB throughout its operational existence.(12)

e. The Netherlands Sub-Section (NEFTS III)

The problem of the Netherlands Sub-Section of AIB was rendered acute by the serious shortage of personnel in every branch

(12) Eventually, intelligence and coastwatching radio stations, numbering nearly 100, were linked in a vast reporting system. Quantities of guerrilla supplies were sent in. PRS received and analyzed most information; the Philippines Section, G-2, collated and distributed the product of the Island nets. PRS activities are recorded in detail in Vol II, Intell Series, "Intelligence Activities in the Philippines during the Japanese Occupation."

of the remnant Dutch force in Australia and by the fact that agents were compelled to operate in areas known to be intensely hostile. A total of 30 projects was undertaken by the Dutch Section from the middle of September 1942, through the middle of August 1945. More than one third of these projects unfortunately had to be written off as "lost or captured." Many of these instances involved only one agent rather than an entire party. Nevertheless, whole parties of several individuals each did disappear.

On the credit side there is a record of 19 parties having obtained considerable information, primarily of importance to the Dutch. These operations concentrated on Java in the beginning. Seven parties penetrated Java during the first year of AIB activities. Other Dutch operations concerned the islands to the north of Australia (Borneo, the Celebes, and the Aroes).

The Dutch Section established a forward operations base at Merauke, on the south coast of New Guinea. From this point AIB parties operated to patrol the extensive inland waterways, with the object of preventing Japanese infiltration. Other Dutch parties penetrated near Hollandia before that point was captured.

At the end of the war, the Dutch were cooperating with the SRD Section on an extensive plan for "stepping-stone" penetration of Java.

The Netherlands Section was responsible for the development of a highly efficient radio transmitting and receiving unit, especially adapted to the needs of agents operating in remote parts and having necessity for communication with GHQ through AIB. This set was utilized by the Philippine parties of AIB with great success.

f. Secret Intelligence, Australia (SIA)

This was a very specialized unit, designed primarily to

deal with subversion. As organized, it was better adapted to the needs of industrialized, congested national or metropolitan areas than to conditions in the Pacific. In order to preserve the security of the parent organization elsewhere in the world, GHQ agreed, while keeping strict operational control through G-2, that SIA could live a very self-contained existence; records would be kept at an absolute minimum.

SIA's initial operations were concerned with the introduction of native religious leaders, whose immediate object was to gain intelligence, and whose incidental object was to maintain Islamic solidarity to offset Japanese racial propaganda. For this purpose, Hadjis were imported from Mecca. The decision to use Hadjis followed upon the advice of the Rajah of Sarawak, then in Australia. The casualty rate was high among Dutch and Australian operatives attempting to penetrate NEI and the islands to the north of Australia. G-2 believed that the use of itinerant priests, whom the natives were not likely to betray, had good possibilities. Great difficulty was experienced in inserting these specialized agents, however, and still more in following up to obtain the results of their activities. Several of them apparently were captured, as nothing was heard of them again. However, later in the war, others managed to obtain useful information before Allied forces occupied the islands in the Halmaheras, particularly Morotai.

The SIA Section assisted in the development of a Celebes coastwatcher net under a general AIB plan known as "Co-monitor." SIA parties operated in the Banda Sea area, flashing their signals to the net control stations at Biak and Darwin. SIA's communication net was operated in conjunction with the existing Netherlands net.

In 1945, not long before the surrender, SIA succeeded

in establishing five excellent information and weather-reporting secret stations in the hostile Java area. One operated off Soerabaja, in the west, while another covered the Sunda Straits, between Java and Sumatra; three others were on islands on the perimeter of Java. These stations were in operation at the war's end, and, in fact, were continued for a while after the cessation of hostilities in order to check movements of Japanese renegade forces.

E. The AIB Record - Summation and Historical Examples

Operating far behind the enemy lines, AIB activities were extremely hazardous. Members of coastwatcher stations and espionage parties sent into enemy territory often met with disaster. In carrying out 264 party missions, casualties totaled 164 killed, 6 known wounded, 75 captured, and 178 missing. Personnel of the Bureau won over 100 battle awards and decorations, American and Australian. Between January and August 1945 AIB, alone, sponsored 155 sorties into enemy operational areas, 91 of these by land-based aircraft, one by submarine, 13 by surface craft, and 50 by flying boat. Approximately 325,000 pounds of supplies were dropped or delivered to Allied forces and agents. Though combat was definitely not one of the AIB missions, its agents and native combat units destroyed over 7,000 of the enemy and captured nearly 150 prisoners of war. In addition, 950 of the enemy surrendered as a result of reading AIB propaganda leaflets. A total of 1050 Allied air, ground and navy personnel and native troops were rescued by its various agencies.

AIB operated a maximum of 41 small ships of all classifications. In addition, there was a considerable number of special landing boats and numerous one and two-man submarines, mainly used by SRD. This figure does not include the huge cargo-carrying submarines which eventually were assigned to Philippine Regional Sec-

tion while it was still intimately associated with AIB.

AIB also had assigned to it a special Australian Flight of B-24 type aircraft ("200 Flight"), modified for carrying personnel and making paratroop and supply drops, the latter being in a SRD-designed pack, known as the "Storpedo."

AIB's comprehensive communication net was so extensive and efficient that on many occasions its use was requested by the military forces for priority operational traffic.

Against the background of these achievements, it may be observed that this international group, which obviously needed highly coordinated control, proved one of the most difficult to manage because of the prevailing staff indifference toward the principle of centralized intelligence and even intermittent opposition to operational control by G-2. This control was inevitable: All missions were set by G-2, GHQ, the responsible Staff Section. Priorities, modifications, and rejections went through the same operative channel; the American funds were carried on G-2 Confidential Voucher #6, and handled by the American Deputy Controller. The moment the field parties came into a command area at the front, their tactical unit G-2's invariably had to enter the picture.(13) Despite the constant friction resulting from these opposing viewpoints, AIB has written some brilliant pages in the field of clandestine operations, as shown in two characteristic examples, viz:

Example 1

Role of AIB Agents in the Solomons

On 7 August 1942 a small force of United States Marines escorted by United States and Australian warships, landed at Guadal-

(13) Nevertheless, there was maintained a puerile, but irritatingly stubborn fiction of "complete independence"; it flared up in April 1943, particularly as between the status of the Philippine Regional Section, which Col Whitney had just taken over, and AIB, then under Col Roberts; this is covered elsewhere. With a dozen ambitious unit commanders of several nationalities, coordination sooner or later made them look toward Headquarters and G-2.

canal in the Solomon Islands. The surprise landing at Guadalcanal had two main objectives: the harbor at Tulagi and the airfield at Lunga Bay.

The Japanese, recovering quickly from the initial shock of the Allied strike, countered with fierce, ceaseless attacks on land, sea, and in the air. From the day of the landing in August 1942 to January 1943, they made repeated and costly efforts to dislodge the Allied foothold on Guadalcanal's beaches and drive the Marines back into the sea.

An AIB coastwatcher station, previously established on the hills overlooking Buin on Bougainville Island was sending daily reports on enemy harbor activity to the Allied Fleet off Guadalcanal. (Plate 18) Another coastwatcher group gave details of sea and air arrivals and departures at Buka Passage. Other agents at Gold Ridge, near Lunga, and in northwest Guadalcanal formed an interlocking and efficient intelligence chain; there was little the enemy could do in that area that was not immediately relayed to Allied Headquarters.

The main air bases used by the Japanese in their attacks on Guadalcanal were at Rabaul on New Britain, and Kavieng on New Ireland. Only the fields at Rabaul and Kavieng could accommodate heavy bombers. Air strikes against the Allies would, therefore, originate at Rabaul and Kavieng. The air route from Rabaul to Guadalcanal passed over Buin and that from Kavieng to Guadalcanal over Buka Passage. AIB agents, perfectly situated for observation purpose, gave the American Forces ample warning of an impending air Attack.

The AIB network in the Solomons area was so organized that the Coast Watchers were able to give three successive warning signals of Japanese bombers en route to Tulagi and Guadalcanal:



the first one, approximately two hours prior to arrival of enemy planes; the next, approximately an hour and one-half before; and the final warning, forty-five minutes before the estimated strike. There was no delay between the sighting of enemy aircraft and the receipt of radio news by the Allied landing forces.

It was also correctly assumed that Buka Passage and Buin on Bougainville Island would be used by the enemy as anchorages for ships to be employed in any naval counterattack. Both harbors therefore were kept under constant observation. Allied aircraft were in a position to strike against enemy shipping at times most advantageous for maximum damage.

On 7 August, just four hours after the United States forces had launched their attack on the beaches, AIB agents flashed a warning that 24 enemy torpedo bombers were en route to counter-attack.(14) The bombers arrived as reported and ran into a waiting trap of Allied fighter planes in position. Only one enemy plane escaped.

Early the next morning (at 0840) the AIB agent at Buka Passage spotted 45 Japanese bombers and fighters roaring overhead, going southeast. By 0910 unhurried preparations had already been completed at Tulagi to crush the expected attack.

That same afternoon, the AIB agent at Buin reported more aircraft. Again the Allied fighters met them and again the intended blow was smashed. An enemy attack the next day met disaster in the same manner.(15) The Japanese lost over 55 planes during the first three days of the attack after the Allied landings. Crippled by enormous losses in the air, the baffled enemy was un-

(14) "The Coast Watchers", by Eric Feldt, pp. 115, 144. Commander Feldt, RAN, was long in field command of the important N.E. Regional Section of AIB.

(15) "The Coast Watchers," by Eric Feldt, p. 144.

able to mount another strike for several days, thus giving the Allied forces invaluable time to consolidate their beachhead gains.

In the afternoon of 20 August, the first "Grumman Wildcat" flew into Henderson Field, arriving after enemy raiders had gone. The next day, warned as usual by the coast watchers that Japanese planes were on the way, the Allied planes soared aloft, intercepted the enemy at the most favorable altitude, and shot down several craft. The same routine was carried out the following day with equally satisfactory results. Thereafter, almost daily for a month, forewarned "Wildcats" intercepted the oncoming enemy, shooting him out of the sky in large numbers. The shattering effect on Japanese morale was an intangible but important factor in these air actions; the Japanese estimated that Allied aviation was in greater numbers than was actually the case.

In recognition of their brilliant service, General MacArthur awarded the DSC to the AIB agents at Buka Passage and Buin. Admiral R.K. Turner, the Commander of the Amphibious Forces, recognized the excellence of the intelligence furnished and acknowledged that a substantial share of his successes at Guadalcanal was due to the tireless Coast Watcher Service. No details of these situations were published at the time; the enemy was told nothing of the decisive part played by intelligence in wreaking havoc on its forces.

Example 2

Role of Intelligence in Arawe and Cape Gloucester Operations

The capture of Finschhafen and Sattelberg in November 1943 completed Allied conquest of the Huon Peninsula which commanded the western approach to Vitiaz Straits. In order to gain unhampered control of both sides of this 60 mile wide strategic seaway, General MacArthur decided to take Cape Gloucester on the southwestern tip of New Britain, first making a diversionary attack at

Arawe about 65 miles to the south. Control of the Vitiaz Straits would block the way to further Japanese southward movement and pierce deeply into the enemy's outer defense perimeter, opening the path for further Allied thrusts to the north.

Known heavy concentrations of enemy air strength on the Rabaul airfields presented a serious threat to Allied landing operations. Widely dispersed then over several fields, the Allied Air Force demanded advance warning of Japanese flights out of Rabaul toward Arawe and Gloucester, in order to furnish a protective umbrella over the naval convoy.

In planning the Cape Gloucester operations, it was anticipated that air opposition would originate primarily from Rabaul. It was expected that the Japanese fighters and bombers would fly a more or less direct route from Rabaul to the invasion points in order to save fuel for the combat area. Therefore, a chain of AIB radio stations was stretched across the neck of the Gazelle Peninsula. Other agents took up their assigned positions at Wide Bay, Open Bay, Gasmata, and Cape Crford.

Two/three months prior to the Allied invasion of New Britain the U.S. submarine "Grouper" landed 16 Allied Intelligence Bureau operatives and 27 specially trained natives on New Britain. (16) Dispersed at strategic places through the island, they had established a comprehensive network of observers behind the enemy lines.

It took weeks for these parties and radio equipment to reach their stations. Radio communications on special frequencies were established between observers and the Allied fighter command, "Nadzab." In order to test the efficacy of reporting and the time element involved it was decided to make a tactical feint in a small-

(16) "The Coast Watchers," by Eric Feldt, p. 341


scale landing operation against Arawe. If the Jap reacted as expected, it was possible to inflict heavy losses and, by attrition, the subsequent job for the major landing at Cape Gloucester would be that much easier; there was no illusion that the naval convoy, en route to Gloucester, would not be picked up by enemy reconnaissance and lead to violent air reaction; in fact, our Air Force would not guarantee an absolute air umbrella over Vitiaz Straits unless advance warning was given of the approach of enemy air formations to enable our own scattered forces to rendezvous over Vitiaz Straits.

On 15 December, the 112th Cavalry landed at Arawe. Subsequent operations confirmed initial G-2 forecasts. Ground resistance was weak and the U.S. forces reached their final objectives by 1148 in the morning of the day of attack. However, air opposition, as predicted, was swift and powerful. Within two hours after the landings, over 35 Japanese dive bombers attacked Allied shipping. AIB agents radioed advance reports of all enemy formations en route. On the first day of the Arawe invasions, the enemy employed over 85 planes in his efforts to disrupt Allied operations, but, as planned, our fighters were high overhead waiting for the kill and the Japanese lost heavily. On the 16th, the enemy raided three times with the same results.

On the 17th, there were twelve attacks by dive bombers and 48 fighters were reported en route.(17) The enemy was actually exhausting his air strength: The Arawe "feint" had achieved its purpose brilliantly by drawing considerable enemy forces to the Arawe region thus draining his potential power to meet the forthcoming main attack later.(Plate 19)

On 26 December, after a previous heavy aerial bombard-

(17) "G-2 Daily Intell Summary," No. 634, 13/14 Dec 43, p. 3



ment of enemy airstrips and defenses in the area, the 1st Marine Division landed at Cape Gloucester. After four days of hard, fierce fighting the Gloucester airdrome was in Allied hands. By 14 January 1944, the last stronghold of enemy resistance had been overcome and the Gloucester operation completed.

The story at Gloucester was much the same as at Arawe. Ground resistance, although stronger than at Arawe, was no more than expected. Air reaction, as anticipated, was initially strong and determined. Again, AIB reports gave advance warning of 30 to 60 minutes and again the U.S. fighters were able to rendezvous to meet the enemy at the most advantageous altitude. Four raids were intercepted over the beaches the first day with disproportionate losses to the enemy. On 26/27 December in 2 missions of 70 and 90 fighters and bombers the enemy lost over 75 planes as compared with five of the Allies. It was estimated that over 180 planes were destroyed from 23-27 December. By 29 December enemy air activity had practically ceased. The cordon of AIB air watchers and radio transmitters on the Gazelle Peninsula, over which all enemy formations had to fly from Rabaul en route to Gloucester, had played its part on New Britain just as a similar cordon had on Guadalcanal.

That the Japanese ultimately were painfully aware of the effective work of AIB/G-2 is evidenced by this statement(18) made by Lt. Col. Hara, Shiro, Eighth Area Army Staff Officer (Operations Section):

"...Allied intelligence activities were responsible in great part for our losses in New Guinea. They were very effective and the Allies seemed to know our strength and dispositions beforehand for it always seemed to me that they continually attacked our weak points and by avoiding our concentrated strong points managed to obtain their objectives with minimum losses. I always felt that Allied Intelligence gained its great effectiveness through the failures of our own intelligence to combat it....."

(18) Interrogation Files, G-2 Historical Section, GHQ, FEC.

2. Psychological Warfare Branch (PWB):

In June 1944 Brig. Gen. B.F. Fellers, G-1, SWPA, assumed charge to carry on psychological warfare operations for the U.S. Army in the Philippines and Japan thru an organization similar to FELO. This organization was known as Psychological Warfare Branch (PWB); it was assisted by FELO officers, some of whom served with U.S. Army and Air Force Units throughout the Philippines Campaign.

There had been no interference with FELO up to the organization of PWB, as the former had operated in islands primarily under Australian, British, and Dutch jurisdiction. In the latter part of June 1944, with the Philippine Campaign in the offing, all propaganda agencies (FELO, OWI, a Dutch Unit, etc.) were subordinated to PWB for coordination.(19) However, FELO still operated in and prepared leaflets for islands outside of the Philippine Archipelago. In July 1944, just prior to the invasion of the Philippines, PWB came under the jurisdiction of G-5.(20) Preparation of leaflets and broadcasts destined for the Philippines and Japan was carried on in Brisbane since printing facilities were lacking in Hollandia.(21)

During 1944 other aspects of propaganda work were developed. Leaflets were fired from 25 pounders and mortars, and thousands were dropped by the U.S. Air Force. Front line broad-

(19) This was sound, within the Allied organization, but AIB had long sponsored FELO in the field and we find here again a semi-independent unit springing up to again evade G-2 coordination.

(20) Under the thin excuse that propaganda was diverted "toward the civilian population."

(21) ATIS facilities and linguists had to be used in the preparation of leaflets. Colonels S.D. Mashbir and H. Doud, Coordinator and Assistant Coordinator of ATIS respectively, gave considerable assistance in checking leaflets prepared by PWB, whose linguists were initially furnished by ATIS. ATIS was then and remained the central linguist pool for the theater and contained personnel who had lived and worked in Japan, and could, in fact, claim to be expert on things Japanese, and particularly their "psychology." There was, of course, no point in creating another section. ATIS could have handled all missions.

casts were developed to send messages to Japanese troops. Mobile propaganda units exploited recently re-occupied and enemy occupied territory to win native support for the Allied forces. In Hollandia, 59 of the enemy surrendered with their surrender leaflets, at Sansapor 94 Formosans surrendered in one group, and at Biak 357 prisoners were taken as result of psychological warfare.(22)

In the battle for Manila when remnants of Japanese troops were in pockets throughout the city, radio broadcasts were frequently employed in the expectation of lowering the morale of the enemy and to induce the Japanese to surrender.

On the afternoon of 25 January 1945, a message was broadcast from the second floor of the Girls Normal School, Ermita, by two Nisei enlisted men on duty with an ATIS Advanced Echelon. The same broadcast was repeated later to Japanese troops in the Bureau of Agriculture and Commerce building and in the open fields in that vicinity. Through prisoner-of-war interrogation it was learned that the enemy prior to the broadcasts had considered themselves as being in the front lines; in the evening following the broadcasts, several large groups of the enemy attempted to escape and were killed by machine gun fire.

On 1 March, a third broadcast was made. This time the microphone was placed in a position from which FWB personnel had complete observation of the enemy. Running commentary, adapted to the movements of the enemy, was made for a half-hour period. The results of this broadcast were much more in evidence than those of the first two. A number of prisoners were taken, and several well prepared and well supplied positions fell into American hands.(23)

(22) G-2 Folder No. 322, titled "F.E.L.O.", G-2 (SCAP & FEC) Administrative File.

(23) Vol V, Intell Series, "Operations of the Allied Translator and Interpreter Section, GHQ, SWPA."



新内閣の顔触れ

内閣瓦解と日ソ


鈴木老提督の内閣樹立

海軍色濃厚

近衛系の復活も顯著

敗戦責任が原因

【ワシントン十三日路透電】鈴木元帥が、内閣を樹立するに際して、海軍系を濃厚に採用し、近衛系も復活するものと見られる。鈴木元帥は、敗戦責任をめぐり、海軍系と近衛系との間に大きな溝が生じた。この溝を埋め、内閣の統一を図るため、鈴木元帥は海軍系と近衛系との両方を重視する方針を打ち出した。海軍系には、海軍大臣に海軍省出身の大臣を任命し、近衛系には、近衛文相の旧僚を重用する。このように、鈴木元帥の内閣は、海軍系と近衛系との両方を重視するものと見られる。



空からの対観 此島は、米軍の空襲を受け、大規模な破壊を受けた。島の上には、米軍の飛行場や施設が確認できる。

米軍既に沖繩の四分の一を占領

血み泥の沖繩戦

米戦車隊伯林に百廿八哩内

マツカーサー全太

平洋の陸軍を掌握

スルー諸島を掌握

米軍ホロ島に上陸

全比島に殲滅戦續行

南方への海上輸送を完全に封鎖

【ワシントン十三日路透電】米軍は、沖繩島の四分の一を占領し、血み泥の戦いを続けている。また、米戦車隊は、伯リンから百廿八哩内まで進軍し、マツカーサーは全太平洋の陸軍を掌握している。スルー諸島も完全に掌握され、米軍はホロ島に上陸し、全比島に殲滅戦を続けている。南方への海上輸送も完全に封鎖されている。

新内閣の顔触れ

内閣総理大臣	鈴木元帥
外務大臣	近衛文相
海軍大臣	海軍省出身
陸軍大臣	陸軍省出身
文相	近衛文相
司法大臣	司法省出身
逓信大臣	逓信省出身
農林大臣	農林省出身
労働大臣	労働省出身
社会大臣	社会省出身
教育大臣	教育省出身
建設大臣	建設省出身
逓理大臣	逓理省出身
官房長官	官房出身

"RAKKASAN NEWS" No. 5, 14 April 1945
 "Rakkasan (Parachute) News" was prepared by ATIS for FWP, GHQ, SWPA. This series of leaflets was dropped on Japanese troops and civilians in an effort to weaken their morale by informing them of the true picture of the war. Make-up of leaflet conformed to that of regular Japanese newspapers.

沖繩島近海の海空戦 戦艦大和を撃沈

出撃の日本機動部隊と交戦

【アムステルダム十三日日本電】沖繩島近海に於ける海空戦は、十三日午後一時、日本機動部隊の出撃と同時に開始された。日本機動部隊は、沖繩島近海に展開し、アメリカ機動部隊と交戦した。戦艦大和は、アメリカ機動部隊の攻撃を受け、沈没した。また、戦艦ミズホも沈没した。日本機動部隊は、戦艦大和と戦艦ミズホを撃沈し、戦艦大和の沈没は、日本機動部隊の出撃以来の最大の敗北と見られる。



アラバカに出撃を行つた機動部隊

廿五％の損害
日本機動部隊は、沖繩島近海に展開し、アメリカ機動部隊と交戦した。戦艦大和は、アメリカ機動部隊の攻撃を受け、沈没した。また、戦艦ミズホも沈没した。日本機動部隊は、戦艦大和と戦艦ミズホを撃沈し、戦艦大和の沈没は、日本機動部隊の出撃以来の最大の敗北と見られる。

英戦艦傷つく
【ロンドン十三日路透電】英海軍は、十三日午後、日本機動部隊の攻撃を受け、戦艦大和と戦艦ミズホを撃沈した。また、戦艦大和の沈没は、日本機動部隊の出撃以来の最大の敗北と見られる。



米ソ北極航空路
日本は、北極圏を飛行し、ソ連と航空路を開く。これは、日本が北極圏を飛行し、ソ連と航空路を開くための計画である。

古賀提督の最期

【東京十三日日本電】古賀繁治提督は、十三日午後、沖繩島近海に於ける海空戦で戦死した。古賀提督は、戦艦大和の艦長として、戦艦大和を撃沈した。古賀提督の戦死は、日本機動部隊の出撃以来の最大の敗北と見られる。

納維に突入
日本機動部隊は、沖繩島近海に展開し、アメリカ機動部隊と交戦した。戦艦大和は、アメリカ機動部隊の攻撃を受け、沈没した。また、戦艦ミズホも沈没した。日本機動部隊は、戦艦大和と戦艦ミズホを撃沈し、戦艦大和の沈没は、日本機動部隊の出撃以来の最大の敗北と見られる。

日本船船沈の
最高記録作らる
【東京十三日日本電】日本機動部隊は、沖繩島近海に展開し、アメリカ機動部隊と交戦した。戦艦大和は、アメリカ機動部隊の攻撃を受け、沈没した。また、戦艦ミズホも沈没した。日本機動部隊は、戦艦大和と戦艦ミズホを撃沈し、戦艦大和の沈没は、日本機動部隊の出撃以来の最大の敗北と見られる。




山々を越えてソ連に
日本は、北極圏を飛行し、ソ連と航空路を開く。これは、日本が北極圏を飛行し、ソ連と航空路を開くための計画である。

中支の支那軍
敵進軍を阻止
【東京十三日日本電】中国軍は、中支の支那軍を率いて、敵進軍を阻止した。中国軍は、敵進軍を阻止し、中支の支那軍を率いて、敵進軍を阻止した。

進軍抄

水と兵隊
火野葦平



航空機生産
目標を突破
【東京十三日日本電】日本は、航空機生産の目標を突破した。日本は、航空機生産の目標を突破し、航空機生産の目標を突破した。

夜間練習首しむ
【東京十三日日本電】日本は、夜間練習の首しむを始めた。日本は、夜間練習の首しむを始めた、夜間練習の首しむを始めた。

駐米大使を歓迎
【東京十三日日本電】駐米大使は、米国の歓迎を受けた。駐米大使は、米国の歓迎を受けた、駐米大使は、米国の歓迎を受けた。

重女舞妓
【東京十三日日本電】重女舞妓は、舞妓の舞を披露した。重女舞妓は、舞妓の舞を披露し、重女舞妓は、舞妓の舞を披露した。

宮原公使離獨
【東京十三日日本電】宮原公使は、獨逸を離れ、日本に帰国した。宮原公使は、獨逸を離れ、日本に帰国し、宮原公使は、獨逸を離れ、日本に帰国した。

Psychological warfare, when used in front line positions along with surrender leaflets delivered by aircraft and special ground weapons (mortars and artillery) proved itself to be effective in many situations.

By July 1945 PWB was broadcasting twelve hours a day to Japanese troops and to the people of Japan, dropping millions of leaflets, and copies of a Japanese language newspaper "Rakkasan" (parachute) into Japan containing current news of the campaigns and world events.(24)

One to two million copies of "Rakkasan" were dropped on enemy troops and the civil population of Japan each week. Seven million copies of the leaflet, "The Red Army Strikes," were dropped on Japan the day the Soviet Union declared war. The Potsdam Declaration was translated into Japanese and millions of copies of the translation were showered over the homeland and troops in the field within seventy-two hours after it was received by radio in Manila. Prior to V-J Day a total of 222 million leaflets and news sheets were produced, and for the month of September 1945, alone, an output of 120 million was contemplated.

3. Allied Geographical Section (AGS):(25)


Since vast stretches of New Guinea were completely unknown and others poorly mapped, an "Allied Geographical Section" was promptly established to coordinate the assembly of pertinent geographical information in the Southwest Pacific Area. It became, next to ATIS, the most important and productive Allied agency operating under G-2, SWPA. It collected, checked, and integrated available geographic and hydrographic information into compact

(24) From interrogation of Col J. Woodall Greene, former Executive Officer of PWB.

(25) See Vol VI, Intell Series, "Operations of the Allied Geographical Section, GHQ, SWPA."



Col W. V. Jardine-Blake, Dir., Allied Geographical Sec. (1942/45)



Allied Geographical Section, Brisbane, 1945

printed studies for operational use by staffs and troops, and maintained reference files and card indices of information incidental to such studies.

The Section operated under the authority of three separate directives. The first, dated 17 June 1942, sanctioned such an organization; a second, which appeared on 19 July 1942, was more specific as to functions and internal relationship. The last, dated 6 October 1942, strengthened and extended the terms of the July directive and sharply defined the Section's framework. The personnel was inter-Allied; the internal structure contained an Australian, American, and a Dutch Sub-Section. The Director, Col. William V. Jardine-Blake, an able administrator and editor, was furnished by Australian Headquarters. The Section (Plate 22) was closely supervised by G-2, GHQ, which standardized content and format of its publications and controlled its distribution.(26)

The most important publications prepared by the Allied Geographical Section were a series of "Terrain Studies" covering specific localities of interest to planning echelons, staffs and commanders, to facilitate landing assaults on limited areas.

They contained extensive descriptions of terrain features, landing beaches, transportation facilities, health conditions and other

(26) The competitive, duplicatory character of some of the intelligence organizations affiliated with the theater G-2 has been commented on elsewhere. A particularly flagrant example can be found in the publication, by CIC, of so-called "area studies." Hastily assembled, mimeograph issues, with old or inadequate map material, these "area studies," were developed by CIC, in Sidney or Brisbane, within a stone's throw of the AGS Headquarters, then successfully engaged in the publication of thousands of copies of printed terrain studies and handbooks that reached staffs and troops well in advance of operations. CIC was either not aware of these publications, which is ignorant, or they preferred their own "trade-mark", which is wasteful, presumptuous, and inefficient. One of the worst examples is their publication, Area Study No. 22, "North Borneo, Sarawak and Brunei." At this time, there were published by AGS and available in large numbers the following: Handbook No. 59, "Erunel Bay"; Terrain Studies No. 89, "Sarawak"; No. 90, "North Borneo"; and No. 109, "South Borneo."

topographical characteristics of the specific region. The data were procured through research into old colonial administrative reports, exploitation of scientific records in libraries and archives; and interrogations of colonial magistrates, constabulary, planters and missionaries. The publications were profusely illustrated with maps, mosaics, and latest aerial photographs, and were prepared far in advance of operational needs. The engineers contributed separate Annexes. For distribution, see Plate 23.

"Special Reports" constituted a second important group of AGS publications. These were prepared on short notice, usually in mimeographed reproduction, for the speedy presentation of available geographic information when the demand was immediate; 101 titles were compiled by AGS in addition to 110 separate Terrain Studies.(27) Their AGS publications were prepared within the theater and flown in on carefully calculated flight schedules from the printers in Brisbane, Australia, to the assembly areas of troops being staged for landing assaults.(Plate 23)

"Terrain Handbooks" constituted an abbreviated format of the larger "Terrain Studies" and were produced as a special convenience to the fighting troops. Bound in pocket size, they were issued down to company and platoon commanders usually aboard ship, en route to landing operations. They became a sort of personal "Baedeker" for the assault echelons, as the troops hit the beaches. Over a hundred thousand copies of "Terrain Handbooks" were distributed, covering the major landings of our forces, from Hollandia to


(27) The "Terrain Studies" prepared in SWPA preceded the American counterpart, JANIS (Joint Army-Navy Intelligence Studies), by many months; they set the pace in format and craftsmanship. They were developed within a minimum time period to meet immediate operational needs in New Guinea, the Halmaheras, and the Philippines. By mutual arrangement JANIS studies were oriented to cover the areas to the north -- Japan, China, Korea, and Manchuria -- for strategic purposes, at a later date.

ALLIED GEOGRAPHICAL SECTION PUBLICATIONS
NUMBER OF PUBLICATIONS

Terrain Studies	110
Terrain Handbooks	62
Special Reports	101

NUMBER OF COPIES DISTRIBUTED TO 15 SEPTEMBER 1945

	Ground Forces	Naval Forces	Air Forces	GHQ etc	Totals
Terrain Studies	21,349	16,674	14,817	12,988	65,828
Terrain Handbooks ..	50,345	21,487	25,432	17,092	114,356
Special Reports	5,416	1,737	918	5,300	13,371
Totals	77,110	39,898	41,167	35,380	193,555



- NOTE:** In addition to the above, the following publications were prepared;
- a. Booklets; Getting About in New Guinea)
The Native Carrier) Total Copies Dis-
You and the Native) tributed; 250,000
 - b. Spot Reports - Numbers 1 to 30
 - c. AD HOC Reports (Prepared for adjoining theatres)
 - d. Sailing Directions, Australian Hydrographic Publications 1-7 and 8.
 - e. Annotated Bibliography of Southwest Pacific and Adjacent Areas - Vols I-III
 - f. Vegetation Study and Timber Resources Study - Philippine Islands

Leyte; for comparison in size of the "Terrain Handbook" to the "Terrain Study" see Plate 24.

In addition to the more elaborate series of AGS publications, there was also a group of "Special Publications" for the information of the individual soldier. Pocket size, in booklet form, these were so popular and useful that ultimately 250,000 copies were distributed. Titles included: "Getting About in New Guinea," "The Native Carrier," "You and the Native," etc.; these booklets gave practical information and tips on conduct which were credited with saving many lives and greatly increasing the effectiveness of the troops engaged in the difficult New Guinea Area.


Part of the success of operations in SWPA was directly attributable to the fact that the Allied soldier was generally well informed. Our geographical intelligence, in important combat areas, provided just the type of information which the Japanese commanders chronically complained that they were never furnished. Maj. Gen. Tanikawa, Kazuo, Staff Officer of the Japanese Eighth Area Army stated:

We did not have information about the terrain in New Guinea. As our forces withdrew under enemy pressure, we left some men with wireless sets to get information behind the enemy's lines. The results, however, were meager... Allied intelligence was far above what we would attain. (28)

AGS made other contributions in the form of publications which did not fall into any special category or series. Here its most signal achievement was a three volume "Annotated Bibliography of Southwest Pacific and Adjacent Area," a compilation of all existing titles bearing upon these areas which were to be found in the libraries of the foremost Australian universities.

Though mindful that SWPA had first priority upon its

(28) Interrogation Files, G-2 Historical Section, GHQ, FEC.



**Comparative Size of Terrain Study
and Terrain Handbook**

The terrain study was developed for use of planning staffs, in major commands, while the terrain handbook was designed for the individual soldier, a pocket-size "Baedeker" for every assault echelon, down to platoons, as a guide to each landing area.

activities, AGS made every effort, throughout the entire war period, to render all possible assistance to other Area Commands. Commencing in mid-1943, it agreed to assume responsibility for supplying information on Sumatra and Malaya to the South East Asia Command (SEAC). Between that time and August 1945, it conducted interrogations of more than 650 informants for the sole benefit of that Command and supplied it with over 200 situation reports. Much information was also collected and supplied to ISTD(29), India.

Throughout its existence, AGS strove to amplify its sources of information by establishing liaison with Geographical Intelligence Agencies the world over. Some of its attempts were unsuccessful while others proved to be very fruitful, especially in respect to the Philippines and Japan.

4. Allied Translator and Interpreter Section (ATIS):(30)


This section became possibly the most important single intelligence agency of the war. Its basic mission was the translation of captured documents and the interrogation of prisoners of war through the effective pooling of an initially small number of Allied linguists.

ATIS was organized on 19 September 1942. The brief experience of the U.S. forces on Bataan with a handful of Nisei interpreters(31) had clearly shown the enormous potentialities of a competent interrogation and interpreter linguist service. When the Allies passed to the offensive, the flow of documents and prisoners became so great that the centralization of available language personnel in one organization became imperative. Language specialists

(29) The Inter-Service Topographical Department, a British Geographical Intelligence Agency.

(30) See Vol V, Intell Series, "Operations of the Allied Translator and Interpreter Section, GHQ, SWPA.

(31) Prior to 1941 the AG of S, G-2 Philippine Department employed several second-generation (Nisei) Japanese from Hawaii as counter-intelligence agents in Manila in surveillance of the large Japanese colony. These men formed the small beginning of mighty ATIS.



ATIS EXECUTIVE GROUP, INDOOROPOLLY, BRISBANE, 1944

Front Row L to R : Lt Col E. Meredith, AIF, CO, Allied Land Forces Unit; Col S. Masbitt, USA, Co-ordinator; Lt Comdr L. Hopkinson, RN CO, Allied Naval Forces Unit; Lt Col G. G. Allman, RAAF, CO, Allied Air Forces Unit.
Second Row : Maj J. Suckton, AIF, Plans and Liaison Section; Lt Col W. Holt, USA, Executive Officer; Maj G. Chiger, AIF, Information Section; Maj J. Anderson, USA, Plans and Liaison Section; Lt Col W. Holt, USA, Executive Officer; Maj G. Chiger, AIF, Information Section; Capt J. Young, USA, Production Section; Squadron Leader J. Beveridge, RAAF, Examination Section.

were called from all Allied services and organizations, but due to the complexities of the Japanese language, relatively few qualified linguists were available. In addition to Japanese, ATIS contained personnel able to interpret or translate 34 foreign languages.

The success of this organization was attributable largely to rigid observance of the following principles:

The pooling, to the maximum extent permissible by circumstances, of all linguistic resources.

The complete elimination except for purposes of interior administration of all national and service distinction.

The strict adherence to the rule that all information was simultaneously released to all services.

ATIS remained inter-Allied and inter-service in character from the time in early October 1942 when it consisted of about 35 officers and men until September 1945 when its strength had exceeded 1900 officers and enlisted men. The combat quality of its service is attested by the fact that during this period over 180 members of the organization received awards ranging from the Bronze Star to the Distinguished Service Medal, while some 125 additional members were cited by division and brigade commanders. ATIS personnel participated in 61 combat operations.

Most valuable results were achieved by ATIS personnel working in the field with combat forces. Translator and interpreter teams were sent out with front line units on combat missions. Competent intelligence teams from ATIS field detachments habitually accompanied troops in all initial landing operations. Their control of the collection of documents (efficiently aided by CIC Dets.), their immediate translation of documents captured (Plates 26 & 27), and their spot interrogation of prisoners taken on patrol or in battle furnished field commanders with a great deal of information of immediate tactical value. Front line surrender broadcasts and the preparation on the spot of surrender leaflets was also responsible for the capture of many prisoners of war.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PLATE 26

UNCLASSIFIED

ALLIED TRANSLATOR AND INTERPRETER SECTION
SOUTH WEST PACIFIC AREA

A.T.I.S. PUBLICATION

No. 6

DATE: 14 Dec 44

THE EXPLOITATION OF JAPANESE DOCUMENTS

FOREWORD

This pamphlet has been prepared at the direction of the War Department. No brief is held for the methods described herein nor is it believed that they are the ideal. They are simply those arrived at empirically by an Inter-Allied, Inter-Service Organization over a period of two years in order to meet the constantly changing situation encountered during eight operations in the South West Pacific Area. Although these methods are based on the principles laid down in USA Field Manual 30-15, British Manual of Military Intelligence No. 4-1938 and SOPI No. 23, GHQ, SWPA, 8 September 1944, they have been evolved by constant changes to meet exigencies as they arose. It is certain that further changes will occur as conditions and circumstances require.

Such success as may have been attained is attributable largely to rigid observance of the following principles of conduct:

- a. The pooling, to the maximum extent permissible by circumstances, of all linguistic resources.
- b. The complete elimination, except for purposes of interior administration, of all National and Service distinctions.
- c. The strict adherence to the rule that all information is simultaneously released to all services.

SIDNEY F. MASHBIR,
Colonel, S. C.,
Co-ordinator.

SFM/HD/GC/JEA/REW/NLF

UNCLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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During this period thousands of printed documents, falling into 13 different main classes or categories, were issued to troops and staffs. They included ATIS "Publications" - a numbered series for general reference purposes; "Bulletins," "Inventories," "Spot Reports," "Current Translations," "Enemy Publications," "Interrogation Reports," "Research Reports," "Philippine Series Bulletins," "Advanced Echelon Reports," "Philippine Series Translations," and "Interrogation Spot Reports."

The total number of pages of documents printed and distributed monthly increased from about 20,000 in January 1943 to some 430,000 in January 1944 and almost 2,000,000 in January 1945 when a wartime peak was reached.(32)

Aggregate "A" (Top priority only) Title Subjects Production from Sept 1942 to Sept 1945:

Processed and listed in bulletins	33,500
Translated	19,000
Printed and published	17,000

By May 1945, the transfer of land forces from SWPA to AFPAC had more than doubled the strength of the latter. A natural result was a very material increase in AFPAC linguistic requirements. ATIS personnel totaled 373. ATIS was able to furnish Central Pacific linguist pools some 30 officer and 80 enlisted linguists, over and above those required for Divisions, Corps, and Army. 600 more were needed to service additional American troops scheduled to arrive. The War Department, thoroughly convinced of the value and importance of ATIS, charged AFPAC with the disposition and supervision of Japanese linguists, politely suggesting "one agency" to handle and coordinate them. G-2 was indicated to be that agency.

Toward the end of hostilities, ATIS personnel were

(32) From graph in "Brief History of ATIS Wartime Activities," 18 June 1945 (Prepared by ATIS Staff). Copy in ATIS files.



Maj Gen C. A. Willoughby (left), representing General MacArthur, leads the Japanese emperor's emissary, Lt Gen Torashiro Kawabe (right) into GHQ, SWPA, City Hall, Manila, where the Japanese were tendered the terms of surrender. Following Lt Gen Kawabe is Rear-Admiral Ichiro Yokoyama; Col S. F. Mashbir, CO, ATIS, is in the background.



Maj Gen C. A. Willoughby (left) explains, through Col S. F. Mashbir (center), to the head of the Japanese Surrender Mission, Lt Gen Kawabe (right), the technique of surrender negotiations before entering the conference room, City Hall, Manila, 19 August 1945.

SURRENDER IN MANILA, 1945

called on for the historical task of handling the immense linguist problem of the pre-surrender conference in Manila which included a strong Japanese delegation. Working at top speed, they translated the internationally important documents dealing with the surrender in record time in addition to furnishing top-flight interpreters for the important oral discussions which then took place.

Later, ATIS played an indispensable role in the Occupation of Japan by providing the translators and interpreters' service for the many civil sections of SCAP which were developed for the administration of a nation with a population of 80,000,000 which uses one of the world's most complicated languages.

The enormous range and coverage of subjects published by this remarkable organization continued throughout the Occupation period. The following table for April 1947 shows a representative monthly performance:

Document Pages Translated	6,080
Documents Processed	554
Pages Press Translation	13,859
Document Pages Scanned	124,320
Printed Pages Produced	7,116
Total Pages Distributed	384,297
Pages Research Matters Written	881
Pages Press Summary Written	72
Repatriates Interrogated	1,177
Interrogations for other Agencies	10
Interpreters	286
Translators	54
Linguists Tested and Classified	189
Linguists who Received Training	143

For further details see Chap. V. Par. 4-b.

5. Central Bureau (CB):

Central Bureau, a combined Australian-American organization, was activated on 15 April 1942 under the command of Col. Joe R. Sherr, one of the officers evacuated from Bataan. From its inception until the end of the war the Bureau operated under the direction of Maj. Gen. S.B. Akin, Chief Signal Officer of the Southwest Pacific Area, who was largely responsible for its establishment



MAJ GEN S. B. AKIN, CHIEF SIGNAL OFFICER, SWPA (1942/47)



COL A. SINKOV, CENTRAL BUREAU (1942/46)

and technical development.(33)

The first contingent of American signal intelligence personnel to reach Australia after the outbreak of the war consisted of six officers and eight enlisted men who comprised the 837th Signal Service Detachment. These men left the United States on 16 April 1942 on the last scheduled Clipper flight to Hawaii. As all regular runs from Honolulu to Auckland, New Zealand, had been discontinued, they had to "sweat out" the remaining 7000 miles of their trip as space became available on USAAF and RAAF Planes. From Sydney they proceeded to Melbourne to join the GHQ established by General MacArthur. Within the next two months the American contingent was augmented by 12 additional enlisted men and 3 officers including Major A. Sinkov who took over the command of the Detachment.

The Australian Army component of Central Bureau was the Australian Special Wireless Group which had seen considerable service against the Germans in Africa and the Near East and which included some British personnel who had escaped from Singapore. The Australian Air Force component consisted of personnel assigned from Victoria Barracks, Melbourne,

In the field at that time, Central Bureau maintained

(33) The citation for General Akin reads as follows: Major General SPENCER B. AKIN, 02916, United States Army. For exceptionally meritorious and distinguished service to the Government in a position of great responsibility. From the time of organization of the Southwest Pacific Area, through the Papua, New Guinea, Northern Solomons, Bismarck Archipelago, Southern Philippines and Luzon Campaigns, 1942-1945, General Akin served as Chief Signal Officer. Confronted with the task of establishing an expanding signal communication service, he planned, organized and supervised the system that presently included Australia, New Guinea, Northern Solomons, Bismarck Archipelago and the Philippine Islands. With great foresight, firm determination, and rare organizing ability, he applied his comprehensive technical knowledge with marked success to this difficult undertaking. By his sound judgment, energy and professional qualifications, he brought to the Southwest Pacific Area an efficient signal system that was a substantial factor to the success of the operations.

radio personnel as follows: AIF - No. 51 W/T Unit and the RAAF - No. 1 Wireless Unit. Attached to the latter as special instructors were three U.S. signal intelligence personnel (Lt. Howard W. Brown, Sgt. John J. Phelan, Sgt. Carl Card) who had been evacuated with Colonel Sherr from Bataan.

The 837th Signal Service Detachment was deactivated in May 1943 and was replaced by the Signal Intelligence Service (still a component of Central Bureau) under Col. Harold S. Doud, with Capt. Chester W. Ray as Commander of Troops. In the autumn of 1943 Colonel Sinkov became Commanding Officer, SIS, and Capt. I.W. Wolfe, Commander of Troops.

Central Bureau expanded rapidly. Its strength in 1943 was well over a thousand men and women. Technical direction under General Akin was vested in three assistant directors who were the ranking officers of the three largest contingents: Colonel Sinkov for the Americans; Lt. Col. A.W. Sandford for the Australian Military Forces; and Wing Comdr. H. Roy Booth for the Royal Australian Air Force.

The Bureau brought under a unified control personnel from the signal intelligence services of five nations. Included were the following military and naval forces: Army of the United States, Australian Imperial Forces, Australian Military Forces, Australian Women's Auxiliary Service, British Army, Canadian Military Forces, Royal Air Force, Royal Australian Air Force, Royal Australian Navy, Royal Navy, United States Women's Army Corps, Women's Auxiliary Australian Air Force, United States Army. The United States Navy was not included.

In order to avoid duplication, promote smooth inter-service relationships, and assure the maximum benefit from the pooling of resources and centralizing of control, representatives

of each of the 14 component services were detailed to work on all of the major problems. Personnel were placed where they could work most effectively regardless of nationality or the component to which they belonged. Before the war came to an end the personnel strength of Central Bureau was more than 4000 and there were detachments in all parts of the Southwest Pacific Area. Of this number about fifty per cent were American personnel.

Since the work of Central Bureau was always closely connected with GHQ, the organization followed General MacArthur as he moved northward. This took the headquarters of Central Bureau from Melbourne to Brisbane (September 1942), to Hollandia (late summer 1944), to Leyte (October 1944), to San Miguel (May 1945), and to Tokyo (September 1945). The first move came in September 1942, when GHQ was moved to Brisbane. In Brisbane the administrative control of the American contingent passed (February 1943) to USAFFE. Operational control, however, remained with GHQ throughout the war.

In November 1945, its mission accomplished and a fine record of cooperative effort and notable achievement to its credit, Central Bureau was deactivated. General MacArthur commended the organization for its outstanding achievements and awarded the Legion of Merit to ten of its members.

Chapter IV

MISCELLANEOUS INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES

1. Relationship of Theater G-2 to Army, Corps, Services, and Associated Intelligence Groups:

a. Naval Intelligence, CENPAC and CINCPAC

Even though task forces frequently combined for specific operations, CINCPAC maintained the tightest control over its naval elements. Only the Seventh Fleet was under direct operational control of SWPA. G-2 utilized the Naval Intelligence Officer, Seventh Fleet, Capt. A. H. McCollum as an exclusive channel of communication and intelligence dissemination.(1) Frequent conferences of a general strategic character were held with SWPA in which the Navy habitually included its intelligence officers to confer with G-2. It was never possible to develop a joint intelligence organization in SWFA(2) such as existed in Guam/Hawaii in the form of JICPOA.(3) However, in the Plans and Estimates Section, G-2, the Navy did furnish one to two Naval officers who, combined with a similar representative from FEAF(4) and 5th AAF, became in fact a joint service representation which guided "estimates" for joint operations in fairly reasonable channels. For that reason Plate 30 shows only a liaison connection with Navy and JICPOA. However, the relationship was cordial and G-2 never lacked information of naval character, though more was given than received, particularly in cryptanalysis and linguist products. Ultimately JICPOA established a parallel linguist organization in Guam/Honolulu, which could

-
- (1) A top-flight intelligence operator, Capt McCollum was instrumental in direct naval aid. It was largely due to his efforts that submarine transport was made available, for the dispatch of intelligence parties into enemy areas, especially to the Philippines.
(2) The C/S SWPA failed to recognize the importance thereof, and G-2, on its own as usual, did not have enough power to accomplish it.
(3) Joint Intelligence Center, Pacific Ocean Areas.
(4) Far East Air Forces.




Chart showing Intelligence Relationship
with Theaters GenPAC and CinCPAC
20 May 1945

ordinarily be considered a waste of personnel, except that the strategic interest and axis of operations of CINCPAC, CENPAC, and FOA were far to the north of the operational axis of the SWPA through New Guinea, although they did join on several historical occasions: on Bougainville, on Leyte, and again in the reconquest of Luzon via Lingayen Gulf.

b. JICPOA

There was a constant exchange of data and ideas between G-2, SWPA, and JICPOA, although this activity was slow in building up due to the great distance between initial objectives. However, when operations moved to the Western Pacific and military objectives began to coincide, exchange of intelligence data was more thoroughly coordinated.

After the operations in the Philippines began, it was necessary for JICPOA to supply operational intelligence, charts and maps for the amphibious phases, to the elements of the Third Fleet under SWPA: this intelligence was ordinarily passed to the Seventh Fleet through G-2, SWPA, and it was in this way that the naval units in these operations were prepared for close coordination with the Air and Ground forces. The basic intelligence for operations in the SWPA was provided to JICPOA by G-2, SWPA.

Early in 1945 JICPOA established an advance intelligence center at Guam. This was a relatively small organization which normally prepared intelligence from first phase photo interpretation. This organization worked in very close coordination with G-2, SWPA, and it was by direction of the chief of JICPOA(5) that copy-negatives of all photographs taken of the Japanese Empire were immediately forwarded to G-2, SWPA, for utilization in preparation of intelligence for the final assault on Japan. The cooperation between adjacent theaters is clearly shown in Twitty's comments, viz:

(5) Brig Gen J. J. Twitty, C.E, who was most co-operative within his sphere of activity. See his brief description of his activities.

The many difficulties of transportation and communication in the Pacific can never be understood by officers who did not serve there during the war. We had a situation in which the headquarters of two adjacent theater commanders were for the greater share of the time separated by a distance of approximately 6,000 miles. One of these commanders was of the Army and utilized Army signal communications and Army air communications in nearly all of his activities. The other commander was of the Navy and utilized Naval signal communications and Naval air transportation through all of his operations. The Intelligence officers of both of these commands were Army officers, and in spite of the vast distance that separated the two commands and despite the minor frictions which may have arisen between corresponding members of other divisions of these staffs, there always existed between JICPOA and G-2 SWPA a spirit of mutual high regard and willingness to cooperate in the many problems which arose in the intelligence operations of the war.

Officers of the European Theater will never be able to appreciate some of the difficulties of intelligence peculiar to the Pacific Theater during the war. It is no exaggeration to say that for each person who had visited Tarawa prior to the war and was able to provide fragmentary intelligence of this tiny island, the intelligence officer in the European Theater would probably find a million persons who had visited the Normandy beaches and could provide intelligence thereof. There was another disadvantage, in that most of the moves in the Pacific Theater were over distances of hundreds of miles and the time element between the procurement of photography and the preparation of operational intelligence and operational maps necessitated extremely rapid work at all times.

There was a constant exchange of data and ideas between G-2 SWPA and JICPOA, although this activity was slow in building up due to the great distance between initial objectives. However, when operations moved to the Western Pacific and military objectives became identical, exchange of intelligence data was carefully and thoroughly coordinated.

It is recalled that prior to the LEYTE operation in which General MacArthur re-entered the Philippines, intelligence for the 24th Corps was provided by reprinting at JICPOA 6000 copies of an intelligence pamphlet prepared by the allied geographical section of SWPA. This material was placed in the hands of the 24th Corps 36 hours after request as an operational need.

There was available for communication between the two intelligence officers a top level communication channel of the Army Signal Corps. This channel provided a means for the immediate exchange of elements of top level intelligence at all times. It also provided a secure Army channel of communication between G-2 SWPA and JICPOA on many important intelligence matters.

After the operations in the Philippines began, it was necessary for JICPOA to provide operational intelligence, as well as operational charts and maps for the Amphibious phases, to the elements of the Third

Fleet engaged in these operations under SWPA. This intelligence was ordinarily passed to the Seventh Fleet through the services of G-2 SWPA, and it was in this way that the naval units in these operations were prepared for close coordination with the Air and Ground forces. The basic intelligence for these operations in SWPA was provided to JICPOA by G-2 SWPA.

Early in 1945 it was necessary for JICPOA to establish an advance intelligence center at Guam. This was a relatively small organization which prepared intelligence from first phase photo interpretation normally. This organization worked in very close coordination with G-2 SWPA, and it was by direction of the Commanding General, JICPOA, that copy-negatives of all photographs taken of the Empire were immediately forwarded to G-2 SWPA for utilization in preparation of intelligence for the final assault on Japan.

At this time it was found necessary to hold a conference pertaining to the mapping responsibilities of the two theaters. This conference was held in Pearl Harbor in the spring of 1945, with representatives from the Office of the Chief of Engineers, G-2 SWPA, the Chief Engineer SWPA, the 21st Bomber Command, CINCPAC-CINCPAC, and JICPOA. At this conference there was a de-limitation of responsibilities by areas for the operations in preparation of maps, road maps, and certain other forms of intelligence for use in the final assault on Japan.

The Commanding General of JICPOA was also psychological officer for CINCPAC-CINCPAC, and gave considerable assistance to G-2 SWPA in the psychological assault against the Japanese. At one time I recall sending 5,000,000 leaflets by air to the 6th Army for their use in routing the Japanese out of their final desperate stand against the American forces in the Philippines, at a time when SWPA facilities were obligated for operational and planning needs of greater importance. Beginning about 1 May 1945, 600,000 leaflets per month from SWPA were included in the consignments along with others prepared by JICPOA-OWI for dropping over the Empire by the 21st Bomber Command.

Upon conclusion of the war, JICPOA planned and, with the approval and cooperation of G-2 SWPA, set up a Naval Technical Mission to Japan known as "NAVTECHJAP". This mission upon reaching Japan coordinated its activities under the direction of G-2 SWPA and served a highly useful purpose to Naval Intelligence. The intelligence which was secured was intelligence in which the Ground Forces and Air Forces would not normally be vitally interested but which to the U.S. Navy was of inestimable value.

It may be said in conclusion that for agencies so widely separated, the spirit of cooperation and camaraderie which existed between G-2 SWPA and JICPOA was most invigorating and inspiring. All persons engaged in intelligence under these two activities recognized the need for teamwork and prompt response to all operational needs.(B)

(6) Letter, Col J.J. Twitty to Col F.H. Wilson, Chief, Historical Sec, 2 Feb 1948.

c. Theater Units

The practice of the Theater G-2 was to leave considerable autonomy to G-2's of Army, Corps, and Divisions, but to furnish them liberally with theater information through dissemination of Daily Intelligence Summaries, which contained digests of radios of operational significance passing through GHQ and not ordinarily distributed to lower echelons. In view of the wide distribution of many units geographically, the over-all picture was best known at GHQ and development of the GHQ "Daily" was inescapable. Later on Sixth(7) and Eighth Army(8) developed first class publications of their own and followed a fairly uniform pattern. Plate 31 shows the adaptation in the SWPA of peace-time manuals, regulations, and procedures to war-time needs. At times a functional division, as between "theater" and "war department" intelligence, was observed, a distinction between "tactical" and "strategic" conditions.


A delineation also had to be made between combat and rear areas. This division reappeared in nearly every activity. This was due to the enormous geographic distances that existed in the Southwest Pacific theater, far beyond anything encountered in the European Theater. In the initial part of the campaign of Papua, lines of communications extended for 1500 miles from Sydney, Brisbane, Rockhampton (Australia) to Port Moresby (Papua). In the latter stages of the campaign, they followed the axis of operations through New Guinea to the Philippines. Extended lines of communications encouraged CIC units, to some extent, to maintain an artificial independence in rear areas, but they came under immediate G-2 control when they entered forward combat areas.

2. Combined Operational Intelligence Center (COIC):

It should be noted here that two SWPA Special Staff Sec-

(7) Col H.V. White, G-2 Sixth Army, a top-flight intelligence officer.

(8) Col G. Jones, G-2 Eighth Army, an able Staff Officer whose fine qualities came into play in the fast-maneuver war of this Army in the Visayas.



This SWFA table generally follows existing War Dept Manuals, regulations and practices. The division into "positive" and "negative" intelligence is an old-time W.D. definition, it is also functional; all these sub divisions produce intelligence, of one category or other; the heads, while operating the agency, must nevertheless have a status as members of the staff for whom they directly work. The position that it is "GHQ" or the "C.S." is incidental and an academic distinction, the Asst C of S, are exactly what they denote, assistants, therefore part and parcel of the C/S set-up. Plate dated 20 May 1945

tions, COIC and CIC(9), both of which performed certain intelligence activities, did not directly function under G-2 during the period of hostilities, although liaison became inescapable. COIC, with the ambitious title of "Combined Operational Intelligence Center," was originally designed chiefly for the defense of the Australian mainland and consisted of Australian intelligence units attached to territorial and coastal sectors. Its headquarters was essentially an Australian-staffed "message center," which published an assemblage and reprint of important operational messages of intelligence value, i.e., a sort of daily situation report. In terms of daily radio reports this function is usually covered in U.S. Army Staffs by means of ditto or mimeo copies of incoming messages, either through routine distribution by the AG or directly from the Signal Corps.


COIC was deactivated by the Australian High Command as duplicatory and competitive of the work of its G-2 field staffs. It became an international sensation when this organization, composed primarily of British and Australian nationals, was retained by GHQ, SWPA, thus producing exactly the duplication which the Australians had been quick to recognize and careful to avoid.(10) COIC could never displace G-2 or produce the great volume of its

(9) Counter Intelligence Corps.

(10) The Chief of Staff, for some obscure reason, personally sponsored this unit. The intent was probably to relegate G-2 to the status of a purely "advisory" rather than an "operating" agency. However, there is a far cry from a "message pack" to a "G-2 Estimate of the Situation". Battle order, radio intercepts, evaluation of reports, etc., are factors that were not in the purview or the capacity of COIC. The title was sound and the idea of an "intelligence center" was always a G-2 objective, but there was no room for two intelligence staffs. While the twilight zone of authority and jurisdiction was never settled, the staff and personnel of COIC maintained cordial relations with G-2. The unit was commanded by Group Captain G. F. Malley, RAAF, of Sydney, who served as an Air Force Officer in three wars. When the Sino-Japanese War started, he was appointed air advisor to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek, with the rank of Group Captain. He returned to Australia when the Pacific War broke out and continued to serve in the RAAF. Group Captain Malley was an able executive and a delightful colleague.

war-time intelligence literature; however, the suggestion of competition proved a constant source of embarrassment. It contributed nothing tangible other than the relative minor convenience of a daily "message-pack," circulating the morning after the original radios had already been read by the Staff, in AG distribution copies: it represented a certain drain on manpower.

The following bar graph presents an overall comparison of officer strength in various Staff Sections:



G-2 suggested that in view of losses and the continuing expansion of AFPAC, a comparison of officer strength between GHQ and COIC strongly indicated the need of functional readjustment, if the most economical use of manpower in these related organizations were to be made. A "merger" was again recommended by G-2.

For economy of effort, it was suggested that certain G-2 functions be combined with analogous COIC activities, resulting in the saving of manpower, increase in efficiency, better coordination and greater harmony, viz.:

COIC Research, Records and Archives: COIC employed three officers; G-2 two, one of them being a statistician; both sections could have been combined since they worked in identical fields.

COIC Communiqué Group: COIC employed from four to six officers on communiqués and operational radios; G-2 from two to three. Since both had identical duties, it was only practical that they should have been combined. G-2 was chronologically the first

in this field and required no assistance.

COIC Navy Intelligence: COIC actually published a "Daily Naval Survey," which contained Allied, but primarily Enemy Fleet Intelligence. The same subject was already and completely covered in Section III of the "G-2 Daily Summary." The sources of ordinary Naval Intelligence were obviously the same for COIC and G-2. Navy Intelligence nevertheless published a weekly Naval review. This publication exploited the 7th Fleet Naval review, as was noted by the C.N.I. This paper was of necessity incomplete, since not all Pacific intelligence sources were made available to Navy Intelligence. This was obviously a duplication of effort. Naval Intelligence should have operated under G-2 in its Navy Section.

Despite numerous attempts to bring this group under centralized control, COIC was finally deactivated without ever having been actually absorbed by G-2. This is a monument to a Chief of Staff's wasteful predilections.

3. Counter Intelligence Corps:(11)

Throughout the entire war the Counter Intelligence Corps operated under G-2, USAFFE, rather than G-2, SWPA. The allocation of counterintelligence activities to an "administrative" (USAFFE) rather than an "operational" command (SWPA) was inefficient but is somewhat explicable by the fact of the continuous geographical separation of USAFFE from SWPA: this administrative rear-echelon remained literally thousands of miles behind forward Headquarters. Col. Elliott R. Thorpe, GSC, appointed AC of S, G-2, USAFFE, upon the reactivation of that Headquarters on 26 February 1943, had previously served in the same capacity in USAFFE, where his duties included counterintelligence operations vis-a-vis the

(11) See Vol VIII, Intell Series, "Operations of the Counter Intelligence Corps, SWPA, and Occupied Japan."

U.S. Army forces in Australia.(12) When SWPA forward echelon opened in Papua, USAFFE remained in Australia.

Shortly after the re-establishment of USAFFE, Maj. Albert L. Vreeland arrived from the United States (March 1943) and reported to G-2. He was described in a War Department letter as "Commanding Officer of CIC in SWPA" and was given command of the USAFFE/CIC Detachment. A separate office was opened in Brisbane, Australia, and began to function in early April 1943.

Five months later, USAFFE, acting on War Department authority, issued orders "assigning" all CIC personnel in the SWPA to Military Intelligence Section, CIC, WD, and "attaching" them to Headquarters, USAFFE. Those recruited, trained, and employed locally on CIC activities were assigned to Headquarters Company, USAFFE, and placed on detached service with the CIC unit.

Operating primarily in Australia, i.e., the Z of I for SWPA, the mission of the Counter Intelligence Corps was normal but obviously limited in scope.(13) The Corps was to assure security of all personnel and materials; investigation of disaffection, sabotage, or espionage; continuous check for deficiencies in the security of all military installations; indoctrination of troops in security matters; and cooperation with other interested agencies in establishing security of captured enemy installations, documents, and material.

Duties of CIC personnel in ports and base areas were in connection with security of installations, port control, civilian

(12) The designation of two G-2's in the same command is, of course, debatable; as a matter of fact, the division of activities was again influenced by geography. Advanced echelon SWPA operated in Port Moresby, with G-2 primarily concerned with combat intelligence while USAFFE remained in Sydney/Brisbane, primarily concerned with supply and administration.

(13) Headquarters CIC (USAFFE) remained in Australia (Melbourne, Sydney, Brisbane) from 1942-1944 and did not displace forward to GHQ, Hollandia until November 1944. The comparatively few CIC detachments in the field operated under G-2's of territorial tactical commands.

control, routine security checks of cryptographic personnel and soldiers of foreign extraction, and of censorship violations.

Trained personnel needed for this work was not available from the United States. It thus became necessary to develop a CIC training program. In June 1943 Major Vreeland opened a school in Brisbane, Australia.(14) Students included American officers and enlisted men, as well as officers of the Australian Field Security Service. Under pressure by G-2, GHQ, to offset the Z of I character of operations and prepare CIC for field employment, the curriculum embraced techniques and procedures of the more experienced Australian Field Security Service: military police and military government; handling of prisoners of war and captured documents; the interpretation of photographs; map reading; elementary instruction in "pidgin" English and in the Malay language. In anticipation of the employment of Counter Intelligence with task forces (together with members of technical intelligence teams), field security training was enlarged although, according to plan, the teams would come under the supervision of G-2, GHQ and G-2, Sixth Army. Similar training was also initiated for the 2d Filipino Battalion, then arriving from the United States.

Personnel of the CIC Detachment, USAFFE, were placed on temporary duty with tactical units in both forward and rear areas, and promptly came under operational control of the tactical G-2's.

(15) A few small field units, patterned after the Australian Security Detachments, were used in Papua and New Guinea. The jungle terrain of New Guinea, however, was not conducive to nor did it require extensive counterintelligence operations; normally CIC operations

(14) Full credit must be accorded to this able police technician and administrator.

(15) The absurdity of separation of function appeared every time Z of I units were moved forward: they had to come inescapably under the "operational control" of G-2, in all echelons. This principle should have been observed, in the first place.

have greater productivity in countries with congested industrial areas and urban populations.

In combat and occupied areas the CIC was responsible for search of enemy headquarters, inspection of public facilities, seizure of telephone exchanges, stoppage of civilian communications except those of an emergency nature, the impounding and delivery to censorship teams of all mail, prevention of looting, checking of security, reporting on rumors and morale, and interrogation of enemy agents and sympathizers in conjunction with ATIS teams. As a special CIC project, 11 members of the Corps were placed on duty with the Australian-New Guinea Administrative Unit (ANGAU), in 1943, to study the habits of SWPA natives, their ways of life and systems of administration, and to determine the best method of dealing with them.(16)

When the Allied invasion of the Philippines began, the problems of Filipino collaborators and enemy agents of the former Japanese espionage service assumed importance. General MacArthur ordered the apprehension of "collaborationists." These sometimes included citizens of other than enemy countries. G-2 USAFFE supervised the apprehension and confinement of all suspects. The apprehension and investigation of hundreds of suspects made this a major project.(17)

In order to insure fairness and justice to the accused, CIC instituted a Legal Board of Review. This was composed of lawyers who examined the files to determine whether a prima facie case of collaboration, warranting detention, had been established. The findings of this Board were co-ordinated with the G-2, SWPA.

(16) Several subdivisions of AIB (Allied Intelligence Bureau) were doing the same thing since 1941.

(17) This activity fell into a high level international field, including espionage. Here again, G-2 SWPA had to intervene with or without "authority", and ATIS, with expert linguists, had to fill in the gaps.

4. The 441st Counter Intelligence Corps:

The 441st Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment was activated as the central theater CIC unit at Brisbane, Australia, on 20 August 1944, by General Order No. 79, Hq., USAFFE, 17 August 1944. The Detachment assumed control over 18 other non-tactical CIC detachments which had also been activated by General Order No. 79. Personnel of these had formerly been assigned to Headquarters, 5227th CIC Detachment (Provisional). Concurrently with the above activation, the 5227th CIC Detachment (Provisional) was disbanded and all records and equipment transferred to the 441st CIC Detachment.

As the fighting moved northwards it became apparent that CIC area headquarters should move from Brisbane (Z.I.). Consequently, on 17 November 1944 the 441st CIC Detachment transferred its headquarters to Hollandia, Dutch New Guinea.(18) Five months later, on 14 March 1945, it moved to Manila.

CIC, by May 1945, had developed dual but contradictory functions. In combat sectors CIC personnel came directly under troop G-2's and were teamed with interrogation detachments of ATIS, while in the rear areas they were independent and divorced from the Military Intelligence Section. G-2 protested this inconsistency and stressed the importance of the ultimate coordination of ATIS and CIC teams (as practiced in combat areas), urging the eventual fusion of all intelligence agencies prior to the entry of Japan. The War Department indicated concurrence in this view in old, current, and new instructions.

On 10 June 1945, AFPAC and USAFFE were consolidated. The office of the AC of S, G-2, USAFFE, then dropped the nomenclature of G-2 and became the "Office of the Chief Counter Intelligence Officer," and as a "Special Staff Section" continued to be responsible

(18) In the meantime GHQ Forward Echelon had been operating in Papua, New Guinea, since November 1942, under field conditions.

for counterintelligence activities, retaining direct supervision over the 441st CIC Detachment.(19)

The surrender of the Imperial Japanese Government on 15 August 1945 terminated a phase of CIC but new duties developed during the early days of the occupation of Japan. Based on studies by G-2, GHQ, CIC apprehended the first group of war criminals and interned Axis nationals. As the Occupation progressed, the 441st became a consolidated central unit covering all of Japan and following the pattern developed within the ETO in Germany. The national unit became the general procurement agency for subsidiary CIC organizations and undertook the establishment of a central training school in Tokyo. Geographical command sub-divisions such as the XXIV Corps (Korea) and PHIRYCOM (20) (Philippines and Okinawa) developed CIC units which became locally autonomous but received replacements and trainees from the 441st in Japan.

During this period G-2, GHQ, in his dual G-2 capacity of AFPAC and SCAP, finally assumed operational control of Counter Intelligence. The organization was classified as Civil Intelligence Section (CIS), one of the civil sections of the Occupation. Major sub-divisions of the 441st Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment were: Operations, Plans & Training, Administration, and decentralized operations in three command areas or regions, viz.: I Corps, IX Corps and Tokyo/Metropolitan. For the execution of missions CIS maintained field detachments in every Prefecture of Japan, from Hokkaido to Kyushu.(21)
5. 5250th Technical Intelligence Company (TIC):(22)

Until November 1942 no organized attempt had been made to carry technical intelligence into the field in the Southwest Pacific Area. A few small arms, some ammunition, and odd items of

(19) The semi-independent status of this outfit was continued by the sleight-of-hand of changing a name.

(20) Philippines Ryukyus Command.

(21) The Civil Intelligence Section, see Chap VI.

(22) See Vol VII, Intell Series, "Operations of the Technical Intelligence Unit in the SWPA.

chemical warfare equipment were turned in to ordnance and chemical warfare officers for examination, then forwarded by both American and Australian forces to Australian Army agencies for technical examination, tests and reports. In November, although there were still no technical intelligence teams, a more closely knit control for the processing of captured enemy equipment of intelligence value was established. The flow of materiel was to be from combat troops to service troops in the combat zone, then to the theater special staff officer of the appropriate service (Signal Corps, Engineers, etc.) and thence to the chief of service in the United States. Informational reports on materiel passed through channels from combat troops to S-2 or G-2, then to the AC of S, G-2, GHQ, to the War Department, as well as interchangeably among the service troops handling the materiel. The Chief of each supply arm or service in the Zone of the Interior made final analysis and deductions and prepared visual training aids and field manuals for the operator and maintenance men.

The first technical intelligence unit in the theater was an ordnance group sent from the United States. It began operations in December 1942. The team was divided by function into a headquarters section, a field team and an analysis section. Personnel from these sections were used interchangeably, headquarters and analysis elements going into the field, and vice versa.

Throughout 1942 the channel of evacuation of captured enemy equipment had been Australian. All equipment was sent to Land Headquarters, which then issued the equipment to the appropriate arm or service for further technical analysis and report. In January 1943, arrangements were made for American Chemical Warfare Intelligence officers to be advised of materiel sent back from forward areas by United States forces, so that they could collaborate with Land Headquarters, Australian Army, in its disposition. This system was

a decided improvement even though there was as yet no established Chemical Warfare Intelligence organization. Officers concerned merely examined and reported on Japanese chemical materiel.

The first step toward coordination came in May 1943 when a USAFFE Circular directed the establishment of a salvage depot for captured enemy equipment. Ordnance and Chemical Warfare Service analysis sections were still physically separated from the depot which was used only for shipping and receiving equipment. At the same time, the "Joint Allied Captured Enemy Equipment Board" replaced Australian authorities in exclusively determining the final disposition of captured items. The Board, consisting of two members from the United States, two from the Australian forces, and one from the Allied Naval Forces, disposed of materiel in accordance with technical needs. This permitted both the American and Australian forces to obtain specimens which might not have otherwise been available to them.


In December 1943, responsibility for ground technical intelligence within USAFFE was delegated to the Commanding General, USASOS.(23)

A Technical Intelligence Composite Company was activated. For the first time the T/O and E included the six major services (all except Transportation Corps). On 3 January 1944, the 5250th Technical Intelligence Composite Company, Separate (Provisional) was organized by General Order No. 2, Headquarters, USASOS. The chart from the original directive outlines the organization in detail. (Plate 32)

Centralized control made it possible for teams from the six services to function as one unit, thus enabling them to assist one another during the first days of an operation when speed was

(23) Z of I or rear-area Supply Echelon.

GRAPHIC ORGANIZATION CHART
 5250TH TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE COMPOSITE COMPANY, SEPARATE (PROVISIONAL)
 3 JANUARY 1944



especially important. Individual teams were composed usually of from 2 to 4 men; from 3 to 10 teams were included in a coordinated unit. Information, documents, and equipment could be collected for all branches by all teams and assembled at a central point where the separate items could later be sorted and evaluated by the individual service team concerned. Coordination eliminated questions concerning responsibility and scope of authority and made it possible for the command to have adequately equipped teams constituted and trained in advance of all operations, thus assuring adequate technical intelligence coverage.

Despite the fact that only two branches, Chemical Warfare Service and Ordnance, pooled their work for the Admiralties Campaign in the spring of 1944, their success substantiated the decision to combine all six services for the Hollandia operation. Additional success confirmed the theory that by combining technical intelligence components more territory could be covered in less time.

In spite of the achievements of the combined unit at Hollandia, another such unit was not used until the Morotai operation in September 1944. Varying numbers of field teams were used for Arara, Wakde, Sarmi, Biak, and Sansapor. After Morotai, however, combined units were used for all subsequent large-scale operations, including the occupation of Japan.

The U.S. Technical Intelligence Depot, home base for most technical intelligence detailed analysis, moved with the advancing forces and kept within fairly easy reach of the teams and their captured equipment. Initially established in Brisbane (1943), the Depot was shifted to Finschhafen in August 1944, and while there was enlarged to include housing and other facilities necessary to pre-operational staging of technical intelligence teams. The next transfer was to Manila in March 1945. There technical intelligence

came of age and began operating more efficiently than it had at any previous time in the western Pacific Area. The last displacement was in November when the Depot moved to Tokyo. By General Order No. 337, GHQ, AFFAC, dated 20 November 1945, the 5250th Technical Intelligence Company was established as a theater overhead installation with its own T/O.

In the Occupation, the 5250th Technical Intelligence Company continued to function but with objectives quite unlike those which prevailed during the war period. On 30 June 1947, 5250th Technical Intelligence Company was inactivated and General Headquarters Technical Intelligence Detachment activated to take its place and to carry on its functions which now were primarily in support of Civil agencies of SCAP, notably the NRS (Natural Resources Section) and the ESS (Economic & Scientific Section). Operating under control of G-2, FEC, its varied activities included:

Inspection and Surveillance:

Investigation of, and preparation of reports upon research laboratories, schools, manufacturing agencies, etc.

Reparations:

Investigations, and submission of reports on equipment and materials of scientific value for reparations purposes. Receipt, storage, and preparation for shipment of such items.

Translation of Technical documents and Japanese war records of World War II; in conjunction with ATIS.(24)

Reproduction and Photography:

Preparation and reproduction of reports for Operations Section, G-2, and War Department Intelligence Section. Photographing of equipment and installations; Photographic and microfilm reproductions of pertinent documents.

6. Military Intelligence Service - X Section (MIS-X):

This was a highly specialized intelligence unit concerned with the problems involved in the capture of Allied personnel. Its designation, MIS-X, was a cover-name and throughout the war its activities were rather covert: this trend toward secrecy, thoroughly exploded at Pearl Harbor, was not always practical.

(24) When the 5250th Technical Intelligence Company was inactivated in 30 June 1947, these functions and the ones immediately following were greatly reduced and in the main transferred to ATIS.



The primary functions of MIS-X were to train selected military personnel in proper conduct in case of capture by the enemy, to aid prisoners of war by assisting them in escape, to help in the rescue of lost airmen, and to collect intelligence information in all such cases. Introduced into SWPA rather late, in 1943, it still had considerable success, primarily through air rescue operation.




An extensive briefing program was carried out to teach combat airmen and others how best to care for themselves in the event of being forced down in enemy territory. Escape kits containing useful emergency equipment were distributed. An evasion method was developed which involved the establishment of safe rendezvous points within enemy occupied territory.⁽²⁵⁾ These were selected on the basis of availability of rescue facilities, food and medicines, friendly natives, and remoteness from enemy activity. Most of the points were photographed, and a descriptive folder of them, describing in detail the facilities available at each, was prepared and distributed. The text was supplemented by charts and photographs.

In New Guinea and later in the Philippines, the presence of AIB and PRS agents in enemy areas greatly facilitated rescue operations.⁽²⁶⁾ The Philippine guerrilla, in particular, became a natural ally and point of refuge in forced landing. Attempts were also made to procure specialists for handling contacts with Japanese prisoner of war camps and to rescue inmates whenever possible.

⁽²⁵⁾ Information obtained in G-2 channels.

⁽²⁶⁾ AIB agents operated deep behind the enemy lines and were able to shelter crash survivors and report their whereabouts for rescue operations.





UNCLASSIFIED

PLATE 33

~~SECRET~~

G-2 SCAP & FEC

REVISED ORGANIZATION CHART TO ACCOMPANY
OFFICE MEMO NO 3, 1 APR 48 REVISED BY:
OFFICE MEMO NO 5 1 DEC 45
5/1 15 " "
5/2 24 APR 46
7 3 MAY 46
26 15 OCT 46
10 1 FEB 47




PLATE I

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Chapter V

OCCUPATION INTELLIGENCE: 1945/47

1. Introduction:

GHQ, AFPAC(1) was established in Tokyo on 17 September 1945(2); Occupational Headquarters, SCAP, followed on 2 October. The G-2 Sections of both were headed by General Willoughby. USAFFE having been discontinued in June 1945(3), General Thorpe, who headed G-2 Section USAFFE to the date of dissolution, became head of the Counter Intelligence Section, a "Special Staff Section" of AFPAC, until this function was absorbed by G-2, FEC & SCAP.


As regards a differentiation between FEC and SCAP, if a line of demarcation could be drawn, it would be along "military-technical" and "civil" lines; i.e., military intelligence (FEC) in contradistinction to civil intelligence (SCAP). Military elements have not disappeared; there is still war and unrest and civil chaos along the perimeter of SCAP, in China, Indonesia, and Siam. The shadow of the Soviets rests on vast areas, from Siberia to Manchuria, from Harbin to Ulan-Bator. As far as SCAP is concerned, civil factors naturally predominate in the potential control of a nation of 80,000,000 with complex economic and social problems.(4)

The various G-2 affiliates (ATIS, CIC, etc.) were directed to different objectives or Occupation targets:

-
- (1) On 1 January 1947 AFPAC became Far East Command (FEC).
 - (2) Per radio announcement of that date by Advance SCAP GINGAPPAC to Major Commands; copy in AG records, FEC.
 - (3) The concept of two G-2's (USAFFE and SWPA) was a technical absurdity. In fact, G-2, USAFFE, covered CIC and GCD only. Its physical separation from GHQ, SWPA, ranged from Australia to New Guinea, from Hollandia to Manila.
 - (4) The occupation tasks were brilliantly anticipated in "Blacklist," the Operations Instructions for the Occupation. Annex 5 d to this document is the intelligence plan.



COL COLLIN S. MYERS, EXECUTIVE OFFICER, G-2 (1946/48)



G-2 EXECUTIVE GROUP, TOKYO, 1948

Front Row L to R: Lt Col S. W. Koster, Lt Col E. C. Callahan, Col R. G. Duff, Col C. S. Myers, Lt Col P. H. Bethune, Lt Col R. L. Foster, Lt Col M. K. Schiffman, Maj E. E. Mayer.
Second Row: Maj W. D. Drake, Maj R. J. Rinalducci, Maj R. L. Ohman, Maj S. A. B. Norberg.
Third Row: CWO C. W. Denham, CWO M. E. Lee, 1st Lt J. J. Rumppler, 1st Lt J. A. Bundy, Capt F. W. Scheurlein, 1st Lt K. Jaunkochian, Capt H. H. Featherston.

ATIS Press TranslationsPublic Opinion in Editorials
 CCD Censorship Mail Interceptor for Public Trends
 CIC Counter Intelligence National & International Communism
 CIC Field Detachments Ultra National-Subversive Trends
 FSD Public Safety Prison and Police Reforms
 Foreign Liaison Foreign Diplomatic Missions
 Jap Liaison Contacts with Jap Govt Agencies
 Geographical Section: FEC War Dept International Targets
 Historical Section: FEC War Dept Subjects & FEC Projects

By January 1948, G-2 operated or controlled affiliated
 or subsidiary agencies, with a combined military and civil person-
 nel strength of over three thousand people, viz.:

G-2, FEC & SCAP 261
 The Civil Intelligence Section:
 Operations Division & Executive Group 185
 The 441st Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC) 881
 319th MIS (attached to CIC) 288
 The Civil Censorship Division (CCD) 542
 Public Safety Division (FSD) 87
 WDIIT (War Department Intell Targets Section) 19
 ATIS (Translator & Interpreter Section) 725
 The 5250th Technical Intelligence Group 166
 General Liaison: Foreign and Japanese Section 31
 The Historical Section: FEC and SCAP 28
 The Geographical Section: FEC and SCAP 18

The range and quality of these activities is covered in special
 chapters for each agency and in separate volumes for each subject.(5)
 This considerable increase of personnel, of course, due to an in-
 crease in missions, etc., was naturally reflected in an increase
 of correspondence, action papers, etc., in a tremendous upsurge of
 work-loads.(6)

2. Theater Intelligence:

	Mar. 1946	Mar. 1947	Oct. 1947	Weekly percentage of increase 1947 over 1946 -- Oct.		Monthly percentage of increase 1947 over 1946	
1st week	403	1225	1667	303%	414%	342%	445%
2nd week	407	1330	1969	327%	484%		
3rd week	534	1895	2032	355%	380%		
4th week	527	1955	2674	371%	507%		

(5) See Intell Series volumes.

(6) G-2 Daily Activity Sheets included as Plate 35.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SECTION, GENERAL STAFF

A. THEATER INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

ACTIVITY	ACTION
1. Request for Air Intelligence.	Prepared draft 2nd indorsement to FEAF.
2. China Estimate.	Liaison with FEAF.
3. Operations Report Task Force Frigid.	Briefed for G-2.
4. Tsushima Island Surveillance.	Check sheet to G-3 with G-2 Recommendations.
5. Intell Annex for JPO Study.	Received Air Intell portion from FEAF.
6. Security classification of Aerial Photos.	Prepared 2nd Ind. to FEAF.
7. Letter MIS, G-2.	Prepared draft reply to G-2.

B. CIVIL INTELLIGENCE SECTION

ACTIVITY	ACTION
Executive Group	
8. For comment revised draft G-1 staff study subject: "Character and Loyalty Cases" submitted by Mr. Motz, G-1, to Mr. Carusi, CIS.	Conference Mr. Motz and Mr. Carusi. Subject study reviewed. Changes suggested to comply with radio WAR 91745, 6 Dec 47.
Operations Division (Lt Col W. E. Homan)	
9. Control and Evaluation of CIC Investigations.	(1) 11 Memorandum Reports. 49 Summaries of Information received from CIC, initially evaluated and sent to appropriate branches for action. (2) 2 Requests for EEI sent to CIC for action. (3) 5 Cases closed (no further action). (4) 92 Reports sent to files.
Special Activities Branch	
10. Report: Sixth National Convention of JCP. Information on agenda for forthcoming convention summarized for G-2.	Forwarded to G-2.
11. IOM, Comment #2, subj: Spotlight.	Forwarded.
12. C/S, subj: Robbery of Hokkaido Regional Communist Hqs of JCP, GS request information on incident of robbery.	Forwarded, G-2.
13. Brief to AC of S, G-2, subj: "Philippine Reports," correlating three intelligence reports from Philippines.	Forwarded.
441st Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment	
14. Reports on three cases of Espionage.	To CIS Opns for further action.
15. Reports on three cases on ultra-nationalistic militaristic activity were received.	To CIS Opns for further action.
16. Reports on 30 cases involving possible subversive activity by Radicals (Communist) were received.	To CIS Opns for further action.
17. Reports on five cases on subversive activity by Foreigners were received.	To CIS Opns for further action.
18. There were 21 Spot Reports received from CIC Areas of current happenings throughout Japan.	To CIS.
19. CCD Delinquency Report for period 27 Nov to 5 Dec 47.	Negative Report.
20. Conference of FPB Censors from Districts I, II and III at 0900, 9 Dec 47.	Discussed FPB operations in gathering of special intelligence items.
21. Conference of Postal, Telecom and TOU Censors from Districts, I, II and III at 0900, 9 Dec 47.	Discussed problems and operations of Postal, Telecom and Technical Operations.
22. Col. M. Clay, GHQ, Manpower Board, accompanied by Lt. Col. R. L. Foster, G-2, and Capt. W. D. White, CIS, arrived at CCD at 1000, 9 Dec 47.	G-2 policy for censorship was discussed, Col Clay expects to return to CCD in the near future.
23. Chief Police Administrator conferred with Mr. Yasuoka of H M regarding necessity for amending Alien Registration Law.	Discussed possibility of transferring power to order and enforce repatriation from H/M to M/J. Further conferences scheduled.
24. Chief Police Administrator conferred with Chief of Police Training, Saitama Prefecture about decentralization plans in that prefecture.	Saitama Police Chief has called conference of mayors for 12 December for preliminary discussion.
25. Chief Prison Administrator made arrangements to meet with Dr. McQuarrie, Medical Consultant,	Dr. McQuarrie will be informed of medical and scientific promotion work now being conducted in Japanese

ACTIVITY	ACTION
Rockefeller Foundation, to discuss activities of Prison Branch, PSD.	penal and correctional institutions and agencies.
C. GENERAL LIAISON SECTION	
26. Departure of two Soviet PBY's to Vladivostok scheduled for 1000 hrs, 9 Dec, cancelled by Soviets, due to bad weather. Departure postponed until 19 Dec, weather permitting.	A-3 FEAF notified at 0830 hrs.
27. Four Russian linguists tested.	Lt Kor and Mr. Savitsky administered the examinations.
28. Ltr frm Belgian Mission, re: Cotton Textiles-African Print.	C/N to ESS for appropriate action and reply.
29. Ltr from Neth Mil Mis, re: Petrol Products.	C/N to G-4 for appropriate action.
30. Ltr from Neth Mil Mis, re: Performance of Netherlands Play, "Op Hoop van Zagan".	C/N to CIE for appropriate action.
31. Ltr frm Canadian Liaison Mission, re: Request to forward one box of reports to Canada.	C/N to G-1 for appropriate action.
32. Ltr frm Chinese Mission, re: Dependent Housing.	C/N to G-4 for appropriate action.
33. Ltr frm Belgian Mission, re: Performance Rights for Belgian Play.	C/N to CIE for appropriate action.
34. Ltr frm Chinese Mission, re: Request for Publication of Information in Daily Bulletin.	C/N to AG, Attn: Daily Bulletin Section for appropriate action.
35. 3 ltrs frm Belgian Mission, re: Transmittal of correspondence.	C/N to ESS for appropriate action.
36. Ltr frm UKLM, re: Clearance for Entry.	C/N to G-1 for appropriate action.
D. JAPANESE LIAISON SECTION	
37. Demobilization Bureaux personnel statistics:	Compiled and furnished to Lt Col Griffin, for G-2 Daily Summary, personnel statistics for 1st and 2nd Demob. Bureaus per 1 Dec. 1947. Orally informed G-3 (Lt. Col. Anderson), DS (Mr. Burnett).
38. MIYAMOTO, URANO, representing Federation for Acceleration of Repatriation, presented oral petition for speedup of repatriation from Soviet areas.	Located document in Prime Minister's Office; arranged with Historical Section and Mr. Sato of P.M. Office for photographing of document on 10 Dec. Prepared full report, and brief thereof; to G-2 via Exec. Office.
39. Historical Section project to photograph original of Jap declaration of war (Imperial rescript).	Discussed with Lt. Col. Anderson, G-2 Repatr.; arranged for ATIS translation.
40. Conference 5 Dec. on demobilization machinery problems.	28
41. Mendacious article in "Akahata" re: Repatriation (Lack of shipping, etc., Jap Govt. to blame).	80
42. Jap. Govt. (CLO) letters received, processed.	33
43. Check-Sheets/IOM's received, processed.	
44. Appointments arranged.	
E. ARMY DEPARTMENT INTELLIGENCE DIVISION	
45. Interrogation of thirty-four (34) military returnees for intelligence information on Siberia and Manchuria.	Interrogations held 0800 to 1200 and 1300 to 1700 Reports in preparation for forwarding to ATIS Research and Information Section.
46. Collation.	One hundred and twenty-four (124) intelligence reports relating to two hundred and seventy-two (272) WDI targets and seventy-one (71) SID Numbers were processed and forwarded to the Director of Intelligence, Washington, D. C.
47. Investigation.	Two (2) teams visited the Hikoma Cme (Tachikawa Army Air Arsenal), Tokyo-to, and the Telephone Exchange, Kojimachi-ku, Tokyo-to, relative to a target. One (1) team returned from fifteen (15) days TDY to Hiroshima and Yamaguchi Prefectures, relative to Army Department Intelligence Targets.

ACTIVITY	ACTION
F. G-2 HISTORICAL SECTION	
Pacific Theater: 48. "Campaigns of MacArthur in Pacific."	Chap. III sent to printer after final editing. Research, revision, Chap. IV, V, VII-XII; supervision of maps drawn for Chap. VI. Editing of Japanese interrogations, Conference with Col. Brown on Plates for Chap. III. Conference with Mr. Kawakami on problems of Vol. II.
Vol. II, C-in-C Series: 49. "Japanese Operations Against MacArthur."	Folder containing 13 proposed maps and chart illustrations for Vol. II forwarded for approval. Two sketch-maps completed and sent to translation. Interrogation completed; Maj. Temmyo (55 IMB). 2nd draft of Part III, Chap. 6, sent to ATIS for translation. Editing of Par II, Chap. 6, 2/3 completed. Conference with Hq. Comd't and Col Callahan re space requirements. Conference with Col. Svensson re progress of Vol. II. Conference with Col. Rogers, Col. Brown re typographical problems. Conference with Col. Ryan re space requirements for Hist. Sect. Arrangements made thru Mr. Schneider, Jap Liaison Office, to take photograph of Imperial Rescript in custody of Prime Minister, Japanese Cabinet.
General History: Intelligence Series: 50. Vol. I, Guerrilla Resistance movement in P.I. 51. Vol. II, Intelligence Activities in the P.I. 52. Vol. III, Operations of MIS. 53. Vol. IV, Operations of AIB. 54. Vol. V, Operations of ATIS. 55. Vol. VI, Operations of AGS. 56. Vol. VII, Operations of TIC. 57. Vol. VIII, Operations of CIC.	Compiling Doc Append Material; working on ATIS 398; making list maps and charts for Doc Append. Revising. Revising. Checking and correcting in prep for submission to General. Sorting Doc for Append Fol; arranging photos etc. for Basic Volume. Preparing for review Editor. Compiling Doc Append material. Basic Vol. under review; selecting material for Doc Append.
WD Commitments: 58. Occupation of Japan, USAFPAC. 59. Admin. History of AFPAC. 60. Admin. History of USAFFE. Statistics and Research: 61. Interrogation. 62. Editing. 63. Translation. 64. Guerrilla Messages. 65. Japanese Monographs.	Writing first draft. Writing first draft. Checking in prep for submission to G-2. Lt Gen Nishiyama, CG 23rd Div; conversation with Echigo MAGARI re anti-Russian operations in Manchuria. Rewriting interrogation reports obtained from interview with Miyazaki. Report of interview with T. Watanabe, 35th Army. Preparation of abstract of messages for binding. Indexing and filing of Japanese Operational Monographs.
Library: 66. Reference. 67. Processing & Cataloging. 68. Visitors.	14 calls fr Hist. Sect. 25 documents downgraded; 28 documents cataloged. Sqdn Ldr Coburn authorized access to Library for material for British history. 24 tons documents received from Philippines.
69. Archives. Production: 70. C-in-C Project. 71. Gen. Hist. 72. Admin. 73. Production, general.	6 illustrations in progress; 1 illustration completed. 30 charts in progress; 2 illustrations completed. 50 charts in progress. 1 photo album completed; 6 photo albums in progress; completed assembly of 12 sets of maps.

3. The Military Intelligence Section: APPAC/FEC/SCAP:

Modified to suit the special conditions inherent in a military occupation of former enemy territory, G-2, SCAP and FEC, continued to function as previously under SWPA and APPAC. Its organizational chart(Plate33) adapted to new missions, comprises four major sub-sections: Executive; Theater Intelligence/FEC; War Department Intelligence; and Civil Intelligence/SCAP. From these specialist sub-divisions emanate various daily and periodic intelligence reports such as the traditional Daily Summary (already discussed under Operations Sections,SWPA), Periodic Intelligence and Situation Summaries (Strategic Estimates), Spot Intelligence Reports on urgent events, reports on Japanese Demobilization, coverage of War Department Intelligence Targets, and digests of thousands of interrogations of repatriated Japanese military personnel. CIS issued a monthly summary containing digest information of a civil intelligence nature secured by Censorship, Counter Intelligence, and Public Safety Division throughout Japan.

The G-2 Section, in a dual capacity, adapted itself smoothly to the special conditions of an occupation of former enemy territory.

The internal organization closely followed the war-time organization, proving its soundness and flexibility. There is little difference between the chart of Brisbane in 1942 and the chart of Tokyo in 1947. There is only adaptation and expansion, a shift of the intelligence machinery from battle order and front line reports to internal security, and the expansion of Counter Intelligence into national and international fields.

The "Daily Intelligence Summary,"(Plate 36) published in unbroken sequence from 7 December 1941 to date, merely reduced emphasis on tactical factors and shifted to a surveillance of poli-

Copy No.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS FAR EAST COMMAND
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SECTION, GENERAL STAFF

INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

INTELLIGENCE DATA
COVERING THE MILITARY
ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL
FIELDS IN :

JAPAN
KOREA
PHILIPPINES
CHINA-MANCHURIA
SOUTH EAST ASIA
N. E. I.

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PLATE 37

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SECTION, GENERAL STAFF

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	3. Press Review.4
	4. Civil Intelligence. Activities of Communist Youths		.5
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tical, economic, and social elements affecting the Occupation. Its contents resemble the reports usually rendered by military attaches in foreign countries.(Plate 37)


In June 1946, the Operations Section was subdivided into: Geographical Areas, an Editorial Group and the Publications, Drafting & Maps sub-section (PDM); the Plans & Estimates Section was a separate entity at that time. During the fall of 1946 it was convenient to combine Operations and Plans & Estimates Sections under one head; this was gradually accomplished by appointing a "Director of Theater Intelligence". Eventually, at the time of the change of the command from AFPAC to Far East Command the Theater Intelligence Division was organized with four distinct branches: Operations, Plans & Estimates, PDM, and Training.

The overall mission of Theater Intelligence has changed but little with the passage of time. The group is responsible for fulfilling Department of the Army and Theater Intelligence requirements regarding all aspects of the Far Eastern situation, including determination of trends and analysis of developments. Statistically the accomplishments, in 1946/47, of the Theater Intelligence Division can be shown below:


Issues of the "Daily Intelligence Summary"	415
Total copies, printed, bound and published	41,500
Total pages processed	498,000
Maps printed for the "Daily Summary"	82,000
Long-range Estimates published	4
Special Reports and Studies published	5
Total pages processed	4,100
Maps printed for Estimates and Special Reports .	2,605
Incoming reports and cables processed	46,880
Weekly staff briefings	68
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a. Operations Branch

This branch consists of a Chief of Operations, an editorial sub-section, a Japan sub-section, and a Strategic Areas sub-section. The primary mission of this branch is to produce current intelligence through the medium of special reports, spot intelli-



COL FREDRICK B. DODGE, JR., DIR., THEATER INTELL., G-2 (1946/48)



THEATER INTELLIGENCE SECTION, TOKYO, 1948

Front Row L to R: 1st Lt T. P. Shoemith, Capt H. R. Parks, Capt S. F. Hepford, Capt W. K. Freeland, 1st Lt T. H. Malin, 1st Lt U. A. Strauss, Capt A. H. Fierke, Maj R. C. Roth, Capt H. Mease, Jr.

Second Row: 1st Lt J. J. Milanoski, Lt Col G. Griffin, Lt Col L. A. Witt, Lt Col H. C. Blake, Lt Col A. K. duMoulin, Col F. B. Dodge, Jr., Lt Col D. S. Tait, J. A. Chapman.

Third Row: Lt Col J. H. Randall, Lt Col J. P. Perlett, Maj A. Anton, 1st Lt M. B. Booth, Capt E. A. Likens, Maj H. R. Sewell, Capt C. R. Hill.

Fourth Row: Capt R. M. Davidson, 2d Lt R. Johnson, 1st Lt J. G. Whittemore, Capt R. M. Bathurst, Capt H. W. Kumpunen, Capt D. B. Cullinane, Capt O. E. Bloch, Capt W. E. Daley, Capt H. M. Caldwell.

gence reports, and the "Daily Intelligence Summary." "The Summary" is a continuation of the war-time publication in unbroken sequence of publication since 7 December 1941. In the period from July 1946 through June 1947, 415 issues were published.

b. Plans and Estimates Branch

This branch was primarily responsible for long-range studies of the military, economic, sociologic and political potentials of foreign powers in the Far East. In the period from June 1946 through June 1947 it published four extensive long-range "estimates" and five special studies and compiled a great number of order of battle statistics. Several titles follow:

Periodic Intell. Summary, Korea: 12 April 46
Periodic Intell. Summary, Philippines: 16 April 46
USAFIK Estimate, Korea: 2 July 47
Situation Korea - China - Manchuria: 22 Jan 47
Situation Arctic - Southeast Siberia: 15 March 47
Military Geography of Manchuria: 1 May 47
Military Geography of China: 1 December 47
Security Problems for the Occupation Forces: 15 Dec 47

The last title and contents are shown on Plates 39 & 40.

c. Publications, Drafting and Maps Branch

This branch, as its name implies, edited, printed, and illustrated the publications of the Theater Intelligence Division. The Drafting sub-section of this branch did original drafting of illustrations, in mimeo overlays and also prepared visual aids and charts for Staff presentations. PDM maintained a Map Library of over 10,000 large-scale maps as well as sketch maps and base maps for overlays. They had the assistance of the 64th Topo Engineer Battalion to supply on demand almost any desired type of print, reproduction or map job, but handled field reproduction (mimeo) alone.

d. Training Branch

The Training Branch was organized in March 1947 to provide a policy branch to keep abreast of current requirements in training in Intelligence Agencies within the Theater; this branch

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
PLATE 39
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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SECTION, GENERAL STAFF
PLANS AND ESTIMATES BRANCH

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PERIODIC INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

INTERNAL FACTORS AS
SECURITY PROBLEMS
FOR THE OCCUPATION FORCES



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MANILA * MELBOURNE * MORESBY * MANILA * TOKYO

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General Headquarters
FAR EAST COMMAND
Military Intelligence Section General Staff
Plans and Estimates Branch

Periodic Intelligence Summary
Internal Factors as Security Problems
for the Occupation Forces
December 15, 1947

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brought the previous G-2, FEC, Functions & Organization Folder up to date; it effected liaison between G-2, FEC, and tactical units in the Occupation.

a. Demobilization of the Japanese Armed Forces

In view of expert knowledge of the structure of the Imperial Japanese Forces, G-2 played a prominent role in the surrender negotiations in Manila in August 1945, where basic conditions were laid down to demobilize and disarm the Imperial forces. Completely familiar with the make-up of the Japanese Army after four years of intensive combat observation, G-2 took over the initial planning, policy development, and GHQ staff surveillance of the demobilization of the Japanese units in the homeland.

As of 15 August 1945, Japanese forces stationed within the home islands numbered 2,576,085, comprising 57 divisions, 34 brigades, and 45 regiments. The remainder were spread in a great arc from Manchuria to the Solomons and across the islands of the Central and Southwest Pacific. Japanese Forces everywhere totaled 5,852,000, in an aggregate, 171 divisions and 143 brigades.(7)

General Order No. 1, 2 September 1945, and Directive No. 2, 3 September 1945, issued to the Imperial Japanese Government, directed the rapid dissolution of all armed forces. The actual task of the demobilization and disarmament was charged to the then existing Japanese Army and Navy Ministries, in order that the inherent technical and administrative skill, indispensable for a vast demobilization process, could be fully exploited. Coordination and supervision of this complex operation ultimately involved several SCAP staff sections, and the 8th Army, viz.:

1. Demobilization/Plans & Policy G-2/SCAP
2. Disarmament/Equipment/Supplies G-4/8th Army

(7) Civilian personnel and colonial settlers abroad are not included in these totals.

3. Repatriation/Plans & Policy G-3/SCAP
4. Repatriation Shipping/Plans & Policy COMNAVJAP/G-2/SCAP
5. Execution of: 1 to 4, plans for Jap Demob. Board
6. Field Opns in Execution/ 1 to 4 1st Demob. Bureau
7. Demobilization/Disarmament/GHQ Surveillance G-2/SCAP
8. Arms & Equip/Storage & Distribution G-4/8th Army
9. Repatriation from Overseas/Plans G-3/COMNAVJAP
10. Control: Overseas repatriation shipping COMNAVJAP
11. Operation: Repatriation shipping 2d Demob. Bureau
12. Repatriation Ports and Camps 1st Demob. Bureau/HM
13. Reception and Demobilization 1st Demob. Bureau/PHS
14. Rail/Motor Movements to Home areas 1st Demob. Bureau
15. Dependent Aid/Relocation Local Assistance Bureaux

The enormous initial military risks of landing with "token forces" on the Japanese mainland, potentially a colossal armed camp, and the obvious gamble of landing with only 2½ divisions - confronted by 57 Japanese divisions, 34 brigades, and 45 odd regiments - will probably only be appreciated by military professionals. All strategical landing areas on the east coast of Japan were completely organized by the Japanese and each one of these areas had the potentiality of another, but greatly enlarged, Okinawa. There were perhaps five or six such areas along the east coast of Japan - Kyushu, Shikoku, the Kanto Plain, the Sendai Corridor, and others. The Japanese General Staff had enough divisions and brigades to make an attack expensive everywhere. At Okinawa 2½ Japanese divisions exacted a total of 30,000 to 40,000 American casualties on land; not to mention the shattering "Kamikaze" attacks on the Fleet. This affords an authentic yardstick to forecast what it might have taken in ratio of losses, had we gone in shooting. The sinister fact that 2½ Japanese divisions exacted 30,000 to 40,000 American casualties spells:


<u>Landing Point</u>	<u>Enemy Force</u>	<u>Est. Casualties</u>
Kyushu	13-14 Divs.	150,000 to 225,000
Shikoku	4-5 Divs.	50,000 to 80,000
Kanto	15-22 Divs.	260,000 to 350,000
Sendai	2-3 Divs.	20,000 to 30,000

The conclusions are inescapable. In the face of these suggestive military probabilities, our peaceful entry into Japan

OVER-ALL DEMOBILIZATION STATUS

JAPAN: HOME ISLANDS

TOTAL STRENGTH-ARMY PERSONNEL: 2,566,085




without a shot being fired or a single American casualty is nothing short of miraculous.

The terrific tension was resolved, as by magic, by the shatteringly simple formula of utilizing the present Japanese government, the person of the Emperor and the psychic force of tradition. No other formula was, or is, practicable. General MacArthur made calculated use of its expected effectiveness through expert intelligence on existing political, military, and social factors, and his own brilliant appraisal of the Oriental mind.

By the tactful utilization and suitable modification of existing Japanese government organs, all Japanese armed forces in the home-land were physically demobilized by early December 1945. The War and Navy Ministries, initially responsible for demobilization, were demilitarized and renamed the "First Demobilization Ministry" (Army), whose principal job was the reception and demobilization of overseas troops as they arrived at repatriation ports, and the "Second Demobilization Ministry" (Navy), which was charged with the manning and operation of repatriation vessels, minesweeping, and the maintenance of former naval vessels held at the disposal of the Allied Powers. By the middle of 1946, a total of about 6,050,000 army and navy personnel had been demobilized - some 3,880,000 in the homeland and some 2,170,000 on repatriation from overseas. In June 1946, the two Ministries were further demilitarized and merged into a single "Demobilization Board," under a civilian head, with a subordinate First Bureau (Army) and a Second Bureau (Navy).

It is this Board which carried out demobilization of some 540,000 remnant army and navy personnel returned from overseas areas during the period July 1946 - June 1947. As in the preceding period, this task was also carried out without a single untoward incident. The structure of the Board underwent but a few minor



COL E. H. F. SVENSSON DIR., DAID, G-2 (1947/48)



DEPT. OF ARMY (STRATEGIC) INTELL. DIV. STAFF, TOKYO, 1948

Seated L to R: Maj G. L. Jorgensen, Lt Col L. W. Austin, Col E. H. F. Svensson, Lt Col
C. F. McNair, Maj S. C. Williams.
Standing: Capt B. B. Beck, Lt G. Roosevelt, Capt J. H. Murphy.

changes in the present period, but its total personnel was cut from some 55,500 in June 1946 to somewhat under 18,000 by 1 July 1947 of whom only half are ex-military personnel.

4. War Department Intelligence (WDI):

a. General

The "War Department Intelligence Division" (WDI) was established 26 November 1946 as an internal G-2 group, to accentuate control and coordination.

The following units were placed under the immediate supervision of a Director, War Department Intelligence Division:

Translator and Interpreter Service (TIS)
5250th Technical Intelligence Company (TIG)
Targets Branch (Formerly WD Intell. Targets)
Historical Branch (FEC & SCAP)


Upon expansion, the Historical Branch was removed from WDI Div. and placed under the personal control of the AC of S, G-2.

Subsequently, on Department of the Army instruction, WDI, redesignated Department of the Army (Strategic) Intelligence Division in March 1948, assumed responsibility for the Army's newly organized Japanese Area and Language Course. This course for regular army officers extended for four years, the last three years of which were to be spent in Japan. An increment of 8-10 officers each year was being planned. All matters pertaining to the course, including procurement of Japanese instructors, text books, and library, arranging for lectures, and the conduct of the course itself, were performed by WDI Div.

b. Allied Translator and Interpreter Section (ATIS)

ATIS, as the traditional war-tested theater language agency and linguist pool, continued to play a key role in the Occupation of Japan. (Plate 43) Its strength fluctuated: maximum strength (October 1945) 193 officers, 1,830 enlisted men, to current strength (October 1947) 71 officers, 182 enlisted men, 12 enlisted

ORGANIZATION CHART - ATIS
30 APRIL 1947



LEGEND
 — OPERATIONAL CONTROL
 - - - ADMINISTRATION OF PERS.
 NOTE: DOCUMENT SECTION UNDER
 OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF TARGETS
 BRANCH.

WACs, and 401 Department of the Army civilians. ATIS furnished 2,467 replacement linguists to every key civil and military section in SCAP and to major units in the Theater. At times, replacement flow barely compensated for the heavy drain in linguist personnel incidental to the Occupation; redeployment losses were exceptionally heavy. The Translator Service still handled personnel of scarce category linguists, who served with divisions and regiments, war-crimes tribunals, interrogation centers, and SCAP Civil Sections, etc., and produced a vast volume of interpretation and translations of essential documents. In 1946 ATIS output, in quality and quantity, equalled the total of two preceding war years.

Unit	Month of June		Total for Year	
	Items	Pages	Items	Pages
Documents trans.....	216	3,359	1,171	25,556
Documents scanned.....	2,814	14,947	55,923	243,530
Periodicals trans.....	750	10,256	5,330	45,000
Documents processed			336,666	
Documents to Wash. DC			417,497	
Gross Production				29,000,000

The following are some of the ATIS publications which have been produced and were used extensively in the formulation of SCAP policies, in the administration of the Occupation, and in war-crimes trials:

Hoko - The Spy Hostage System of Group Control CIC
 Japan's Decision to Fight IMTFC
 Pearl Harbor Operation MID
 Japanese Methods of PW Interrogation MID
 Japanese Reaction to Allied Leaflets PWB
 Factors of the Japanese Military Psychology IS
 The Palawan Massacre IS
 The Kempeitai: Japanese Military Police CIC

The ATIS program for interrogating Japanese prisoners of war, repatriated from the Soviet and the Soviet-dominated areas of Manchuria, North Korea, and Siberia, was of considerable practical significance. The EEI(8) used in these interrogations was com-

 (8) Essential Elements of Information.



LT COL C. F. McNAIR, CO, ATIS, G-2 (1947/48)



ATIS EXECUTIVE GROUP, TOKYO, 1948

Seated L to R: Lt Col E. Willoughby, Lt Col N. W. Glenn, Lt Col C. F. McNair, Maj J. H. Dixon, Capt R. F. Blume.
Standing: Maj A. Christberg, Maj G. L. Disharoon, J. Shelton, Capt J. J. Freitag, Maj R. W. Schell.

piled by ATIS Central Interrogation Center on the basis of WD target information requests. All Japanese repatriates from Soviet-dominated areas were carefully screened. While still on shipboard, they filled out personal data forms which, upon debarkation, were collected and scanned by interrogation teams. Likely informants were then interrogated for about one hour. Results of these port interrogations were forwarded to Central Interrogation Center, ATIS, for scanning and analysis, and certain informants who appeared to possess superior information were called for a second detailed interrogation averaging four hours in length. Significant information so developed was assembled geographically; this material comprised one section of an ATIS "Interrogation Report," an intermittent publication distributed to all services. (Plates 45 & 46)

The practical intelligence value of these reports was well established. The Periodic Intelligence Summary Supplement No. 2, "Military Geography of Manchuria," 1 May 1947, contains a bibliographical reference to 22 ATIS and 125 Eighth Army Interrogations.


When ATIS Central Interrogation Center was established by General Order No. 26, GHQ, APPAC, 2 June 1946, the repatriation-interrogation program developed into a major intelligence effort. The abstracting, collating, editing, indexing, printing, and dissemination of interrogation reports involved a large percentage of the personnel and effort of four of the six operational sections of ATIS.

ATIS contributed extensively to the success of the Occupation by procuring, scanning, summarizing, translating, and publishing many and varied types of documents and by furnishing documentary evidence used in the trials of Japanese War Criminals. It rendered continuous interpreter service to Occupation agencies, trained and tested linguists, supported or instituted measures for

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS FAR EAST COMMAND
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SECTION, GENERAL STAFF

ALLIED TRANSLATOR AND INTERPRETER SECTION

INTERROGATION REPORTS



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PART I. TABULAR ANALYSIS OF ATIS AND EIGHTH ARMY INTERROGATIONS

Figures listed below are tabulations of information contained in the first 44 books of ATIS Interrogation Reports and in 16,665 Eighth Army Interrogations.

	<u>Total References to Date from ATIS and Eighth Army Interrogation Reports</u>	<u>Total References from Extracts in ATIS Interrogation Report No. 44</u>
1. COMMUNICATIONS		
a. Roads	875	14
b. Railroads	1336	19
c. Telephone Lines	176	0
d. Radio Stations	833	40
e. Sketches	188	
2. INDUSTRIES BEING EXPLOITED		
a. Factories in Operation	5951	103
b. Factories Stripped	812	0
c. Power Plants	1444	25
d. Mines	2158	18
e. Sketches of Industrial Areas	572	7
3. SHIPPING		
a. Port Establishments	779	28
b. Shipbuilding and Repairs	205	29
c. Naval Vessels	1023	34
d. Locality Sketches, Ports	217	3
4. SOVIET FORCES		
a. Units	5129	86
b. Equipment	2814	7
c. Chemical Warfare	14	0
d. Installations	2071	59
e. Fortifications	1423	35
f. Sketches of Installations	238	7
g. Sketches of Fortified Areas	138	1
5. AIRFIELDS		
a. Air Establishments	3394	40
b. Aircraft	1751	13
c. Aircraft Locality Sketches	1872	3
6. PW CAMPS		
a. Localities	5097	21
b. Locality Sketches	266	2
7. PERSONALITIES	7955	112
8. INDOCTRINATION	887	13
9. TOPOGRAPHY AND WEATHER	1348	25
10. MEDICAL ITEMS	1354	31

exploiting War Department Intelligence Targets, and collected such other information, documents, technical data, and reports as were required by the War Department. Operations from 1 November 1945 to 30 September 1947 were as follows:

Press Translations:(Plates 47 and 48) From 1 November 1945 to 30 September 1947, ATIS translated 33,924 newspapers and magazines each month, or a total of 233,710 pages. Approximately 137,607 documents (1,178,356 pages) were received for scanning and/or translation from various Occupation agencies. Of these, 3,646 (110,013 pages) were translated and 133,761 (1,022,082 pages) scanned.

Communications Translated: An average of 18,836 communications per month from the Japanese to the Commander in Chief were translated and analyzed to determine the political, economic, and social trends among the Japanese people. Those requiring action were forwarded to appropriate Occupation agencies. An average of 4,749 communications to the Allied Council for Japan was also received and translated each month.

Translators and Interpreters: ATIS was called upon to supply many Occupation agencies with translators and interpreters for screening and translation of documents and for interrogations. An average of 31 translators per month was furnished such GHQ agencies as Civil Property Custodian, Legal Section, Civil Information and Education, etc. Approximately 340 interpreters performed a monthly average of 2,227 man hours of work for various Occupation agencies; two hundred and thirteen (213) interrogations were conducted for the benefit of other sections.

Inquiries: The Section processed 4,485 inquiries from various agencies.


Distribution of Printed Matter: ATIS printed and distributed a total of 30,516,554 pages, an average of 1,326,806 per

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SECTION, GENERAL STAFF

47

ALLIED TRANSLATOR AND INTERPRETER SECTION

**PRESS TRANSLATIONS
AND
SUMMARIES**



MANILA • MELBOURNE • MORESBY • MANILA • TOKYO

ATIS PRESS TRANSLATIONS AND SUMMARIES IS PUBLISHED DAILY EXCEPT SUNDAY IN ORDER TO ACQUAINT THE OCCUPATION FORCES WITH THE CONTENTS OF THE JAPANESE PRESS AS SPEEDILY AS POSSIBLE.

THE MORNING EDITION SECTION CARRIES SELECTED MATERIAL FROM TODAY'S TOKYO EDITIONS. ALL EDITORIALS AND ARTICLES FROM TOKYO NEWSPAPERS ARE SCANNED AND THOSE OF LEADING IMPORTANCE ARE TRANSLATED. PARTICULAR ATTENTION IS GIVEN TO THE FOLLOWING PAPERS WHICH HAVE THE LARGEST CIRCULATION.

AKAHATA	NIHON KEIZAI
ASAHI	SHIN-YUKAN
DAI ICHI	TOKYO SHIMBUN
JJI SHIMPO	TOKYO TIMES
MAINICHI	YOMIURI
NIMPO	YUKAN MIYAKO

OTHER TOKYO PAPERS, PUBLISHED IRREGULARLY AND OF LESS EDITORIAL INFLUENCE, ARE ALSO SCANNED AND OCCASIONALLY IMPORTANT ARTICLES ARE TRANSLATED AND PUBLISHED IN THIS VOLUME.

THE SECTIONS HEADED POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND EDITORIAL CONTAIN ARTICLES TRANSLATED FROM NEWSPAPERS AND MAGAZINES PUBLISHED NOT ONLY IN TOKYO BUT EVERYWHERE IN JAPAN. SECTION I, PRESS SUMMARY, BRIEFLY PRESENTS THE HIGHLIGHTS OF THE MATERIAL INCLUDED IN THE PUBLICATION.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
 SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
 MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SECTION, GENERAL STAFF

ALLIED TRANSLATOR AND INTERPRETER SECTION
 PRESS TRANSLATIONS AND SUMMARIES-JAPAN

NO: 416

DATE: 25 Sep 47

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month. The bulk of this printed matter consisted of press translations, the remainder of interrogation reports, research reports, and miscellaneous documents.

Linguist Training: Linguist training, testing, and classification are continuously carried on within ATIS. Part of the training included practical application at War Crimes Trials, Tokyo District Court, the Diet, industrial plants and local universities. Approximately 100 linguists were trained each month and an average of 314 was tested and classified. These linguists were distributed within ATIS, assigned to temporary duty, special duty or detached service with other Occupation units, or were permanently assigned to Theater Overhead language units. As of 30 September 1947, 10 commissioned and 29 enlisted ATIS personnel were serving with other agencies or units, while 8 officers and 27 enlisted men were stationed at repatriation ports. Two hundred seventy two (272) officers and 722 enlisted men were assigned to Theater Overhead language units.

Research Facilities: ATIS research facilities were available to Occupation agencies and the War Department for special reports on many and varied subjects pertaining to the war in the Pacific and to the Occupation. This resulted in the production of 15,366 pages of research matter. As of the close of the period reported upon, ATIS research facilities were concerned chiefly with the processing of interrogation reports.

During the period from June 1946 through June 1947, ATIS continued to furnish translation, interrogation, and interpreter service to Occupation agencies. The combined strength of the section fluctuated from a maximum of 828 military and civilian personnel in October 1946 to a minimum of 672 in February 1947. During that year, a geographic section was also set up for the pur-

CONSOLIDATED STRENGTH REPORT AS OF 30 JUNE 1946

UNIT	ATIS					T D Y				TOTAL				
	OFFICERS	EM	CIVIL SERV EMPLOYEES	JAPANESE & FOREIGN NATS.	TOTAL	OFFICERS	EM	CIVIL SERV EMPLOYEES	TOTAL	L	ANC	ADM	TOTAL	
TIS AF PAC	L	83	375	128	166	752	38	50	1	89	84	-	-	-
	ANC	9	82	47	61	199	2	8	-	10	-	209	-	-
	ADM	29	282	-	-	311	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	TOTAL	121	739	175	227	1262	40	58	1	99	-	-	-	1361
ALLIED NAVAL FORCES	L	13	-	-	-	13	6	-	-	6	19	-	-	-
	ANC	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	ADM	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	TOTAL	13	-	-	-	13	6	-	-	6	-	-	-	19
ALLIED LAND FORCES	L	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	2	2	-	-	-
	ANC	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	ADM	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	TOTAL	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	2	-	-	-	2
TOTAL	L	96	375	128	166	765	46	50	1	97	862	-	-	-
	ANC	9	82	47	61	199	2	8	-	10	-	209	-	-
	ADM	29	282	-	-	311	-	-	-	-	-	311	-	-
	TOTAL	134	739	175	227	1275	48	58	1	107	-	-	-	1382
GRAND TOTAL										1382				
NOTE: L: LINGUISTS-TRANSLATORS, INTERPRETERS and INTERROGATORS. ANC: ANCILLARY PERSONNEL - COLLATORS, EDITORS, TYPISTS, ETC. ADM: ADMINISTRATIVE-GUARDS and OTHER OVERHEAD PERSONNEL.														

REGAPITULATION OF LINGUISTS

LOCATION	U.S. ARMY		CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES		JAPANESE & FOREIGN NATIONALS		ALLIED		TOTALS		AGG
	T	E	T	E	T	E	T	E	T	E	
ATIS	201	257	103	25	153	8	13	-	475	290	765
T D Y	45	43	-	1	-	-	7	1	52	45	97
TOTALS	246	300	103	26	158	8	20	1	527	335	862
	546		129		166		21		862		862

pose of preparing geographic and terrain studies. The following statistics show the total ATIS output for the period:

Document pages translated (less Press Trans).....	69,476
Press pages translated.....	152,049
Document pages scanned.....	685,164
Printed pages produced.....	65,462
Total pages printed and distributed.....	5,081,691
Pages research matter written.....	11,857
Pages press summary written.....	781
Documents processed.....	38,330
Interrogations.....	5,529
Linguists furnished to other agencies:	
Interpreters.....	3,765
Translators.....	393
Linguists tested and classified.....	3,874
Linguists who received training.....	1,342

In addition, an average of 18,836 communications per month from the Japanese to the Commander-in-Chief were translated and analyzed to determine political economic, and social trends among the Japanese people.

c. War Department Intelligence Targets (WDIT)

This section coordinated the collection of Intelligence by all military and special staff sections of General Headquarters, U.S. Army Forces, Pacific, and of other agencies such as the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey and the Washington Document Center. The following statistics show the results which this section accomplished in the procurement of Intelligence of interest to the War Department and the Theater from September 1945 to 30 June 1946:

Reports received and processed.....	6,651
Pages received and processed.....	119,718
Reports filed in WDI library.....	4,400
Copies filed in WDI library.....	13,200
Pages filed in WDI library.....	237,600
Reports to MID.....	5,718
Pages forwarded to MID.....	102,924
Reports related to War Department Targets.....	79,578
War Department Targets satisfied.....	1,442
War Department Targets partially satisfied.....	553
Reports produced (ditto and mimeograph).....	278
Copies produced (ditto and mimeograph).....	5,940
Pages produced (ditto and mimeograph).....	60,000

Total pages of historical material (9) which were

(9) Actually done by 5250th TIC and ATIS.



CAPT B. B. BECK, CHIEF, TARGETS BRANCH, DAID, G-2 (1947/48)



TARGETS BRANCH STAFF, TOKYO, 1948

prepared under the supervision of this section in both English and Japanese is as follows:

1st Demobilization Board	9,911
2nd Demobilization Board	15,677

The following statistics are available for this section's work during the period, 1 July 1946-30 June 1947:

Reports received and processed	9,369
Pages received and processed	187,380
Reports filed in Targets Br. Reports Section	5,237
Copies filed in Targets Br. Reports Section	19,287
Pages filed in Targets Br. Reports Section	385,740
Reports forwarded to MIS, Wash., D.C.	8,768
Copies forwarded to MIS, Wash., D.C.	105,216
Pages forwarded to MIS, Wash., D.C.	2,104,320
Reports related to War Department Targets	3,471
Pages related to War Department Targets	69,420
Reports related to SID numbers	3,200
Pages related to SID numbers	64,000
War Department Targets satisfied	1,720
War Department Targets partially satisfied	563
Reports produced (ditto and mimeograph)	792
Copies produced	12,818
Pages produced	264,621

d. 5250th Technical Intelligence Company (TIC)

The 5250th Technical Intelligence Company acted as an operating agency for the special staff sections in collecting technical intelligence material in Japan. During the first year of the Occupation its accomplishments were as follows:

Microfilm exposures processed	40,000
Pages of tech reports in multiple copies	450,000
Photographs developed	120,000
Items of tech intell value	1,574
Pounds shipped to USA	361,225
Items discovered and examined	70,000
Interrogations	1,168
Pages of translation completed	23,125
Documents scanned for potential intell value ..	10,341
Miles covered in 89 field investigation trips ..	74,500
Miles covered in 1403 local investigation trips ..	35,000
Volumes on tech intell in 5250th TIC library ...	3,640
East Asia intelligence maps reproduced	310
Weeks invest. conducted in conjunction with TIC ..	6
Officers Pauley Repe Commission TDY	3
Laboratories, research agencies, visited and reported	750
Communications projects investigated and reported ..	190
Visitors to Technical Intelligence Museum	1,200

During the period 1 July 1946 to 30 June 1947, 5250th



MAJ S. C. WILLIAMS, CO, TID, DAID, G-2 (1948)



TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE DETACHMENT STAFF, TOKYO, 1948

Seated L to R: Capt L. S. Quarterman, Maj S. C. Williams, Capt J. P. Lowe.
Standing: W. P. Donnelly, Lt T. N. Okawachi, Miss L. M. Nicolich, Lt G. M. Johnston, Lt K. Kitagawa.

Technical Intelligence Company had as its primary function the collection of technical intelligence throughout Japan. In addition to its regular assignments for G-2, the company conducted intelligence missions for SC&P agencies, particularly Natural Resources Section (NRS), Economic & Scientific Section (ESS), Civil Communications Section (CCS), and Reparations Section (RS). Statistics of these activities are:

Number of Field Trips by Intelligence Teams	126
Number of Visits by Intelligence Teams	1,200
Miles Traveled by Intelligence Teams	121,090

Intelligence Targets Visited and Reported:

For ESS	986
For NRS	456
For WDI	653
For CCS	143
Interrogations and interviews	2,062
Pages of technical reports submitted in multiple copies ..	7,782
Reparation items received, classified and maintained	399,549
Pages of technical reports reproduced in multiple copies .	238,190
Microfilm exposures processed	60,780
Photographs developed	40,755
Sheets mimeographed	272,111
Tracings	998
Volumes of documents Jap War History translated	76
Pages of technical documents translated	11,449
Pages of technical documents scanned	331,596

e. Historical Section

1) Japanese War Records:

GHQ, SC&P, General Order Number 9, 2 October 1945, directed the collection and exploitation of Japanese Military Historical Records and official reports of the Army, Navy, and Air Forces; for implementation, SC&PIN 126 to the Liaison Committee for the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy, directed that a bureau be formed. In compliance, the "Institute for War Records Investigation" was organized by the Japanese. On 15 December 1945, G-2 issued a directive to the Institute requiring all Japanese Army operational histories be made available. On 21 February 1946, a G-2 directive was issued which required the submission of reports



EDITOR-IN-CHIEF & SENIOR EDITORS, HISTORICAL SECT., G-2

Seated L to R: Col E. H. F. Svensson, Dr. G. W. Prange, Maj Gen C. A. Willoughby, Dr. H. E. Wildes, Col F. H. Wilson.
 Standing: C. H. Kawakami, Lt Col M. K. Schiffman, Prof. M. Araki, Lt Col N. W. Willis, S. Thorn.



HISTORICAL SECT. EXEC. & PRODUCTION GROUP, TOKYO, 1948

Front Row L to R: Lt Col A. W. Ind, Lt Col H. I. Rogers, Col F. H. Wilson, Lt Col R. H. Ryan, Lt Col W. H. Brown.
 Second Row: Lt Col J. B. Schindel, Lt Col S. M. Case, Maj A. Christberg, Dr. L. W. Doll, Capt E. B. Ryckaert, 1st Lt S. J. Falk.
 Third Row: 1st Lt Y. G. Kanegai, 1st Lt T. Katagiri, WOJG H. L. Stone, Miss M. Moore, M/Sgt W. M. Tracy, T/Sgt H. Y. Uno.

by the Japanese on their naval operations during the war. In March 1946, WDI (ATIS) assumed responsibility for collection of Japanese War Records and the preparation of initial historical studies based thereon. At this time, the G-2 Historical Section was considered an incidental and minor sub-division of WDI. On 27 March 1946, SCAPIN 826-A required the assignment (upon repatriation) of selected former Japanese Army officers to the Japanese Institute for War Records Investigation for research. In April, the first of the required Japanese reports of Naval operations were received.

In June, the very modest organization of the Historical Section consisted of only three officers and the part-time assistance of the WDI librarian. The translation of the Japanese historical material was assigned as a major project to 5250th Technical Intelligence Company and production was tentatively arranged to be handled through ATIS facilities.

Supervision was maintained over the Institute for War Records Investigation by liaison visits at least twice a week, by members of WDI. In the period from March to June, approximately 200 reports pertaining to war records were received by WDI, most of them being translated documents of value to the Historical Section.

The following statistics indicate the operations of the Institute, reported in the Historical Section's Progress Report for July 1946:

Original Reports	ARMY	NAVY
Pages in Japanese: (filed)	1,368	4,040
Pages in Japanese: (not filed)	5,730	10,000
Sketches to accompany historical reports.	147	524

2) The Official Histories: SWPA/AFPAC

The functions and responsibilities of the Historical Division, G-3, were transferred to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, in December 1946. He was charged with the supervision and

26 Mar	VOLUME	TITLE	RESP SEC	EDITOR	REVIEW EDITOR	EST MANUS
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC & JAPAN SERIES (A)						
1	I	Allied Operations in the Southwest Pacific Area	G-2	Dr Prange	Gen Willoughby	378
2	II	Japanese Operations in the Southwest Pacific Area	G-2/ATIS	Dr Araki	Col Svensson	370
3	III	The Allied Occupation of Japan 1945 - 1946	Stat&Rpts	Col Unger	Stat & Rpts Sec	
4	IV	The Allied Occupation of Japan 1947 - 1948	Stat&Rpts	Col Unger		
GENERAL INTELLIGENCE SERIES (B)						
5		A Brief History G-2 Section, GHQ, SWPA and Affiliated Units	G-2-T/Int	Lt Col Willis	Gen Willoughby	
6	I	The Guerrilla Resistance Movement in the Philippines	G-2-Exec	Miss Tonougar	Gen Willoughby	142
7	II	Intelligence Activities in the Philippines during the Japanese Occupation	G-2-Exec	T Sgt Elder	Gen Willoughby	80
8	III	Operations of the Military Intelligence Section, GHQ, SWPA	G-2-T/Int	Miss White	Col Dodge	136
9	IV	Operations of the Allied Intelligence Bureau, GHQ, SWPA	G-2-Exec	Miss Ketchum	Col Myers	159
10	V	Operations of the Allied Translator and Interpreter Section, GHQ, SWPA	G-2-ATIS	Mr Grey	Col Svensson	160
11	VI	Operations of the Allied Geographical Section, GHQ, SWPA	G-2-DAID	Miss Gossin	Lt Col Zalesky	253
12	VII	Operations of the Technical Intelligence Unit in the SWPA	G-2-DAID	Sgt Ryder	Lt Col Schiffman	155
13	VIII	Operations of the Counter Intelligence Corps, SWPA, and Occupied Japan	G-2-CIS	Capt Ellsworth	Col Bratton	285
14	IX	The Civil Intel Section: Occupation Phase SCAP 1945 - 1948	G-2-CIS	Mrs David Tait	Col Bratton	
15	I-IX	Documentary Appendices (for each master volume as indicated above)	G-2-Exec	Lt Larkin	Lt Col Willis	
DA HISTORY ASSIGNMENTS (C)						
16	III	Mil. Phase of the Allied Occupation of Japan (1945 - 1946)	G-2	Lt Col Schindel	Dr Wildes	550
17		Administrative History of USAF in the Pacific	G-2	Mr Amos	Lt Col Schindel	150
18		Administrative History of USAF in the Far East, (Gen & Spec Staff Sec)	G-2	Mr Amos	Col Wilson	233
19		Japanese Official War Records (Monographs Nos. 1 to 96)	G-2	Dr Wildes	Col Svensson-Vol II	5000
20		Military History Eighth Army	8th Army	-	G-2 (Transmission)	300
21		Military History of Korea	USAFIK	-	G-2 (Transmission)	2000
22		Non-Military History of Korea	USAFIK	-	G-2 (Transmission)	700
1 - 2	}	Reproduction, Drafting, Printing: - Lt Col Brown, 1st Lt Kanegal, T Sgt Uno	G-2-Hist	Lt Col Brown	Lt Col Brown	
5 - 19			G-2-Hist	1st Lt Falk	1st Lt Falk	

To accompany memo to CofS 15 Aug 47 and 9 Oct 47 re "Historical Commitments FEC & SCAP." These commitments are based on WD letter directives dated 21 Aug 45 and 8 Sep 45 subject "Historical Program for USAFAPAC", letter dated 8 Oct 1945 subject "Administrative Histories", and WDCID Radio No. 98738 dated 25 May 1947. Note that of 22 commitments, G-2 carries 16 items. Consequently, G-2 cannot undertake a rewrite of Vols III and IV, Group A. It will be able to coordinate the editorial details, in format, text, etc. It is strongly recommended that the various SCAP Civil Sections establish liaison with Stat & Rpts and be prepared for editorial rewrite and condensation, in their specialty, from present Stat & Rpts "Monograph" to Vol III and IV size.

coordination of the Theater historical program. One officer, two civilians, and two enlisted men clerk-typists were transferred and joined the G-2 Historical Section. The commitments with which the G-3 Historical Division was charged at the time of its transfer consisted of eight projects required by the War Department. This was considerably augmented to 22 projects.(10) Since 1942, G-3 had actually worked on only two of these projects and they had to be completely revised.(11)

The G-2 Historical Section was organized under a Chief of Section(12) and consisted of the following sub-sections: Research and Editorial, Production, and Library, Standing Operating Procedure Instructions were issued. Practically all personnel were "borrowed" from G-2 affiliates, and except for three professional civil historians the rest of the personnel were untrained as writers or researchers. Nevertheless, all historical projects were under way as the new year began and were grouped in several categories as shown in Plate 53.

f. Geographical Section

This Section was essentially a continuation, at reduced strength, of the enormously productive, war-time AGS, with some chronological interruptions.

(10) A Historical Division, G-3, had been in operation, since 1942. It developed a series of four (4) Historical Monographs on the campaigns of the SWPA. In Dec 1943, the Division was transferred to G-2. No personnel was provided. The range of Hist. Commitments increased considerably and is shown elsewhere:


(11) G-2's Editorial Job:	G-3	G-2
No. of pages	695	485
No. of pages deleted	397	
No. of pages revised		298
No. of pages added		187
No. of plates	78	123
No. of plates deleted	33	
No. of plates revised		45
No. of plates added		78

(12) The AC/S, G-2, later took over the editor-in-chief functions of the Section, and the former chief of section became a Deputy.

The Geographical Section (FEC and SCAP) was established as a subdivision of the (ATIS) Allied Translator & Interpreter Section in June 1946, primarily for administrative purposes. It remained a "bureau" under a directive of 9 July 1946 until the arrival of Dr. K.B. Krauskopf, who was designated Chief of the Geographical Section. The unit was directed to collect geographical data and reference material for permanent files. In addition, the limited personnel assisted with the overflow of work for research and operated in conjunction with "Central Interrogation Section", ATIS, in extracting geographic data and establishing correct geographic place names for interrogation reports.

The Geographical Section also procured, translated, and edited all available Japanese geographical studies (Japanese Army and Navy Staffs); and on the basis of these studies checked, corrected and brought up to date existing U.S. geographical studies, and prepared further terrain studies for areas not covered by existing reports.

On 18 February 1947, an MID directive was received outlining six "critical geographic areas" for which reports were to be prepared from information available to the section. Reports on No. 1 (Northern Korea and Southeastern Manchuria), No. 2 (Northeast China), and No. 5 (East Central China) were completed before 7 July 1947. On this date the February directive was modified by a further directive which was in use in 1948. Highest priority was assigned to "Brief Geographic Studies" on North Korea, Sakhalin, the Kuriles, etc., as well as to geographic supplements to "Periodic Intelligence Summaries" on Manchuria and China prepared by the Plans & Estimates Section, G-2. A lower priority was given to eventually more complete Terrain Studies, which were proposed for North Korea, Manchuria, Sakhalin, the Kuriles, China, Outer Mongolia, etc., etc.



LT COL R. C. ZALESKY, CHIEF, GEOGRAPHIC SECT., G-2 (1948)



GEOGRAPHICAL SECTION, TOKYO, 1948

Seated L to R: Dr K. B. Keanskopf, Lt Col R. C. Zalesky, Maj T. G. Balliet, 1st Lt R. E. Donnelly.
Standing: E. M. Harwood, J. J. Clifford, S. Kato, R. Hamaji.

"Spot reports" were to be developed as requested. All available geographic information on the Far East was filed accessibly and was suitably cross-indexed.

The Geographical Section was organized into the following sub-sections: 1) Administrative, which directed and supervised the work of the entire section. 2) Research: The Research Sub-section collected, collated and correlated data for all reports. It maintained liaison with ATIS for scanning of primary sources. Contact with Central Interrogation Section was established for assistance in interrogating special Japanese or foreign informants. 3) Cartographic: The Cartographic Sub-section prepared maps, charts, and illustrations required for all reports. It maintained liaison with ATIS Production Section, the 64th Engineer Topo. Bn., A-2, FEAF, and other agencies.

The sources for information for all reports consisted of the following: 1) Japanese geographical studies and other pertinent documents (Japanese Gen. Staff Studies). 2) Selected informants (Repatriates). 3) Geographic studies prepared by other agencies, viz.: ACS Terrain Studies and Special Reports, JANIS Intelligence Studies, MID Strategic Engineering Studies, CINCPAC-CINCPAC Bulletins and Target Information Studies, Air Target Folders, MIS Reports and ONI Reports. 4) Japanese technical, scientific, and commercial agencies which had in their possession pertinent information. Personnel from these agencies were interviewed by the Geographical Section, and records of the agencies were examined for geographic data.

The following reports have been prepared by and were typical of the work of the Geographical Section:

Railway, Highway, Water Transportation; Peip-ling to K'ai-feng and Shanghai to Wang-chu. February 1947, 35 pp., 4 maps.
Japanese Estimates of Russian Invasion Plans of Manchuria, with Emphasis on Invasion Routes. April 1947, 8 pp.

Deposits of Fissionable Material. April 1947, 32 pp., 1 map.
Military Geography of Kurile Islands. October 1947, 38 pp., 10 maps.
Military Geography of Sakhalin. October 1947, 44 pp., 12 maps.
Military Geography of Northern Korea. October 1947, 32 pp., 16 maps.
Military Geography of S.E. Siberia. April 1948, 30 pp., 24 maps.

Other reports on certain aspects of the military geography of adjacent areas were prepared as Annexes to intelligence summaries by the Plans & Estimates Section, G-2 and JSPOG.

Many special interrogations of technically trained persons have been conducted by members of the Geographical Section. From these about 70 special interrogation reports have been prepared and collected into a volume called "Special Interrogations on Geographic Subjects." (Approx. 140 pp., 16 maps)

The Cartographic Sub-section prepared a total of 506 original drawings of maps, charts, and overlays. In this connection 11,616 maps have been distributed to various sections of ATIS and to repatriation centers.

The Geographical Section obtained a total of 411 foreign documents. Of these 147 have been translated in full and 95 translated in part. Of the remainder, 119 documents were in process of translation.

5. General Liaison:

a. Introduction

With the opening of advance headquarters in Japan, G-2 improvised a Liaison Section to funnel all contacts with the Japanese Government and coordinate the requirements of Foreign Diplomatic Missions resident in Tokyo.

The Section was placed under the Executive Group in G-2, and continued in operation throughout the Occupation, although civil diplomatic contacts were ultimately made the responsibility of the SCAP Diplomatic Section, and G-2 Foreign Liaison specialized on Soviet Mission requirements.



LT COL D. L. WILLETT'S, CHIEF, GENERAL LIAISON, G 2 (1947/48)



GENERAL LIAISON SECTION, TOKYO, 1948

Seated L to R: Maj G. P. Solovskoy, Lt Col D. L. Willetts, Maj E. B. Daniels, Capt J. M. Senko.
Standing: Capt V. S. Page, 1st Lt P. F. Bell, 1st Lt R. M. Herron, Capt G. W. Chandler, 1st Lt O.
H. Kor

The Japanese Liaison Section received all official correspondence from the Japanese government and arranged for proper distribution to SCAP sections concerned. It also arranged for initial interviews of delegations from the Japanese government, individuals and groups.

The Foreign Liaison Section, in June 1948, still handled many contacts with Foreign Diplomatic Missions particularly the current military personnel (Attaches). It received, translated, and distributed to proper Staff sections to the Foreign Missions in Japan. It delivered all communications from the Supreme Commander and his staff sections to the Foreign Missions.

In order to perform its mission, this section maintained a staff of competent linguists able to translate and interpret Russian, Japanese, Chinese, German, Spanish and French.

b. Foreign Liaison Section

The Foreign Liaison Section came into being in Manila on 15 August 1945 immediately upon the arrival of elements of the military staffs of China, Australia, England, France, and the USSR, incidental to the surrender ceremonies. It should be noted that a bona fide Russian Military Mission was previously accredited to SWPA.

The advance echelon of GHQ left Manila late in August, arrived in Japan on 1 September, and brought with it elements of the Foreign Liaison group. Once in Japan, the duties of the Foreign Liaison Section multiplied. Increasing liaison with the Japanese Government required the establishment of a Japanese Sub-Section.

The Foreign Liaison Section was redesignated General Liaison, 1 February 1947. This Section furnished interpreters for conferences between the C/S or various Staff Sections and these Missions, and assisted Foreign Missions by sending linguists to

meet arriving planes or ships. It has also furnished interpreters for numerous local trips of foreign representatives (mostly Chinese or Russian).

Through its message center the General Liaison distributed all the mail addressed to Foreign Missions, and assisted other G-2 Sections of this Headquarters in screening foreign language newspapers and other publications for material of intelligence value.

c. Japanese Liaison Section

When SCAP Headquarters was established in Tokyo, the Japanese Liaison Section was set up. It acted as a funnel for communications between GHQ and the "Central Liaison Office," an agency of the Japanese Government with parallel functions of controlling and canalizing communications between the numerous Japanese Government agencies and the Occupation staffs. This was done to prevent duplications and irregularities.

From the very date of landing demobilization of the Japanese Army and Navy represented an initial and major problem of the Occupation. To facilitate this, the Liaison Commission for the Japanese Demobilization Ministries (L.C.D.M.) was established. Branches of both L.C.D.M. and the Japanese Liaison Office were maintained within the Japanese Liaison Section, G-2. Here were evolved, between G-2 and the L.C.D.M., the basic plans for demobilization of the Japanese Armed Forces, the Japanese Liaison Section acting in the capacity of intermediary and coordinating agency.

Adequate demobilization machinery having been set up, the L.C.D.M. was eventually abolished. In its place, representatives of the Japanese First (Army) and Second (Navy) Demobilization Bureaux were attached to the Japanese Liaison Section. That Section gradually assumed functions beyond those of a mere intermedi-



J. W. SCHNEIDER, CHIEF, JAPANESE LIAISON, G-2 (1947/48)



JAPANESE LIAISON SECTION, TOKYO, 1948
L to R: C. Ito, J. Schneider, 1st Lt T. Tanaka

ary, being responsible for the Staff supervision of demobilization agencies, for collaboration with the Japanese Government in any necessary reorganization of these, and for the submission of periodic reports to Washington on the progress of the demobilization.

Although the major SCAP staff sections later established direct liaison with those departments of the Japanese Government with whose operations they were closely concerned, Japanese Liaison Section nevertheless continued through its second year as a useful intermediary. It received all official correspondence from the Japanese Government and numerous requests for information and for arrangement of appointments with Japanese from many of the staff sections. An endless stream of Japanese called on this section to make preliminary inquiries, present resolutions and petitions, and call for appointments.

To handle its business, the section was staffed with qualified linguists, and was aided by representatives from the Central Liaison Office and the Demobilization Bureaux.

During the period under review, Japanese Liaison Section: 1) received and routed about 10,300 letters from the Japanese Government to General Headquarters; 2) was visited by about 4,000 Japanese callers and answered their queries and requests, or arranged for them to be received by other staff sections; 3) received about 280 delegations presenting petitions and resolutions, and processed these documents; 4) arranged for the summoning of about 14,000 Japanese required for interrogation or interview by various staff sections and facilitated the return travel and reimbursement of expenses of about 4,500 of these persons who had come from outlying areas; and 5) received from staff sections, by telephone, check-note, or through personal visit, about 8,500 requests for information, for passing of information to the Japanese Government, for minor routine actions, and either answered them or caused the Japanese Government to answer and comply, where necessary.

Chapter VI
CIVIL INTELLIGENCE

1. Introduction:

Accurate information on the state of the nation can only be obtained by observation posts in each prefecture in a national system of intelligence/information coverage. Several law-enforcement and surveillance agencies were engaged in national coverage, on the basis of mutual support and interchange of information, viz.: CIS, MP, and Military Government.

The "Civil Intelligence Section" (CIS) was the operating agency for G-2 SCAP for counter intelligence and general security functions within the Theater; CIS might be termed the FBI of the Theater.(1) The intelligence coverage of Japan was uniform through a field distribution of CIS/CIC Detachments. With a relatively low numerical strength, CIS produced a complete internal intelligence coverage of prefectural Japan on a national basis.


CIS was divided into (1) Civil Censorship Detachment, (2) the Public Safety Division and (3) the 441st Counter Intelligence Corps. The Civil Censorship Detachment (CCD) exercised a mild press and mail censorship primarily to prevent anti-Occupation statements being published. Foreign sources attempted to distribute to the Japanese people motion pictures likely to stir up public unrest, racial hatreds, present foreign ideologies not in agreement with American policies, or critical of the Occupation.

The examination of the mail was one of the most direct and reliable intelligence sources. It developed "leads" in practically all current cases against "black market" operations. Besides "leads" to criminal activities, spot-censored mail, on a

(1) See Vol IX, Intell Series, "Operations of the Civil Intelligence Section: SCAP."



COL R. S. BRATTON, CHIEF, CIVIL INTELLIGENCE SECTION, G-2 (1946/48)



CIVIL INTELLIGENCE EXECUTIVE GROUP, TOKYO, 1948

Seated L to R: Lt Col C. M. Myrick, Col R. S. Bratton, Maj C. F. Gillis.
Standing: Maj C. W. Bower, Capt H. E. Thompson, Maj H. S. Buerschinger, J. Carusi.

national basis, became a sort of a "Gallop Poll" of public opinion and trends. All SCAP sections obtained valuable information "leads" from CCD, which assisted them in successfully completing their missions.

The Public Safety Division (PSD) was charged with procedures, training and regulations for the Japanese police, fire and prison institutions, and Coast Guard. Through employment of American experts, this Section instituted important police and prison reforms to date on a national scale. A master police reform plan was submitted by the Japanese Government and approved in principle by SCAP. Inasmuch as these safety agents would be the only stabilizing force remaining in Japan upon the withdrawal of the Occupation Forces, the early reorganization and training of these agencies along democratic lines was then, and continued to be in 1948, of prime importance in the aims of the Occupation Forces. (See chart on Plate 58 for trend of offenses against the Criminal Code.) Since 1 Jan 47, PSC completed 216 major projects including establishment of a Fire Research Institute, a Maritime Safety Service, and plans for revision of: Juvenile Code, Reformatory Act, and Offenders Rehabilitation Act. These projects involved 90 field trips during which 1,632 conferences were held and 1,757 inspections performed. These were broken down as follows:

	<u>Conferences</u>	<u>Inspections</u>
Police	529	1,462
Prison	493	155
Fire	575	105
Maritime Service	35	35

The most important operating agency of the Civil Intelligence Section (CIS) was the 441st Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment and its sub-section, the 319th Military Intelligence Company. These two organizations formed the major investigating agencies in the field in covering activities pertaining to foreign espionage, treason, sabotage, sedition, subversive actions, security

violations, and any acts inimical to the policies of the Occupation Forces, for example: the Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC) kept a close watch on the activities of the Japanese Communist Party.

As shown on the territorial chart, CIC operated on a nation-wide scale. This distribution was essential as accurate information on the state of the Japanese nation could only be obtained by maintaining observation collection points in each prefecture; CIS, by means of its Counter Intelligence Corps detachments, thus, was the only SCAP agency which maintained 100 per cent national coverage. The four main islands of Japan were divided into 37 numbered CIC units which generally corresponded to the political prefectures set up by the Japanese Government. These were further broken down into 61 separate installations.


This surveillance agency closely coordinated its activities with the Occupation staff and troops. For example: the first CIC Region covered the corresponding area of I Corps, while the second CIC Region was responsible for the same area as the IX Corps. Troops habitually called on CIC detachments for assistance in their own local investigations. Division G-2's or Regimental and Battalion S-2's were first recipients of CIC reports.

When each investigation was completed, (see bar graph on Plate 59 for July - August cases) the CIC detachment handling the subject, referred all pertinent material in each case to the tactical units, Military Government or MP detachments for disposition. Close liaison was maintained with all foregoing agencies, on all levels of command.


2. The Civil Intelligence Section (CIS):

a. General

On 2 October 1945, Civil Intelligence Section (CIS) was formulated as one of the several civil agencies of SCAP, its functions and responsibilities covered surveillance policies and



JULY—AUGUST



FIRST AND SECOND CIC REGION
CASES CLOSED

CIS ACTIVITIES—JAPAN, OCCUPATION PERIOD

reform of: 1) Police, prison, and fire control organizations and systems in Japan and Korea. 2) The censorship organization and agencies of the Japanese Government. 3) Subversive activities in Japan and Korea. 4) Investigations relative to compliance by the Japanese Government with SCAP orders. 5) Apprehension and detention of persons as directed by the Supreme Commander.

Some of the above responsibilities overlapped those already carried out by the 441st Counter Intelligence Detachment in the same period.

Between October 1945 and May 1946, the Section assumed added duties: 1) The censoring of all media of public expression - newspapers, radio, books, and magazines. 2) Recommendation of policy in the field of public safety.


In 1948 Civil Intelligence Section exercised operational control over the 441st CIC Detachment, the Civil Censorship Detachment, and the Public Safety Division.

b. Operations

The Operations Division of CIS consisted of a General Activities (rightist surveillance) Branch, a Special Activities (leftist surveillance) Branch, and Compilations and Publications Branches. During the second year of the Occupation, CIS continued to direct the activities of CIC and CGD. All the reports of these two divisions were sent to the Operations Division for information and action. Reports were processed, evaluated, and, in important cases, published. The files previously started were greatly expanded and many new items entered.

Between October 1946 and June 1947, the following accomplishments were recorded (figures are approximate):

5,760 biog. sketches completed for SCAP sections.
6,600 record checks made on request.
41,500 intell. reports processed and information disseminated.
46,300 extracts made from various intelligence reports.
Library greatly enlarged, to a total of 1,500 volumes.
650,000 pp. documents microfilmed, and 4,500 reproductions from microfilm completed.



Special reports published by the various branches of the Operations Division averaged about twelve monthly. Several periodical publications were produced, including the Civil Intelligence Section of the "G-2 Daily Intelligence Summary" and the monthly "CIS Periodical Summary."

To illustrate the range of CIS publications the following samples of special studies and reports are listed:

November 1945:
Foreign Nationals in Tokyo and Their Residential Addresses
German Nationals in Japan Liebenzeller Mission

January 1946:
Special Study on Sabo, Ken and Tokyo Gumisho (Japanese Australian Navy Section During Japan East Asia War)

February 1946:
Organization of the Metropolitan Police
East Asia Federation of Comrades (Toa Remmei Dosud Kai)
Shufu-no-Tomo Publishing Company
Study and Chart Showing the Relative Proportion of Foreign Nationals with Russian Background and Russian Satellite Background Employed by GHQ, SCAP with Other Foreign Nationals Employed by GHQ.

March 1946:
Japanese Class A War Criminal Suspects

April 1946:
Japan Free Publishers Association (Nippon Jiyu Shuppan Kyokai)
Organizational Chart of the Japan Communist Party
Greater Japan Education Society (Dai Nippon Kyoiku Kai)

June 1946:
Communist Party Organizations and Newspapers
Personality study on Officials of the Young Communist League
Kempei Tai in North China (WDI Target 1602)
Japan Russian Society (Nichi Ro Kyokai) (WDI Target 1601)

August 1946:
Diamonds in Possession of the Ord Admin Headquarters

September 1946:
Counter Intelligence Reports, Japanese (WDI Target 560)
Information Desired on Members of Koiso Cabinet (WDI Target 383)
Chart Showing the Organization of the Nazi Party in Japan

October 1946:
Black Dragon Society (Kokuryukai) (WDI Target 1601)
Field Military Police (Yasen Kempei Tai) (WDI Target 1602)

December 1946:
Communist and Leftist Movements in Universities
Japan Democratic League (Nippon Minshu Remmei)
Study of all German Nationals in Japan

January 1947:
Japan Industry Club (Nippon Kogyo Kurabu)

March 1947:
Communist Infiltration in Magazine Publishing Industries
Study on Japan-India Association (Nichi In Kyokai)

April 1947:
Hosei University Communist Cell
Tokyo Branches of the League of Koreans Residing in Japan

May 1947:
Charts on Factions Within the Four Leading Parties of Japan
Organization Chart of the Economic Stabilization Board

June 1947:
Saionji-Harada Memoirs (Consisting of 24 Parts: 3010 pages)

441st CIC DETACHMENT LOCATIONS—JAPAN

KANAZAWA AREA 13
5TH AIR FORCE
ISHIKAWA DET MG TOKAI-HOKURIKU REGION 4
TOYAMA DET MG TOKAI-HOKURIKU REGION 4
FUKUI DET MG KINKI REGION NO 5

NAGOYA AREA 12
622ND MP BN
NAGOYA CCO DET (PPS)
24TH COMBAT TEAM
TOKAI-HOKURIKU MG REGION NO 4
5TH AIR FORCE

KOBE AREA 8
KOBE BASE SECURITY BN
HYOGO DET MG KANTO REGION 3
25TH INF DIV
ITAM AIR BASE
20TH MP CO
800F

TAKAMATSU AREA 5
SHIKOKU MG REGION NO 7

OKAYAMA AREA 7
KINKI MG REGION NO 5 B DETACHMENTS
800F 804F

KURE AREA 5
HIROSHIMA DET MG CHUGOKU REGION 6
30TH AUSTRALIAN INF BRIG (SOP)

YAMAGUCHI AREA 4
804F
YAMAGUCHI DET MG CHUGOKU REGION 6
2ND NZFF BRIG

KOKURA AREA 3
FUJOKA DET MG KYUSHU REGION NO 8
24TH INFANTRY 24TH ARTY DIV
19TH INFANTRY
SAGA MP
213 TH COMPOSITE WING
24 TH DIV MP PLAT

KASOOSHIMA AREA 1
KASOOSHIMA DET MG KYUSHU REGION 8
KANSAI INF BATT
MIZUAKI (MGT)
21 ST B 19 TH INF REGT
CCO DET 71

SAPPORO AREA 37
PWTS 101B
CHITOSE AAB
HOKKAIDO DET MG HOKKAIDO REGION 1
11 AIR DIV

AUMURI AREA 36
KOMORI DET MG TOHOKU REGION 2
511 PORT INF(LIA)S DIV

MORIOKA AREA 35
IWATE DET MG TOHOKU REGION 2

AKITA AREA 34
AKITA DET MG TOHOKU REGION 2

YAMAGATA AREA 32
YAMAGATA DET MG TOHOKU REGION 1
11 AIRBORNE DIV ARTY (JINMAGRI)

NIGATA AREA 30
NAGATA DET MG KANTO REGION 3
21 ST FA BN
511 ACW 17TH AIR FORCE

NAGANO AREA 29
NAGANO DET MG KANTO REGION 3

IX COR
MG SEA
122 COM
100 TH
17 COR

VI
FUKUSHI
188 TH

TOCHIGI

I
IBARAKI
118TH

7
GUMMA
2701ST
140121
DIV AF

SAITAMA
1ST C
87N C
5TH

CHIBA
1ST C
112121

1ST BF
TOKYO
CCO (C
998)
120 A
507 TH

TOKYO
118 AF
212 M
CCO
10005
21
2 TH

SHO
8TH

KATSUYAMA AREA 22
KOFU DET MG KANTO REGION 3


SHIZUOKA AREA 18
SHIZUOKA DET MG TOHAI-HONSHU REGION 4
24TH INF REGT 122TH DIV GFLA
18TH DIV REGT
622 MP BN

OSAKA AREA 14
CCO DET NO 2 (OSAKA)
KOME MG REGION 5 AND DET
25 TH INF DIV 127TH INF REGT
25 TH DIV MP PLAT


KYO AREA 10
HQ 5TH AIR FORCE
KYOTO AREA 10
HQ 5TH AIR FORCE
KUMI MG REGION NO 3 AND DET
25 TH INF DIV 127TH INF REGT
CORPS MP PLAT
15TH AIR FORCE

YOKKAICHI AREA 11
MIYE DET MG TOKAI-HOKURIKU REGION 4
PW 5TH AIRBORNE (NAGATA)
622ND MP BN (NAGATA)
25TH DIV ARTY (NARA)

KIYAMOTO AREA 2
KIYAMOTO DET MG KYUSHU REGION 8
25 TH INF PLAT
NAGASAKI DET MG KYUSHU REGION 8
14 TH INF REGT (NAGASAKI)
SUB DET 22-B, CCO



**CIC DETACHMENT
STATIONS—JAPAN**



A large part of the work of the Civil Intelligence Section, G-2, has been that of probing into political, social, cultural and business organizations to weed out reactionary influences and persons inimical to the aims of the Occupation and to the evolution of a democratic Japan.

The SCAP Directives of 4 January 1946, (SCAPIN 550 and 548) included comprehensive lists of organizations to be abolished because of militaristic or ultra-nationalistic tendencies,(2) and barred several hundred persons from holding public office. A previous 4 October 1945 directive (SCAPIN 93) sometimes called the "Japanese Bill of Rights,"(3) ordered the removal of restrictions. Studies necessary to assure compliance with these and other democratizing directives were of monumental size.

c. 441st Counter Intelligence Detachment

The 441st Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment supplied almost all the information on subversive activities in Japan not incidentally furnished by Civil Censorship. Working in every prefecture and every important city, agents of the CIC carried an increasingly heavy load since they arrived with the first troops in Japan. In the tense days immediately following the landing of American Forces, CIC personnel handled the job of "securing" the Occupation headquarters and other important installations. During the first month a network of detachments was spread throughout Japan. These detachments have served since as field units for anti-subversive and other intelligence work.

In December 1945, the former headquarters of the Japanese Military Police (Kempei Tai) was taken over in Tokyo. The Kempei Tai was the enemy counterintelligence agency which G-2 and

(2) G-2 anticipated this list in Annex 5 d to "Blacklist," the Operations Instructions for Occupation of Japan, 14 August 1945.
(3) SCAPIN No. 93, 4 October 1945, "Removal of Restrictions on Political, Civil and Religious Liberties."

CIC had to combat from Papua to the Philippines. It was an impressive and ironic occasion when the American CIC took over as its own the former main headquarters of the Kempei Tai and named it after Capt. John H. Norton, a CIC officer killed on Okinawa.

During the first months of the Occupation, the Civil Intelligence Section, was responsible for effecting the release of those individuals who had been imprisoned, or held under "protection and surveillance," for violation of the multitudinous laws, decrees and regulations which for so many years had restricted the freedom of speech, thought, religion, and assembly of the Japanese people.

One of the most important tasks assigned to CIS in that period was the apprehension of the "Class A" war criminal suspects. The first from a list of several hundred of these suspects were placed behind bars during the first two weeks of September.

A spectacular apprehension was that of former General Hideki Tojo, Prime Minister during most of the war. It was upon the arrival of arresting CIC officers at Tojo's home 11 September 1945, that he barricaded his door, seated himself in an overstuffed chair, and attempted suicide.

The emphasis has shifted from ultra-nationalists and war criminals as that job has been completed. This trend may be illustrated by the following comparison:

	June 1946		June 1947	
	Closed	Pending	Closed	Pending
Sabotage	4	4	5	12
Espionage	5	13	7	14
Treason	0	0	0	0
Sedition	0	0	0	0
Subversive activities	311	383	260	432
Disaffection	2	5	0	1
Violation of AR 380-5	0	2	0	2
Security risk	30	30	1	0
Security Invest'n Pers ...	339	58	56	66
Security Survey	2	4	0	1
Miscellaneous	598	227	43	45

In every part of Japan CIC agents were busy in investi-

gation, in surveillance and in counter espionage. The flow of their reports into CIS was a steady stream of huge volume. Without CIC the Occupation authorities would have been operating in the dark.

d. Civil Censorship Detachment


Civil Censorship in Japan has been discreet but thorough. Immediately after the establishment of a Civil Censorship Detachment, civil censorship codes were devised for the Japanese press, radio, and motion pictures to insure that the media for disseminating information would develop to conform with Occupation objectives laid down by SCAP. In conjunction with censoring current material, CCD attempted to remove the anti-democratic and militaristic propaganda of the past; pre-surrender Japanese films were reviewed and those of an anti-democratic or militaristic tenor were censored. The Japanese Government was directed to remove wartime propaganda publications from all warehouses, bookshops, bookdealers, publishing companies, distributing agents and all commercial establishments and agencies of the government where they were held in bulk, though individual private copies were exempted from the confiscation order.

During the second year of the Occupation, the Civil Censorship Detachment widened and expanded its activities in all fields of communication, press and public information. The volume of routine work increased greatly, and they added several special features to their activities, viz.:

	<u>June 1946</u>	<u>June 1947</u>
External Mail Examined	610,000	810,000
Internal Mail Examined	3,990,000	5,910,000
Precensored Theatricals	1,120	2,940
Precensored Films	301	673
Precensored Recordings	94	514
Precensored Broadcasts	6,400	8,600
Precensored Daily Papers	40	69
Postcensored Newspapers	5,000	11,110
Precensored Magazines	637	917
Postcensored Magazines	75	223
Precensored News Agencies	24	16
Precensored Books	1,120	1,810
Valuable Mail Intercepts	13,300	14,600
Comment Sheets	98,500	31,100
Domestic Telegrams	710,000	2,210,000
External Telegrams	10,100	20,500
Telephonic Conversations	11,600	24,000

AREA 25
 (Tokyo - Yokohama District)
 STATISTICAL TABLE AND GRAPH SHOWING
 CASES PENDING AND CLOSED


TYPE OF CASE	Pending		Closed	
	A	B	A	B
Violation of AR 380-5	1	0	0	2
Disaffection	2	1	0	1
Security Risks	2	1	0	1
Security Survey	2	2	0	0
Espionage	23	23	2	4
Miscellaneous	22	20	23	14
Security Invest. of Personnel	53	29	36	38
Subversive Activity	146	121	67	65
Totals:	250	197	128	125



This enormous volume of intercepts developed "leads" of great importance and was one of the most effective security measures for the Occupation. Information "leads" were developed that were of immediate usefulness to the civil sections of SCAP and all law enforcement and surveillance agencies. Practically all initial "tips" or "leads" in criminal cases of interest to the Occupation, i.e. "blackmarket" dealings in Occupation properties or supplies and irregular operations of Japanese, came through censorship sources. This information was fed into the appropriate Occupation channel for investigation and punitive action.

In September 1946 a public opinion tally was begun to get a cross section of Japanese public opinion. Japan was divided into nine geographical areas, and five hundred letters were chosen at random every day from each of the areas for the public opinion tally. These letters were examined for expression of opinion on ten specific subjects: Cabinet, Diet, Communism, Riots and Demonstrations, Occupation Policies, Emperor System, Food Problems, Public Health Problems, Occupation Personnel, and Education. The examiner's worksheets were sent in to headquarters, where the special reports sub-section collated the information for publication. Although the number of letters was small, they represented a general cross section of opinions and indicated trends. The first tally was made from 16 September to 30 September, and later the number of letters per day per district was increased to 1,500.

A series of special reports was inaugurated by the Press, Pictorial and Broadcast Section in January 1947. Three months later 16 of these had been published, of which the following titles are typical: "Saito Bookstore," "Summary of Propaganda Publications," "Declining Trend in the Supply of New Books," "Survey of the Raw Film Situation in Japan."



e. Public Safety Division

In the field of public safety, SCAP faced great difficulties. The Japanese Police had been masters of the people so long that it was hard for the public to consider them in any other light.

One of the first acts of SCAP was to abolish the dread "Thought Police" which had long maintained an iron grip on Japanese society. Along with the "Thought Police" went other special bodies and powers of the police; for example, their tendency to exercise absolute control over the economic life of a community.

From the United States CIS introduced experts in the public safety field to advise on the reform of the Japanese public safety organizations; former Police Commissioner Lewis J. Valentine of New York; Oscar Olander, Commissioner of state police in Michigan. Most of the men operating the Public Safety Division of CIS, G-2, were civilians or military personnel with wide experience in the public safety field.

Other features of the public safety mission consisted of the modernization and democratization of the prison systems and fire control agencies of Japan. Through detailed surveys of existing regulation, procedures, equipment and educational programs, the Public Safety Division acquired a realistic grasp of present deficiencies and delineated recommendations insuring the establishment of an efficient public safety system for Japan.

The major special police reports of the late New York Commissioner Lewis J. Valentine and Mr. Oscar A. Olander of the Michigan State Police were completed by the end of June 1946. Much of the work of the Public Safety Division during the year which followed was aimed at getting these reports accepted as official policy and putting their recommendations into effect.

Several other more detailed supplementary reports were

completed: (1) Police Communications Systems, (2) Police Training, (3) Metropolitan Police, and (4) Rural Police. In every case, the report supplemented the basic Valentine and Olander reports.

On the basis of these various studies, recommendations were made to the Commander-in-Chief. By the end of June 1947, two major staff studies were in the process of being approved. The first dealt with a complete reorganization of the Japanese Police System, although its final approval came later. The second staff study dealt with the corresponding problems of the Water Police.



As a companion to research, the Public Safety Division conducted numerous widespread investigations throughout Japan. Inspections and surveys of Japanese public safety organizations were constant, with different simultaneous objectives. A great number of corrections were made on the spot, merely by supplying suggestions and helpful advice. Almost all the police detention cells in Tokyo were rebuilt and modernized in this manner. Police brutality and corruption were curtailed and the Japanese police inspectors were trained to continue the new program on their own initiative.

Experts in penology made thorough investigations into the Japanese prison and reformatory systems. Every important institution was visited and completely surveyed. Prisoners and prison officials were interviewed and a mass of statistical information accumulated. As in the case of police, it was possible to make a very large number of "on-the-spot" corrections. Repeat trips insured that the suggestions were carried out. Several special projects were based on the information obtained: guard training schools, prison industries, paroles and probation practices, and prisoner classification. Since the establishment of the Public Safety Division, the prisoner mortality rate has declined sharply.

Equally effective work was accomplished in the other


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JAPANESE CRIME STATISTICS

A. JAPANESE CRIME STATISTICS
OFFENSES AGAINST THE CRIMINAL CODE




B. JAPANESE CRIME RATE
 (OFFENSES AGAINST THE CRIMINAL CODE)

BY PREFECTURE
 DECEMBER 1947



DECEMBER NATIONAL
 RATE: 145

C. OFFENSES REPORTED
BY OFFENSE, BY MONTH
 1947



D. NUMBER OF OFFENSES REPORTED DURING
 DECEMBER 1947
 BY TYPE, BY PREFECTURE

Prefecture	Major Criminal Code				Other Than Criminal Code	
	Person	Property	Others	Total	Criminal Code	Grand Total
Shikoku	78	5,465	438	6,031	1,269	6,030
Amori	23	491	86	570	259	1,129
Izumi	23	1,000	65	1,066	842	1,908
Miyagi	26	1,130	74	1,204	1,209	2,413
Akita	33	540	75	615	369	1,002
Iwate	33	941	50	1,004	380	1,404
Fukushima	50	1,460	94	1,594	1,727	3,321
Ibaraki	57	1,163	102	1,355	772	2,127
Tochigi	46	1,428	67	1,545	511	2,056
Gunma	65	2,253	41	2,319	355	2,674
Saitama	101	3,154	130	3,385	1,521	4,906
Chiba	69	1,331	122	1,500	1,000	2,500
Tokyo	217	14,768	528	15,810	11,886	27,696
Kanagawa	96	2,628	115	2,845	1,254	4,109
Chiba	21	1,032	92	1,107	1,454	2,561
Tochigi	16	789	76	881	1,099	1,978
Ishikawa	5	1,004	30	1,040	79	1,119
Fukuoka	9	612	26	648	217	865
Yamanashi	20	746	97	849	356	1,205
Gunma	21	1,727	97	1,827	1,000	2,827
Ibiki	21	1,528	106	1,634	1,424	3,058
Shizuoka	54	2,408	142	2,550	1,622	4,172
Aichi	53	6,261	131	6,445	2,387	8,832
Mie	37	1,430	65	1,512	345	1,857
Osaka	14	499	87	580	1,475	2,055
Kyoto	24	2,230	21	2,251	1,658	3,909
Oosaka	218	7,539	172	7,700	3,276	10,976
Hyogo	136	7,057	396	7,818	2,159	9,977
Fukuoka	11	748	35	787	386	1,173
Hiogo	41	1,133	58	1,243	414	1,657
Yamaguchi	14	623	18	627	125	752
Shimane	20	454	35	489	524	1,013
Okayama	62	2,456	139	2,595	267	2,862
Hiroshima	97	2,540	130	2,670	593	3,263
Yamaguchi	48	2,717	73	2,790	542	3,332
Chugoku	17	470	73	540	469	1,009
Shiga	18	970	46	1,016	309	1,325
Chiba	38	1,428	105	1,533	308	1,841
Chiba	21	1,485	62	1,547	324	1,871
Fukuoka	34	6,050	247	6,297	2,045	8,342
Saga	22	797	34	831	240	1,071
Yamaguchi	97	1,263	119	1,382	374	1,756
Osaka	35	1,724	84	1,808	753	2,561
Oita	29	215	202	417	440	857
Miyazaki	26	1,468	393	1,861	267	2,128
Kagoshima	58	388	33	421	450	871
TOTAL	2,242	105,330	5,776	114,348	47,687	162,034

SOURCE:
 MINISTRY OF HOME AFFAIRS

PLATE II
 RESTRICTED

PREPARED BY:
 PUBLIC SAFETY DIVISION

branches of the division. The Fire Branch extended its investigations into every major city in the country. Great effort was made to improve the working conditions of the firemen, and to remove them from the control of the police burcaucracy and to give them the basic equipment of fire fighting - hose, gasoline, etc. Voluminous city grading studies were begun, based on the standard American fire underwriters procedures. Deficiencies were brought to light in this way, and insurance rates were equalized. A great effort was spent on "Fire Prevention Week," the first such affair ever held in Japan. By means of an elaborate publicity campaign, a great deal of cooperation was obtained from prominent citizens; neighborhood fire protection associations were formed which gave valuable service in eliminating local fire hazards.

In 1947 PSD completed 216 major projects including establishment of a Fire Research Institute, a Maritime Safety Service, and plans for revision of: Juvenile Code, Reformatory Act and Offenders Rehabilitation Act.

Chapter VII

CONCLUSION

At the outset of the war, G-2 in the Southwest Pacific faced what appeared to be insuperable obstacles, viz.:

World-wide lack of adequate initial information on Japanese strength, resources, disposition, and order of battle.

Scanty information of terrain held by the enemy. Compared with the ETO map situation, New Guinea was an uncharted wilderness.

Practical cessation of flow of intelligence from the Philippines in 1942.

Operations against an enemy with one of the world's most complicated language systems.

Absence of and the creation of appropriate intelligence agencies for geographical, linguist, and clandestine operations:

CB : Central Bureau

ATIS: Allied Translator & Interpreter Section

AIB : Allied Intelligence Bureau

ACS : Allied Geographical Section

Trend toward independence of the various intelligence agencies and Allied establishments leading to competitive efforts and sometimes duplications. (CIC; COIC; AIB)

The manner in which these problems were met has been described in the preceding pages. The fact that they were solved successfully is evidenced by the historical achievements of the forces in the Southwest Pacific Area. An advance of some 2,500 miles from Papua to the Philippines was made with a minimum of means and tactical losses. Victories were forged at the end of the longest supply lines the world has ever seen and were made possible only by the most economical use of usually limited means. Not a single tactical setback occurred in a most difficult, tropical theater against a competent enemy who fought tenaciously to the last ditch. The victories in the Southwest Pacific Area were substantially based on accurate intelligence information of every category. A mere trickle of enemy information, at the beginning of the war, became a flood of intelligence data on every phase of operation of the Japanese

armed forces and the territory they occupied.(1) When queried on the primary causes for Allied victory in New Guinea, Lt. Col. Shinohara, Masaru, Senior Intelligence Officer, Japanese Eighth Area Army Headquarters, said: "Air superiority, superior strategy, General MacArthur's overall offensive plan, superior weapons and equipment, and a superior intelligence system."(2)

Experience gained in the war in the Southwest Pacific shows the absolute necessity for centralized intelligence control. Competitive, quasi-independent agencies must be eliminated, or ruthlessly subordinated as they tend to unduly assert their individuality and operate independently, causing friction, duplication of effort, loss of valuable time, general inefficiency, and unsatisfactory command relationships. Centralized control was found to be imperative if intelligence was to operate at peak efficiency; everything else was tried reluctantly, only to result in failure.

The problem of effective coordination between various intelligence agencies will be one for Service Schools to solve through methods of training, improved curricula, intelligence planning against future emergencies. Without centralization of intelligence and sharply defined control of all intelligence agencies, needless waste of time, means and men is inevitable. In this con-

(1) Extract from a C in C citation for the award of the D.S.M.:
".....Upon the establishment of the South West Pacific Area..... G-2 was charged with the particularly difficult and complex task of organizing and co-ordinating intelligence activities in the theater. Speedily and with brilliant resourcefulness, he planned and put into action necessary agencies for providing the command with reliable and comprehensive information concerning the terrain, the native inhabitants, enemy installations, dispositions and movements in a vast and inaccessible area. During the containing operations which were necessary before an offensive could be launched, his assessments of enemy strengths and intentions were conspicuously accurate, and data were meanwhile assembled upon which sound plans of attack could be based. General Willoughby, by his noteworthy achievements as an organizer and his penetrating analysis of the military situation, made an invaluable contribution to the success of military operations in the South West Pacific area....."

(2) Interrogation Files, G-2 Historical Section, GHQ, FEC.

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
nection, the dramatic report of the Pearl Harbor Committee is significant. Exaggerated secrecy and departmental intransigence dominate its pages of accusation. It is only recently that the principle of centralization has found highest official expression in the formation of a National Intelligence Agency.

This problem was never entirely solved in the SWPA. Whatever success G-2 was able to achieve can be attributed to a continuous, vigilant, uncompromising effort to establish and maintain centralized control of all intelligence agencies, affiliates and subsidiaries, in spite of obviously adverse conditions, and to maintain the highest standards in G-2 publications which won final recognition by their intrinsic merit.

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CHRONOLOGY OF THE WAR GHO



IN THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC, 1941-1945

CHRONOLOGY OF THE WAR IN THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC, 1941-1945




ENEMY OFFENSIVE

1941

DEC.

- 7 Japanese carrier force struck Pearl Harbor
- 8 Thailand surrendered
- 8 Japanese bombed Clark Field, Luzon
- 9 Malaya invaded
- 10 Japanese landed at Vigan and Aparri, Luzon
- 10 Guam captured
- 20 Japanese landings at Davao, Mindanao
- 23 Wake Island surrendered
- 25 Hong Kong surrendered
- 26 Manila declared open city
- 27 Manila bombed by Japanese

CHRONOLOGY OF THE WAR IN THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC, 1941-1945



1942

JAN.

- 2 Manila occupied
- 22-24 Battle of Makassar Straits
- 23 Japanese took Rabaul
- 24 Balikpapan (Borneo) occupied

FEB.

- 10 Gasmata (New Britain) occupied
- 15 Singapore surrendered
- 19 Heavy Japanese air raid at Darwin
- 20 Timor invaded
- 28 Battle of Java Sea


MAR.

- 1 Japanese invaded Java
- 2 Refugees from Java caught by Japanese air raid on Broome
- 8 Lae-Salamaua captured
- 8 British evacuated Rangoon

APRIL

- 7 Buin (Southern Bougainville) seized
- 9 American surrender of Bataan
- 16 Japanese landed at Capiz and Iloilo, (Panay)

CHRONOLOGY OF THE WAR
IN THE SOUTH PACIFIC, 1941-1945



MAY

- 2 Tulagi occupied
- 6 Japanese occupied Hollandia
- 6 Surrender of Corregidor
- 7-8 Battle of Coral Sea
- 9 Surrender of United States Army Forces in the Far East (USAFPE) Visayas and Mindanao

JUNE

- 3-6 Battle of Midway

JULY

- 21/22 Japanese landed Buna-Gona area
- 31 Kai, Aroe, Tanimbar Islands seized

AUG.

- 25/26 Japanese landed Milne Bay

DEC.

- 18-19 Madang and Wewak occupied

1943

JAN.

- 30 Japanese repulsed at Wau

CHRONOLOGY OF THE WAR IN THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC, 1941-1945



GENERAL CHRONOLOGY

1941

DEC.

- 12 Task Force-South Pacific constituted at sea
- 22-23 First United States Expeditionary Forces landed Brisbane, Australia. Task Force-South Pacific became United States Forces in Australia (USFIA) upon debarkation

1942

JAN.

- 5 USFIA became United States Army Forces in Australia (USAFIA)


MAR.

- 17 General MacArthur arrived at Darwin, Australia

APRIL

- 18 Initial date General Headquarters Southwest Pacific Area (GHQ SWPA)

CHRONOLOG OF THE WAR IN THE SOUTH PACIFIC, 1941-1945



MAY

- 7-8 Battle of the Coral Sea. Japanese attempt to capture Port Moresby repulsed
- 31 (31/1 June) Midget submarines attacked Sydney Harbor


JULY

- 20 GHQ closed at Melbourne, opened at Brisbane
- 20 United States Army Services of Supply (USASOS) created to assume functions of discontinued USAFIA
- 21/22 Japs landed at Gona
- 23 through 23 Jan. 1943. Papuan Campaign. Forces engaged Kokoda Trail: 7th Austn Div (-18th Bde), 16th and 30th Austn Bdes. Forces engaged Milne Bay: 7th and 18th Austn Bdes. Forces engaged Buna-Gona area: Austn—7th Div, 16th Bde, 30th Bde, 14th Bde. US—I Corps, 32nd Inf Div, 163rd Inf (41st Inf Div)
- 26-29 Japanese captured Kokoda airdrome

AUG.

- 7 US Marines landed Guadalcanal—Tulagi area

CHRONOLOGY OF THE WAR IN THE SOUTH PACIFIC, 1941-1945



AUG.

- 7 through 21 Feb. 1943. Guadalcanal Campaign.
Forces engaged: 1st Mar Div, elements 2nd Mar
Div, Americal Div, 25th Inf Div
- 8/9 Naval Battle of Savo Island
- 23-25 Naval Battle of Eastern Solomons
- 26 through 7 Sept. Japanese are repulsed at Milne
Bay by 7th and 18th Austn Bdes

SEPT.

- 3 Fifth Air Force established
- 17 Japanese drive over Owen Stanleys halted at Imita
Range, 20 airline miles from Port Moresby
- 26 25th Austn Bde (7th Div) began offensive to drive
Japanese back across Owen Stanleys

OCT.

- 11 Naval Battle of Cape Esperance
- 14 First elements 32nd Inf Div move by air to north
coast New Guinea, landing at Wanigela
- 22-26 Landing and operations Goodenough Island (one
Austn Bn)
- 26-27 Naval Battle of Santa Cruz

CHRONOLOGY OF THE WAR IN THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC 1941-1945



NOV.

- 2 Kokoda airdrome occupied by 25th Austn Bde (7th Div)
- 12-15 Naval Battle of Guadalcanal
- 30 Naval Battle of Tassafaronga

DEC.

- 9 Gona captured by 21st Austn Bde (7th Div)
- 14 Buna Village captured by 127th Inf (32nd Inf Div)

1943

JAN.

- 2 Buna Government Station captured by 127th Inf
- 18 Sanananda captured by 18th Austn Bde (7th Div)
- 22 Last organized Japanese resistance Buna-Gona area ended
- 24 through 31 Dec. 1944. New Guinea Campaign
- 30 Japanese repulsed at Wau by 17th Austn Bde

CHRONOLOGY OF THE WAR IN THE SOUTH PACIFIC, 1941-1945



FEB.

- 16 Sixth Army established in SWPA
- 21 Russell Islands landing (elements 43rd Inf Div)
- 22 through 21 Nov. 1944. Northern Solomons Campaign
- 26 USAFFE reconstituted

MAR.

- 2-4 Bismarck Sea Battle (destruction of Lae convoy by Fifth Air Force and RAAF)
- 15 Southwest Pacific Force redesignated Seventh Fleet

MAY

- 11 Attu invaded by 7th Inf Div

JUNE

- 22 through 5 Aug. Woodlark and Kiriwina Islands occupied
- 22/23 Advance echelon landed Woodlark
- 23/24 Advance echelon landed Kiriwina
- 30 Main landings. Forces involved 112th Cav RCT (Woodlark) and 158th RCT (Kiriwina). This was 1st operation directed by Sixth Army, operating as Alamo Force.

CHRONOLOGY OF THE WAR IN THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC, 1941-1945



29/30 Nassau Bay landing (Mackechnie Force, composed of elements 162nd Inf, 41st Inf Div)

30 New Georgia Group landings

JULY

5/6 Kula Gulf Naval Battle

13 Naval engagement off Vella Lavella

14 Mubo captured by 17th Austn Bde operating under command 3rd Austn Div

AUG.

5 Munda airdrome, New Georgia, captured (43rd, 37th, and 25th Inf Divs engaged)

6/7 Naval engagement off Vella Lavella

15 Vella Lavella landing. Forces engaged Vella Lavella operation were 35th RCT of 25th Inf Div and elements 3rd New Zealand Div

17-18 Heavy Fifth Air Force raids on Wewak. More than 200 Jap aircraft destroyed

21 Kiska occupied by US and Canadian forces

SEPT.

4 Amphibious landing Lae area (9th Austn Div)

CHRONOLOGY OF THE WAR IN THE SOUTH PACIFIC, 1941-1945



SEPT.

- 5 Nadzab parachute landing (503rd Prcht Inf Regt)
- 6 Transport aircraft began to fly elements 7th Austn Div to Nadzab
- 11 Salamaua captured. Forces engaged in Salamaua operations: 17th and 15th Austn Bdes, 162nd Inf (41st Inf Div). Operations under 3rd Austn Div to 26 Aug., thereafter under 5th Austn Div.
- 16 Lae captured by 25th Austn Bde (7th Div)
- 20 Kaiapit captured by elements 7th Austn Div
- 22 Finschhafen landing (20th Austn Bde, later reinforced by remainder of 9th Div)

OCT.

- 2 Finschhafen captured by 20th Austn Bde
- 5 Dumpu occupied by 21st Austn Bde (7th Div)
- 6/7 Naval battle off Vella Lavella
- 12 Over 300 SWPA aircraft struck Rabaul
- 15 All enemy resistance in New Georgia Group having ceased. Com 3rd Flt terminated the operation

CHRONOLOGY OF THE WAR IN THE SOUTH PACIFIC, 1941-1945



27 Treasury Island landing (elements 3rd New Zealand Div)

28 Amphibious landing Choiseul Island (2nd Mar Prcht Bn)

NOV.

1 Bougainville landing. Empress Augusta Bay. 3rd Mar Div landed initially, 37th Inf Div commenced landing 7 days later. Operations to 15 Dec. under 1st Mar Phib Corps, thereafter under XIV Corps. Americal Div relieved 3rd Mar Div beginning 27 Dec.

1/2 Naval Battle of Empress Augusta Bay

2 Heavy SWPA air strike on Rabaul

3/4 Marine parachute bn withdraws from Choiseul

5 & 11 3rd Fleet carrier strikes on Japanese naval forces Rabaul

20 Gilbert Islands landings by 2nd Mar Div and 165th RCT of 27th Inf Div

25 Naval battle off Bougainville

25 Sateberg captured by 26th Austn Bde (9th Div)

CHRONOLOG[★] OF THE WAR IN THE SOUTH WEST PACIFIC, 1941-1945



DEC.

- 15 through 27 Nov. 1944. Bismarks Campaign
- 15 Arawe landing (112th Cav RCT). Elements 158th Inf Regt later reinforced 112th RCT. 40th Inf Div relieved 112th RCT early June 1944
- 26 Cape Gloucester landings (1st Mar Div). 40th Inf Div relieved 1st Mar Div Apr/May 1944
- 30 Cape Gloucester air strips captured by 1st Mar Div

1944

JAN.

- 2 Saidor landing (126th RCT initially, later reinforced by remainder of 32nd Inf Div)
- 16 Sio on Huon Peninsula captured by elements 9th Austn Div
- 23 Shaggy Ridge in Finisterre Range North of Dumpu cleared by 18th Austn Bde (7th Div)

CHRONOLOGY OF THE WAR IN THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC, 1941-1945



FEB.

- 1 4th Mar Div landed on Roi and Namur. 7th Inf Div on Kwajalein Island, in Kwajalein Atoll, Marshall Islands
- 10 Juncture of elements 32nd Inf Div and 8th Austn Bde (5th Div) at Yagomi, East of Saidor
- 10 Patrols 1st Mar Div and 112th RCT establish contact on New Britain
- 10 CG Sixth Army terminated Dexterity Operation (Western New Britain and Saidor)
- 15 Green Island landing (elements 3rd New Zealand Div)
- 16-17 Naval task force struck Truk
- 17 Eniwetok landing (22nd Mar Regt and 106th Inf of 27th Inf Div)
- 23 Naval task force struck Marianas
- 29 Landing at Los Negros, Admiralty Islands. (2nd Sqn. 5th Cav Regt, reinforced by remainder 1st Cav Div) beginning 2 Mar.

MAR.

- 5 Landing at Mindiri, West of Saidor, by elements 32nd Inf Div

CHRONOLOGY OF THE WAR IN THE SOUTH PACIFIC, 1941-1945



MAR.

- 6 Landing on Willaumez Peninsula vicinity of Talasea by elements 1st Mar Div
- 6-28 Japanese assault on Empress Augusta Bay perimeter repulsed by 37th Inf and Americal Divs
- 9 Talasea captured by elements 1st Mar Div
- 15 Manus Island landing West of Lorengau by 2nd Brig, 1st Cav Div
- 17 Lorengau air strip captured by 2nd Cav Brig
- 18 Lorengau captured by 2nd Cav Brig
- 20 Landing at Emirau by 4th Mar Regt
- 30 through 1 Apr. Naval task force strikes Palau, Yap, Woleai
- 30 through 3 Apr. Hollandia air strips heavily bombed, approximately 288 Japanese aircraft destroyed.

APRIL

- 13 Boqadiim occupied without opposition by elements: 15th Austn Bde operating under command of 11th Austn Div

CHRONOLOGY OF THE WAR IN THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC, 1941-1945




- 22 Hollandia and Aitape landings. I Corps directed operations at Hollandia with 41st Inf Div (163rd RCT) landing Humboldt Bay and 24th Inf Div (-34th RCT) landing at Tanahmerah Bay. 34th RCT was I Corps reserve. 163rd RCT landed at Aitape
- 24 Madang captured by elements 15th Austn Bde (11th Div) and 8th Austn Bde (5th Div)
- 26 Alexishafen occupied by 8th Austn Bde (5th Div)
- 26 Hollandia, Cyclops, and Sentani airdromes captured by elements 24th and 41st Inf Divs
- 30 through 1 May. Naval task force raided Truk

MAY

- 7 Cape Hoskins airdrome (New Britain) occupied by elements 40th Inf Div
- 17 Landing at Arara on mainland opposite Wakde Island by 163rd RCT (41st Inf Div). Later engaged in operations Wakde-Sarmi area were 158th RCT, 6th Inf Div, 31st Inf Div (-124th RCT), and 123rd RCT (33rd Inf Div)

CHRONOLOGY OF THE WAR IN THE SOUTH WEST PACIFIC, 1941-1945



MAY

- 17 South East Asia Command carrier force and SWPA heavy bomber strike on Sourabaya
- 18 Wakde Island landing (elements 163rd RCT)
- 18 CG Sixth Army terminated Admiralty Islands Campaign
- 19 Wakde airdrome secured by elements 163rd RCT
- 27 Biak Island landing (vicinity of Bosnek) by 41st Inf Div (-163rd RCT). Task force was reinforced in June by 163rd RCT and 34th Inf of 24th Inf Div. I Corps directed operations 15-29 June

JUNE

- 6 CG Sixth Army terminated Hollandia operation
- 6 Mokmer airdrome, Biak, captured by 41st Inf Div
- 15 XIV Corps (US Army forces Emirau, Green Island, Bougainville, Treasury Island, New Georgia Group) came under direct control SWPA
- 15 Saipan invaded (2nd and 4th Mar Divs, 27th Inf Div)

CHRONOLOGY OF THE WAR IN THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC, 1941-1945



- 15 Hansa Bay occupied by elements 5th Austn Div
- 15 Far Eastern Air Force established
- 19-20 Naval Battle of Eastern Philippines
- 20 Borokoe and Sorido airdromes captured by 34th Inf (24th Inf Div)
- JULY**
- 2 Noemfoor Island landing. 158th RCT initially, reinforced beginning 3 July by 503rd Prcht Inf RCT
- 10/11 through 8 Aug. Japanese XVIII Army attacked United States Driniumor River line East of Aitape, after initial breakthrough suffered severe defeat. XI Corps directed operations. 127th and 128th Inf Regts (32nd Div), 112th Cav Regt, 124th Inf Regt (31 Div), and elements 169th Inf Regt (43rd Div) were engaged in the battle
- 21 Guam invaded (3rd Mar Div, 1st Mar Prov Brig, 77th Inf Div)
- 24 Tinian invaded (2nd and 4th Mar Divs)
- 30 Landings at Cape Opmarai, Amsterdam and Middleburg Islands (6th Inf Div, less 20th RCT which rejoined Div at Sansapor in Aug)

CHRONOLOGY OF THE WAR IN THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC, 1941-1945



JULY

- 31 Shore-to-shore landing, Cape Opmarai to Sansapor, by elements 6th Inf Div


AUG.

- 6/7 First air attack on Philippines since 1942 (Sassa naval airdrome near Davao)
- 20 CG Sixth Army terminated Biak operation
- 25 CG Sixth Army terminated Aitape operation
- 31 CG Sixth Army terminated Noemfoor operation
- 31 CG Sixth Army terminated Sansapor operation

SEPT.


- 2 CG Sixth Army terminated Wakde-Sarmi operation
- 7 Eighth Army established
- 9-14 3rd Fleet struck airdromes and shipping in Mindanao and Visayan area
- 15 Morotai Island landing (31st Inf Div and 126th RCT of 32nd Inf Div under command XI Corps)
- 15 Landing on Peleliu Island (Palau Group) by 1st Mar Div
- 17 Landing on Angaur Island (Palau Group) by 81st Inf Div (-323rd RCT)

CHRONOLOGY OF THE WAR IN THE SOUTHEAST PACIFIC, 1941-1945



- 21-24 3rd Fleet struck Luzon and Visayas
- 23 Unopposed landings Ulithi Atoll by 323rd RCT of 81st Inf Div
- 30 First heavy raid on Balikpapan, Borneo
- OCT.
- 4 CG Sixth Army terminated Morotal operation
- 10-21 3rd Fleet struck Nansei Shoto, Formosa, Luzon and the Visayas
- 17-18 6th Ranger Bn landed Dinagat, Suluan, and Homonhon Islands in entrance to Leyte Gulf
- 20 Sixth Army invaded Leyte. X Corps (1st Cav Div and 24th Inf Div) landed San Ricardo—Palo area. XXIV Corps (96th and 7th Inf Divs) landed Dulag area
- 20 Tacloban airdrome seized by 1st Cav Div
- 23-26 Naval Battle of Leyte Gulf
- 24 Elements 1st Cav Div landed on Samar
- NOV.
- 2 Cariqara captured by 24th Inf and 1st Cav Divs

CHRONOLOGY OF THE WAR IN THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC, 1941-1945



NOV.

- 2 Elements 7th Inf Div reached Baybay on West coast of Leyte
- 15-20 Mapia and Asia Islands cleared of Japs by elements 31st Inf Div (1st Opn directed by Eighth Army)
- 24 Limon captured by 32nd Inf Div
- 24 First B-29 raid on Japan from Saipan
- 26/27 First landing of Jap airborne troops East coast of Leyte (San Pablo-Dulag area)

DEC.

- 6/7 Second enemy airborne attack on Leyte (Buri, San Pablo, Bayug airdromes) plus diversionary drops in Tacloban-Dulag area
- 7 77th Inf Div landed South of Ormoc in vicinity of Ipil
- 10 Ormoc captured by 77th Inf Div
- 14-16 3rd Fleet strikes on Luzon
- 15 Mindoro landing (503rd Prcht RCT and 19th RCT of 24th Inf Div)
- 22 Highway 2 cleared from Limon to Ormoc as 1st Cav Div and 32nd Inf Div overcame final Japanese resistance in Lonoy-Cananga area
- 25 CG Sixth Army terminated Leyte campaign

CHRONOLOGY OF THE WAR IN THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC, 1941-1945



1945

JAN.

- 3 Marinduque Island landing by elements 21st Inf (24th Inf Div)
- 3-9 3rd Fleet struck on Nansei Shoto, Formosa, and Luzon
- 9 Sixth Army invaded Luzon. I Corps (43rd and 6th Inf Divs) and XIV Corps (37th and 40th Inf Divs) landed Lingayen Gulf
- 12-22 3rd Fleet struck Indo-China and China coasts, Formosa, and Nansei Shoto
- 15-31 Camotes Islands cleared by elements 7th Inf Div
- 21 Tarlac captured by 40th Inf Div
- 29 Landing in San Narcisco area of Zambales Province by XI Corps (38th Inf Div and 34th RCT of 24th Inf Div)
- 31 Nasugbu, Batangas Province, landing by 11th A/B Div (-511th Prcht Inf)
- 31 Mindoro operation terminated

FEB.

- 3 511th Prcht Inf (11th A/B Div) seized Tagaytay Ridge, Batangas by parachute drop
- 3 1st Cav Div entered Grace Park, Manila

CHRONOLOGY OF THE WAR IN THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC, 1941-1945



FEB.

- 15 Landing at Mariveles, Bataan by 151st RCT (38th Inf Div)
- 16 In airborne operation 503rd Prcht Inf Regt landed Topside, Corregidor, while elements of 34th RCT (24th Inf Div) made amphibious assault
- 16-17 5th Fleet struck Tokyo and Nagoya-Kobe areas
- 19 Iwo Jima landing (4th and 5th Mar Divs with 3rd Mar Div in reserve)
- 19-20 Landings on Northwest tip of Samar, Capul and Biri Islands in San Bernardino Strait by elements Americal Div and 1st Philippine Inf Regt
- 28 Palawan landing, in vicinity of Puerto Princesa, by 186th RCT (41st Inf Div)

MAR.

- 3 Last organized enemy resistance in Manila overcome. 37th Inf Div, 1st Cav Div, 11th A/B Div participated in battle for Manila
- 10 41st Inf Div (-186th RCT) landed near Zamboanga, Mindanao
- 15 Basilan Island (Sulu Archipelago) landing by elements 41st Inf Div

CHRONOLOGY OF THE WAR IN THE SOUTHERN PACIFIC, 1941-1945



- 18 Panay landing, 13 miles West of Iloilo, by 10th Inf Div (-108th RCT)
- 26 Cebu landing, 5 miles West of Cebu City, by Americal Div (-164th RCT)
- 26 77th Inf Div landed Kerama Retto
- 29 Negros landing (West coast near Palu Pandan) by 40th Inf Div (-108 RCT)

APRIL

- 1 158th RCT landed at Legaspi, Southeast Luzon
- 1 Tenth Army landed on Okinawa. 3rd Mar Phib Corps (1st and 6th Mar Divs) XXIV Corps (7th and 96th Inf Divs)
- 2 Elements 41st Inf Div landed Sanga Sanga Island, Tawi Tawi Group
- 3 Joint Chiefs of Staff appointed General MacArthur Commander of all US Army forces and Admiral Nimitz Commander of all US Naval forces in the Pacific
- 5 Soviet Government abrogated Russo-Japanese neutrality agreement
- 5 Koiso cabinet resigned, succeeded by cabinet of Adm Suzuki
- 6 Establishment of United States Army Forces Pacific (AFPAC)

CHRONOLOGY OF THE WAR IN THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC, 1941-1945



APRIL

- 9 Elements 41st Inf Div landed Jolo Island, Sulu Archipelago
- 11 Elements Americal Div landed on Bohol (Visayas)
- 16 77th Inf Div landed on Ie Shima
- 17 X Corps landed Malabang-Cotabato area Mindanao. 24th Inf Div made initial landing, followed 22 April by 31st Inf Div
- 26 Baguio captured by 129th Inf (37th Inf Div)

MAY

- 1 26th Austn Bde (9th Div) landed Tarakan Island, Borneo
- 2-4 Davao captured by 24th Inf Div
- 8 Victory in Europe announced
- 10 Macajalar Bay (North Mindanao) landing by 108th RCT (40th Inf Div)
- 11 Wewak captured by 6th Austn Div
- 13 Balete Pass secured by 25th Inf Div
- 17 Ipo Dam captured by 43rd Inf Div
- 19 Foochow freed on the China coast
- 23 Elements 155th Inf (31st Inf Div) and 108th Inf (40th Inf Div) established contact in the Impalutao area, Mindanao, clearing Sayre Highway

CHRONOLOGY OF THE WAR IN THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC, 1941-1945



29 Wawa Dam captured by 38th Inf Div


JUNE

- 10 Brunei Bay, Borneo landings by 9th Austn Div (-26th Bde)
- 10 AFPAC and USAFFE consolidated
- 19 Formation of United States Army Forces Western Pacific (AFWESPAC) to take the place of USASOS
- 20 Wenchow seized on the China coast
- 21 Admiral Nimitz announced that all organized resistance on Okinawa had ended at 1037, 21 June, the struggle lasting 82 days
- 21 Aparri captured (Aparri was the first place the Japanese invaded on Luzon on 10 Dec. 1941)
- 22 All organized resistance on Tarakan Island ceased
- 26 Landing on Kume, 50 miles West of Okinawa

JULY

- 1 Southern Philippines Campaign officially closed
- 1 7th Austn Div landed at Balikpapan, Borneo
- 4 Luzon Campaign officially closed

CHRONOLOGY OF THE WAR IN THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC, 1941-1945



JULY

- 14-17 Admiral Halsey's 3rd Fleet joined by the British in operations against the Japanese homeland from North Hokkaido to Tokyo
- 27 Potsdam Ultimatum issued to the Japanese government
- 31 10th Army and all other forces in Ryukus (except Strategic AF) under command of General MacArthur

AUG.

- 6 First atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima
- 9 Russia declared war on Japan
- 10 World received news of Japan's acceptance of the Potsdam Ultimatum in late evening
- 11 Morning of 11 Aug. General MacArthur acknowledged the news of Japan's acceptance with an impromptu speech from the balcony of the City Hall Manila
- 15 Official notification General MacArthur to be the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers
- 15 GHQ issued its final communique

Copy No.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS FAR EAST COMMAND
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SECTION, GENERAL STAFF

INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

INTELLIGENCE DATA
COVERING THE MILITARY
ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL

FIELDS IN :

JAPAN

KOREA

PHILIPPINES

CHINA-MANCHURIA

SOUTH EAST ASIA

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SECTION, GENERAL STAFF

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INTELLIGENCE HIGHLIGHTS

No. 2082

CHINA-MANCHURIA

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Weihaiwei-Hanting area currently under attack; fall of cities probable. North Shantung ports of Penglai and Weihaiwei evacuated. Shihchiuso, south of Tsingtao, also evacuated. Government claims evacuations made to provide reinforcements for Northeast and because these ports "no longer have strategic value." Evacuations present refugee problem in Tsingtao. Minor fighting in progress south of Tsinan. CMA G-2 says 20,000 CCF now massed northwest of Tsinan with Soviet advisers. All-out offensive in May indicated. Shantung governor claims he is prepared to continue fight against CCF even in event of general collapse of Government. (Page 2)

Chaotung Airfield described. (Page 2)

CHIANG declines nomination; KMT to allow free election. National Assembly elects 85-man presidium; will act as steering committee. Adjournment of National Assembly may be postponed. Election dates of President and Vice President undecided. LI Tsung-jen, SUN Fo leading candidates for Vice Presidency. U.S. observer impressed by National Assembly. Government shakeup likely. (Page 3)

KOREA

S. Korean prices steady; currency issue declining. Former Japanese-owned farmlands sold. Electric power may be shut off in South Korea; committee develops emergency power ration plan; power production to be increased. (Page 4)

SOVIET AREAS

Parachute unit observed in USSR Maritime Province. Night jumps conducted. 400 SU-122 howitzers, 300 SU-58 tanks, four-engine bombers observed. Submarine parts plant in operation. (Page 5)

Soviet troops violate 38th parallel. (Page 5)

SOUTH EAST ASIA

Raiders active in Kashmir-Jammu. Transfer of Indian Army command delayed. Communists arrested by provincial governments. Hyderabad negotiations reopened. Atomic control bill passes. (Page 6)

JAPAN

Communications workers strike in Osaka. Settlement still undecided. Premier, most of Cabinet will visit Kansai, 16-20 Apr. Education Ministry to be reorganized. Bills changing election law sent to Diet. HATOYAMA testifies before Illegal Property Transactions Committee. (Page 7)

Japanese to welcome repatriates; repatriation to be resumed in May. (Page 8)

Increasing interest in Communist Party reported. Officials plan to triple party membership. Awards offered cells showing foremost gains. Drive to win over repatriates. (Page 8)

Communists hold rally in Tokyo to oppose "unjust tax assessments." Last-minute negotiations successful in averting Tokyo Rapid Transit Workers' Union strike. Kofu AJCWU strike considered not serious. Government negotiations with public office workers' unions still stalemated; AJCWU expected to institute strike action. AJCWU locals in Miyagi Prefecture schedule strikes; major strike action planned for Osaka area. (Page 9)

"Mainichi" urges management to assert rights, take play away from labor; sound, dynamic management with possible aid of purgees advocated in view of expected foreign capital influx; "Tokyo Shimbun" advises expansion, intensification of Hoarded Goods Committee's activities. (Page 10)

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CHINA, MANCHURIA

Military, Political, Economic, Social Situation, Press Review, Civil Intelligence, Miscellaneous

Selected Items for the Information of Commanders
and Staffs of the Far East Command

No. 2082

MILITARY SITUATION

1. Shantung Situation--10 Apr 48: (Refer to Map No. 1)

(a) Weihhsien Under Attack: Fighting continues with increased tempo in the Weihhsien-Hanting area of East Shantung, but appears to have subsided in the area immediately east of Tsinan. The current threat to Weihhsien developed when Chinese Communist Forces (CCF) feinting toward Changlo, bypassed it and laid siege to Hanting. Defending forces in Weihhsien reportedly consist of approximately 12,000 Peace Preservation Corps (PPC) troops. A previous estimate (Intell. Summary 2076) placed this PPC figure at 18,000, supplemented by approximately 4,000 regular Chinese Nationalist Army (CNA) troops. Weihhsien defenses are described as good, but as troop morale is low and many troops are deserting to the CCF, it is doubtful if the city can withstand a determined CCF effort. (a,b,c,e)

(b) North Shantung Ports Evacuated: It has been officially announced that CNA forces have evacuated Penglai and Weihaiwei, except for islands in the Weihaiwei harbor which are still garrisoned by small naval forces. Reports indicate that the evacuations, under the direction of Vice Admiral KWEI Yung-chin, Acting Commander of the Chinese Navy, were accomplished by LST and LSM with insignificant loss. Shihchiuso, south of Tsingtao, has also been evacuated by the CNA. According to Government announcements, the evacuations were effected to provide reinforcements for the Northeast, in accordance with the recently announced policy of "abandoning points which no longer have a strategic value." These cities remain under CNA control at least for the present, garrisoned by local police and PPC troops. (a,b,d,e)

(c) Effect on Tsingtao: The recent evacuation of Lungkou (Intell. Summary 2071), Penglai, Weihaiwei, and Shihchiuso has severely taxed the limited resources available in Tsingtao for the care of the refugee population. An estimated 3,000 refugees from Shihchiuso already have arrived in Tsingtao and 25,000 more are expected. (c)

(d) Status of Tsinan: Although Tsinan is not considered to be in immediate danger, some fighting is reportedly in progress south of the city. CNA forces recaptured Foicheng and successfully repulsed CCF attacks from the Hsintai area. (b,e)

(e) New Threat Indicated: The CNA G-2 reported that 20,000 CCF from the Northwest, accompanied by Soviet advisers, are massed northwest of Tsinan. Shantung priests also report being advised by CCF officers to evacuate Shantung in view of an all-out offensive to begin in May. Current order of battle records show a total of some 36,000 CCF northwest of Tsinan; however, the report of Soviet advisers is questionable. (b)

No change is reported in the disposition or activities of Gen CHEN Yi's forces in the general Puhhsien-Puyang area of Southwest Shantung and Southern Hopeh.

(f) Shantung Governor's Stand: Although Gen WANG Yao-wu, governor of Shantung Province, admits the critical nature of the present over-all situation and considers the collapse of the present regime possible, in conjunction with other powerful North China generals, he is prepared to continue fighting the CCF. (d) (B-2)

2. China Airfield Data: (Refer to Sketch No. 1)

(a) Chaotung Airfield, Yunnan Province: The Chaotung Airfield is two miles southeast of Chaotung, one and one-half miles east of the road between Chaotung and Weining, and 12 miles northeast of Luitien. The field is

- (a) ALUSNA, Nanking, 27402, 12 Apr 48
- (b) AMILAT, Nanking, 26844, 10 Apr 48
- (c) COMNAVWESPAC, Shanghai, SITREP 8 Apr 48
- (d) COMNAVWESPAC, 26093, 8 Apr 48
- (e) ALUSNA, Nanking, 25702, 7 Apr 48

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No. 2082

ORDER OF BATTLE
COMPARISON OF STRENGTHS
SHANTUNG AREA

Chinese Nationalist Army (CN):

North China Military Region:

One army (-) 7,000

E-3 (-)

Strength 7,000

Teikwang:

Two divs - - - - - 26,000

Strength - - 26,000

" 12,000

XX
35

XX
34

" 11,000

E of Hsuehchou:

Two divs - - - - - 15,000

Strength 7,000

XX
44

XX
51

" 7,500

S of Hsuehchou:

One div - - - - - 15,000

Strength 15,000

XX
45

SW of Hsuehchou:

One div - - - - - 15,000

Strength 15,000

XX
65

E of Hsuehchou:

One div - - - - - 15,000

Strength 15,000

XX
85

Hsuehchou:

One div - - - - - 25,000

Strength unknown

XX
27

XX
80

" 25,000

Huai:

One div - - - - - 15,000

Strength 15,000

XX
7

Southern Army:

One army (-) - - 20,000

Strength 20,000

XX
12 (-)

SE of Tsian:

One div - - - - - 15,000

Strength 15,000

XX
4

Tsian:

Two divs - - - - - 15,000

Strength 7,500

XX
28

XX
33

" 7,500

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Kotse: One div - - - -13,000
^{XX}
~~XX~~ 57 Strength 13,000
Tsinan: One army (ELMS) 14,000
^{XX}
~~XX~~ 12 (ELMS) Strength 14,000
Anyang: One div - - - -15,000
^{XX}
~~XX~~ 40 Strength 15,000
Kaifeng: Two divs - - - -25,000
^{XX}
~~XX~~ 41 Strength 12,500
^{XX}
~~XX~~ 47 " 12,500
S. of Kaifeng: Two divs - - - -29,000
^{XX}
~~XX~~ 75 Strength 14,500
^{XX}
~~XX~~ 88 " 14,500

Note: Figures represent the latest and most accurate reported strength estimates of each identified unit. All estimates are subject to adjustment as new identifications are reported and as strength estimates are revised by field sources.

Total CNA Forces Shantung area - - - -279,000
 Three armies (-) (18 divs)

ORDER OF BATTLE
 COMPARISON OF STRENGTHS
 SHANTUNG

Chinese Communist Forces (CCF)
Liyang: One div - - - - 3,500
^{XX}
~~XX~~ 37 13 (CHEN) Strength 3,500
S of Kwomi: One div - - - - 3,500
^{XX}
~~XX~~ 38 13 (CHEN) Strength 3,500
Weih sien Area: One div - - - - 3,000
^{XX}
~~XX~~ 39 13 Strength 3,000
E of Tsinan: Two clms - two divs - 20,000
^{XX}
~~XX~~ 9-clm (CHEN Yi) Strength 12,000
^{XX}
~~XX~~ 19 7-clm Strength 4,000
^{XX}
~~XX~~ 20 7-clm Strength 4,000

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S of Tehsien: One ctm - - - - 8,000



LK

Strength 8,000

W of Tehsien: Seven brigs - - - 28,000



N-3

Strength 4,000



N-6

" 4,000



7

" 4,000



8

" 4,000



7-Ind

" 4,000



8-Ind

" 4,000



N-8

" 4,000

E of Anyang: Five ctm - - - - 28,000



1-ctm(CHEN Yi) Strength 5,000



4-ctm " 3,000



6-ctm " 5,000



3-ctm (-) " 7,500



6-ctm(-) " 7,500


Hop-Shan-Shensi Border: Unidentified - 33,000

Note: Figures represent the latest and most accurate reported strength estimates of each identified unit. All estimates are subject to adjustment as new identifications are reported and as strength estimates are revised by field sources.

Total CCF Shantung Area - - - - - 127,000


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


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TSINGTAO



22° 123°


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 Military Signaling Section
 General Staff


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YUNNAN PROVINCE
CHAOTUNG (TSAOTUNG) AIRFIELD
(27°16'N - 103°39' E)



YUNNAN PROVINCE
CHAOTUNG AIRFIELD
(27°19'N/103°39'E)



YUNNAN PROVINCE
CHAOTUNG AIRFIELD
(TSAOTUNG)
(27°19'N/103°39'E)

Location: Two miles SE of Chaotung, on plateau hill on stream passing through S corner of road between Chaotung and Weining; Lutien. (c,d)

Description: Elevation: 6,413 feet.
L-shaped area approximately 5,650 x 1 and 3,659 x 1,500 feet NW/SE.
Runway: NE/SW, gravel, 4,920 x 164 feet capacity 15,000 to 35,000 lb
Taxiways: Two: one parallel to the runway with four taxiways connecting to another at 90° to first taxiway approximately 3,200 feet, with four revetments. Four large hard aprons 820 x 105 feet. (c,d)

Facilities: No hangars; no control tower; one operations and alert shack; radio (homing) station; two ordnance storage shacks; one weather motor maintenance shops. Drum fuel storage capacity. No housing facilities (c,d,e)

Obstructions: Mountains NW of airfield. (c,d,e)

Condition: Present condition unknown. Reported Sep 47. (a)

Comment: This installation probably is not used; many of the facilities having become unserviceable. (FEAF)

Sources: (a) Military Attache Report, Shanghai
(b) Airfield Map, Hq USAF, 1947
(c) JANIS 71-1, 1947 info date Dec 45
(d) Provisional Airfield List, 1945
(e) Airfields in China, 3rd Ed. Hq 11

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YUNNAN PROVINCE
CHAOTUNG AIRFIELD
(TSAOTUNG)
(27°19'N/103°39'E)

- Location: Two miles SE of Chaotung, on plateau just SE of small hill on stream passing through S corner; 1½ miles E of road between Chaotung and Weining; 12 miles NE of Lutien. (c,d)
- Description: Elevation: 6,413 feet.
L-shaped area approximately 5,650 x 1,500 feet, NE/SW and 3,659 x 1,500 feet NW/SE.
Runway: NE/SW, gravel, 4,920 x 164 feet. Weight load capacity 15,000 to 35,000 lbs. (b,c,d,e)
Taxiways: Two; one parallel to the runway, 4,920 feet with four connecting taxiways to runway; another at 90° to first taxiway and extending approximately 3,200 feet, with eight fighter revetments. Four large hardstands; fighter apron 820 x 105 feet. (c,d,e)
- Facilities: No hangars; no control tower; one operations building and alert shack; radio (homing) station; two warehouses; two ordnance storage shacks; one weather station; two motor maintenance shops. Drum fuel storage, 50,000-gallon capacity. No housing facilities; no lighting. (c,d,e)
- Remarks: Mountains NW of airfield. (c,d,e)
- Notes: Present condition unknown. Reported to be operational, Sep 47. (a)
- This installation probably is not used and has deteriorated, many of the facilities having been removed and/or become unserviceable. (FEAF)
- (a) Military Attache Report, Shanghai, China, Sep 47 (B-2)
(b) Airfield Map, Hq USAF, 1947
(c) JANIS 71-1, 1947 info date Dec 45
(d) Provisional Airfield List, 1945
(e) Airfields in China, 3rd Ed. Hq 14th AF, 1944

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
Military Intelligence Section
General Staff

SKETCH NO. 1
FOR INTELL SUMMARY 2082
Prepared by A-2, FEAF

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L-shaped, with one northeast/southwest runway, 4,920 by 164 feet, surfaced with gravel. There are eight fighter revetments, four large hardstands, and a fighter apron 820 feet by 105 feet. The facilities on the field include a homing station, weather station, two motor maintenance shops and drum fuel storage of 50,000-gallon capacity. There are no hangars, control tower, nor lighting facilities. (f)

POLITICAL REPORT

3. Election Developments:

(a) CHIANG Declines Nomination: CHIANG Kai-shek's 5 Apr announcement that he did not desire the Presidential nomination came as a general surprise. CHIANG said he desired the Presidency to go to a nonmilitary man such as Dr. HU Shih, president of the National Peking University, but HU disclaimed any desire for the office (Intell. Summary 2077).

CHIANG's probable motives are:

- (1) A desire to avoid the largely ceremonial Presidential post in favor of the much more potentially powerful one as President of the Executive Yuan.
- (2) A sincere desire to live up to the Constitution and broaden the base of the Government with a nonparty, nonmilitary President (Intell. Summary 2068 and preceding).
- (3) To impress the U.S.
- (4) To avoid any future responsibility for the dark military situation.
- (5) To stop LI Tsung-jen's bid for the Vice Presidency by a showy gesture to eliminate military candidates, beginning with himself.

Source Comment: A reliable source states that when the Generalissimo personally urged LI Tsung-jen and Gen CHENG Chien to withdraw from the Vice Presidential race, CHENG agreed but LI refused on the grounds that the appeal was too late.

(b) Master Stroke: The Kuomintang (KMT) met CHIANG's refusal to accept the Presidential nomination by deciding not to designate any candidate but to allow a free election. CHIANG has expressed no firm decision to refuse the Presidency if elected by a free vote and the consensus is that he will bow to the mandate of the people. Whatever CHIANG's motives are, it is generally agreed that his announcement was a master political stroke.

The generals of the Whampao Clique are reported to have threatened to join the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) unless they could continue to serve their leader. This move probably brought into line some who have criticized CHIANG in the past, when confronted with the choice of bearing with the current ills rather than flying to other new ones. CHIANG's position has improved by his recent statements, while his cohorts have been making frenzied appeals for him not to forsake the country.

(c) Assembly Developments: The National Assembly elected an 85-man presidium which will henceforth act as a steering committee. The Assembly is attempting to break Article 27 of the constitution which limits the powers of the Assembly virtually to the election of the President and Vice President and ratifying the acts of the Legislative Yuan. A resolution, passed on 8 Apr requires Government officials to report to the Assembly on military, economic and political activities with the apparent intention of determining if the Government is being carried on efficiently. Unless CHIANG himself makes these reports, the Government spokesman may expect severe questioning.

(d) Vice Presidential Candidates: LI Tsung-jen and SUN Fo are campaigning hotly for the Vice Presidency. Competent observers predict that SUN Fo will win unless he withdraws from the race for fear that he cannot hold both the Vice Presidency and the Presidency of the Executive Yuan concurrently. His withdrawal probably would insure the election of LI.

(e) U.S. Observer's Impression: An official U.S. observer reports that the general impression gathered from the National Assembly was decidedly favorable. Barring a few occasions, the sessions have been orderly and a high degree of parliamentary skill has been exhibited by the presiding officers. (g)

(f) A-2, Hq, FEAF
(g) AMILAT, Nanking, 26844

KOREA

Military, Political, Economic, Social Situation, Press Review, Civil Intelligence, Miscellaneous

Selected Items for the Information of Commanders
and Staffs of the Far East Command

No. 2082

ECONOMIC REPORT

1. General Situation:

(a) Prices Remain Steady: Over-all prices remained generally steady during March, with some items showing a slight seasonal decline. However, the black-market price of gold soared to an all-time high of more than 1,500 yen a gram, as compared with approximately 1,000 yen a gram in February, due to the heavy purchases of gold and other precious metals by North Korean agents who are using old Bank of Chosun currency collected in North Korea during the conversion last December.

Bank of Chosun officials estimate that approximately 1.4 billion yen of pre-liberation Bank of Chosun issue were still in North Korea as of Dec 47. It is believed that the notes have been flowing into South Korea in substantial amounts since that time to finance Communist activities. The Bank of Chosun currency issue in South Korea is continuing to decline, being about 4.1 billion yen below the Jan 48 peak, as of 24 Mar.

(b) Farmland Being Sold: The National Land Administration (NLA), established 22 Mar to sell former Japanese-owned farmland to tenant farmers, is in the process of selling the farms and has established a goal of 100,000 farm sales during April. The first payment will not be due until the 1948 crops are harvested. NLA officials indicate that the farmers' initial reaction was favorable toward the program. Many Rightist and Moderate South Korean leaders have expressed the view that announcement of this land program was long overdue. A spokesman for the Communist-dominated All-Korea Farmers' Union declared that the NLA program is denying the farmers a true land reform of confiscating land and distributing it without payment.

(c) Electric Power: More than 60 per cent of the electricity now being consumed in South Korea will be unavailable if KIM Il Sung, chairman of the North Korean People's Committee, carries out his threat to cut off electric power to South Korea (Intell. Summary 2066). An emergency committee on electric power has developed a ration plan to be put in operation if the power is cut off. The plan provides for the allocation of 42,900 kilowatts for essential purposes, including the maintenance of essential water works, communications and railroad systems, military installations, the five major coal mines, gas plants, rice mills, hospitals, docks, and a limited amount for residential lighting.

The average monthly consumption in South Korea in January and Feb 48 was about 102,000 kilowatts, of which North Korea supplied 70,000. During March, North Korean production dropped to slightly below 70,000 kilowatts, but South Korea supplied over 40,000 kilowatts and may attain an average of 50,000 in April. Numerous reasons exist for the increased power production in South Korea, including the initial operation of a power boat in Pusan harbor, increased output at the Yongwol thermal plant, approximately 85 miles Southeast of Seoul; and a seasonal increase in water available for the hydroelectric plants.

Various measures are being undertaken to improve the power situation in South Korea. The National Economic Board is recommending the expenditure of 275 million yen for the further rehabilitation of the Yongwol thermal plant and the near-by anthracite coal mines in an attempt to increase its maximum output of 18,000 kilowatts. A power barge, with a capacity of 6,000 kilowatts, is undergoing rehabilitation in Pusan for use at the port of Incheon. The Chung Pyung hydroelectric plant in Kangwon Province, the largest in South Korea, is operating at only 50 per cent of capacity, due to needed repairs which may be completed by June. The Seoul and Pusan thermal plants are available for only limited operations because of fuel shortages.

Stoppage of power from North Korea would not stop the operation of South Korea's most essential services immediately but a sharp decrease in already low industrial production would be inevitable. (a)

(a) USAFIK, 23701, 31 Mar 48

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SOVIET CONTROLLED AREAS

Military, Political, Economic, Social Situation, Press Review, Civil Intelligence, Miscellaneous

Selected Items for the Information of Commanders
and Staffs of the Far East Command

No. 2082

MILITARY SITUATION

1. Soviet Military Activities:

(a) Paratroop Training: An unidentified parachute unit with a strength estimated at about 600 personnel was observed Aug 47, at Manzovka approximately 75 miles north of Vladivostok. (a) Paratroopers were observed making training jumps from approximately 20 transport planes and an undisclosed number of balloons flying above the Manzovka area at about 2,000 feet. (b) Groups of up to 23 men were observed making jumps from one plane. Night jumping exercises were conducted periodically. (c) Approximately 100 parachute troops also were observed undergoing jump training at Iyalichi, just south of Manzovka, in Oct 47. Jumps usually were made from an altitude of about 2,500 feet. Nine aircraft, reportedly Yak-4 type, were observed at the Iyalichi Airfield. (c) (F-6)

Comment: Previous reports stated that Soviet parachutists were observed near the Maritime Province coast port of Sovetskaya-Gavan near Khabarovsk, about 400 miles northeast of Vladivostok, Aug 47, and in the Chita area, approximately 325 miles east of Lake Baikal, in the latter part of 47 (Intell. Summary 2024). As yet, however, no large-scale paratroop training activities nor maneuvers have been reported.

(b) Observations at Voroshilov: Approximately 400 Soviet SU-122 howitzers and 300 SU-26 tanks were observed about three miles northwest of Voroshilov, 60 miles north of Vladivostok in Nov 47. The headquarters of an unidentified Soviet armored unit also was observed near the area in which the tanks and howitzers were reported. (b) An undisclosed number of four-engine bombers, resembling B-29s, were observed on an airfield at Voroshilov, Jul 47. (b) At Novonezhino Airport, approximately 30 miles northeast of Voroshilov, an estimated 100 aircraft were observed, Nov 47. About 32 of these reportedly were four-engine bombers resembling the Soviet PE-8 type bomber. The airfield at Novonezhino reportedly has two large concrete runways (F-6). (a)

(c) Naval Observations: Three Shchuka-class submarines and three mine sweepers reportedly were based at a small harbor south of Olga, approximately 200 miles east of Vladivostok in Jun 47. An undisclosed number of barracks used by naval personnel also were observed near the harbor during the same period. (c) A new submarine parts plant was in operation in Sep 47 near Diomedes Inlet in the vicinity of Vladivostok Harbor. Approximately 150 Japanese prisoners of war (POWs) were employed in this plant. (b) A torpedo boat base was observed in Aug 47 west of Dunay, 30 miles southeast of Vladivostok. In addition, a naval mine storage area was observed near Dunay in Sep 47. Guards stationed at this area wore shoulder boards of the Soviet Pacific Fleet. (F-6) (c)

2. Activities Near 38th Parallel:

(a) Soviets South of Parallel: Soviet troops violated the 38th parallel near Kaesong, according to a police report from Yohyon, a village near the border. At 1820 hours on 6 Mar 48, two separate groups, each comprised of 10 Soviets, simultaneously were observed 55 to 70 yards south of the parallel at a point slightly northwest of Kaesong. About three hours later, in the same area, a third group of 15 Soviet troops was observed about 80 yards south of the parallel. No further details have been reported. An investigation is being made by U.S. Army personnel. (d)

- (a) ATIS Trans Rpt 26 Mar 48
- (b) ATIS Trans Rpt 19 Mar 48
- (c) ATIS Trans Rpt 2 Apr 48
- (d) USAFIK, 27049, 10 Apr 48

SOUTH EAST ASIA

Military, Political, Economic, Social Situation, Press Review, Civil Intelligence, Miscellaneous

Selected items as they affect the Occupation Forces,
for the information of Commanders and Staffs.

No. 2082

MILITARY SITUATION

1. India:

(a) Raider Activity Increases: Raiders are increasing in strength and activity at Skadru and Punch (Map No. 2 Intell. Summary 2078) indicating a more aggressive attitude.

(b) Defense Command: The transfer of the Army command to Indians will not take place as predicted (Intell. Summary 2054) but will occur gradually. About 300 British officers will be required for an indefinite period for staff positions, schools, and technical services as well as advisers. Lt Gen F.R.R. Bucher will remain as Chief of Army Staff and C-in-C of the Indian Army until August or Sep 48. The head of the Southern Command, Lt Gen E.N. Goddard, is being replaced by an Indian. Maj Gen Kalwantsingh, now commanding Indian forces in Kashmir-Jammu, soon will become Chief of the General Staff with the incumbent, Maj Gen J.N. Chaudry, becoming Deputy Chief of Staff.

Source Comment: Indians realize that they are not ready to assume complete control of the Army because of lack of experience in top responsible positions. Kalwantsingh, with a good record in the Kashmir-Jammu fighting, strengthens the CGS positions.

(c) Indian Reinforcements: The Defense Minister Sardar Baldev Singh announced plans for a territorial force of 130,000 to provide reinforcements for the Regular Army in the event of an emergency and for internal defense duties. These units would be responsible for anti-aircraft and coast defense as well as for training youth units. This territorial force would be composed of combat, service and administrative units. Initially regular officers will be used for organizing and training; later territorial commissioned officers will be used. Individuals are to undergo one or two months' training each year and a number of drill periods each month. The Director of Territorial Forces in the Defense Ministry is now implementing the scheme.

Source Comment: The Defense Minister said this plan is only a beginning and the scope will be extended after six months or a year. With more trained personnel and equipment the program may be extended to include one million men or universal military training may be undertaken.

POLITICAL REPORT

2. Current Developments:

(a) Communists Arrested: Communists were rounded up in Calcutta, Bombay, New Delhi, Poona, 80 miles southeast of Bombay, and Ahmadabad, 60 miles north of the Bay of Camay in Bombay Province, under authority of the Public Security Measures Act. All action taken was initiated by the provinces and not by a directive from the Central Government. The secretary of the Communist Party, B.T. Wandive, escaped and was reported to have gone underground.

Source Comment: Poor planning by provincial officials permitted many principal party members to escape.

(b) Hyderabad Negotiations Reopened: Negotiations between the adviser to the Nizam of Hyderabad, Prime Minister Nehru of India, and Viceroy Lord Louis Mountbatten have been resumed relative to the Hyderabad-India Standstill Agreement (Intell. Summary 1986). Hyderabad accused India of many violations of the agreement, including withholding chemicals, medical supplies, steel, automobiles, arms, ammunition, and sterling credits. Hyderabad claims her good intentions have been demonstrated by not asking Pakistan to cash a two hundred million rupee (\$65,000,000 U.S.) loan, by legalizing the use of Indian coinage within Hyderabad by bona fide travelers and by relaxing export restrictions on ground nuts.

(c) Legislative Action: The Indian Legislature passed an atomic control bill (Intell. Summary 2072), and a war potential policy was announced in parliament with emphasis on production.

Source Comment: The Government believes that quicker and better results can be obtained by starting new industries rather than by taking over existing ones. (a)

(a) DA 2732; 11 Apr 48

JAPAN

Military, Political, Economic, Social Situation, Press Review, Civil Intelligence, Miscellaneous

Selected Items for the Information of Commanders
and Staffs of the Far East Command

No. 2082

POLITICAL REPORT

1. Strike Action Continues: (Comment)

(a) Union Makes Good Threat: Despite official warnings, locals of the All-Japan Government Communications Workers Union continued to employ strike action approved by DOBASHI Kazuyoshi (Intell. Summary 2081), and the Higashi-Yodobashi, Joto, and Sakaike post offices in Osaka started a 24-hour strike at 0001, 15 Apr. The Communications Ministry Engineering Bureau which contains the telephone carrier system in that area also started an indefinite strike at the same time. (a)

(b) Settlement No Nearer: The Government's reiteration of its determination to deal only with those unions which have accepted the new wage scale in forming the Wage Adjustment Committee practically eliminated the position of the Central Labor Relations Committee as a mediator. Some representatives of the National Council of Government Employees' Union thereupon approached KATO Kanju, Labor Minister, and urged him to arrange an interview with NISHIO Suehiro, assistant Premier, whom the unions regard as being behind the strong attitude maintained by the Government. KATO, who has not been active in recent negotiations, agreed to do this.

(c) Premier Plans Trips: The Government is anxious to have the organization of the Wage Adjustment Committee completed at once, as Premier ASHIDA plans to leave Tokyo 16 Apr for a three-day tour of the Kansai area. Transportation Minister OKADA, Welfare Minister TAKEDA, Finance Minister KITAMURA, Communications Minister TOMIYOSHI, Commerce Minister MIZUTANI, KURUSU Takeo, director-general of the Economic Stabilization Board, Attorney-General SUZUKI, and Minister Without Portfolio HITOTSUBATSU plan to leave Tokyo 17 Apr, while NISHIO would like to leave 18 Apr. The group will hold a series of meetings with civic leaders in an effort to secure their cooperation.

(d) Education Ministry To Change: In line with the reorganization of the administrative structure of Government (Intell. Summary 2078), the Education Ministry is to be revamped and probably will have a new name, such as the Culture Ministry or the Arts and Science Ministry. The plan is to have eight bureaus, including a Bureau of Teachers, which would have entire charge of personnel matters. Education Minister MORITO would like to have the reorganization completed by 3 May, the anniversary date of the enforcement of the new Constitution.

(e) Election Bills Discussed: A special Diet subcommittee now has the controversial Election Law bills (Intell. Summary 2078), which will be placed before the Diet shortly. One recommendation is the return to a limited plural ballot instead of the present single ballot, a measure which is certain to cause a great deal of discussion. Attorney-General SUZUKI is serving as a liaison between the Election Control Committee, which drafted the legislation, and the Diet.

(f) HATOYAMA Is Questioned: HATOYAMA Ichiro, purged ex-president of the Liberal Party (Intell. Summary 2076), had a field day when he testified before the Illegal Property Transactions Committee concerning his relations with TSUJI Karoku, veteran political fixer. Admitting his long friendship with TSUJI, HATOYAMA denied the latter's political intentions, although it certainly appeared that he had footed the bill when the Liberal Party was organized. According to HATOYAMA, "TSUJI has no political ambition, nor has he any profit incentive, nor is he chasing after fame." (b)

(a) "I" Corps Report, 15 Apr 48

(b) TIS Press Transl, 15 Apr 48

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SOCIOLOGICAL REPORT

2. Repatriation to be Resumed: (Comment)

(a) Japan Awaits Repatriates: The Japanese hope that repatriation of Japanese from Russia, which was stopped by the USSR last October, will be resumed in May, and huge welcome parties are being planned to welcome the prisoners who have been held in the USSR since the end of the war. Government officials say that all necessary preparations have been made for receiving the repatriates at Hakodate, Maizuru, and Sasebo. Each of these ports is ready to receive as many as 5,000 people a day. Food, medical supplies, and other necessities are ready. Each repatriate will receive clothing, shoes, blankets and other equipment and a loan of 7,000 yen from the Government as a fund for starting a new life. (a)

(b) Repatriation to be Resumed: The Soviet Government advised Occupation authorities in Tokyo that Japanese repatriation from Soviet-controlled areas will be resumed in May instead of April as had been announced previously. Maj Gen Kislenko, Allied Council member for the USSR, stated that "due to unfavorable climatic conditions this year and transportation and technical facilities, the repatriation will be resumed in May of this year. (b)

CIVIL INTELLIGENCE

3. Communist Membership Drive:

(a) One Million Goal: "The most important decision made at the Communist Party's sixth national convention was the one to acquire one million members," a Nagano Communist wrote to the "Akahata" Editorial Bureau in a letter intercepted by CCD. The Nagano Prefectural Committee has launched a "movement for one million strong," the writer assured the Communist newspaper, adding that as a result of organized lecture tours and increased party activities, "people have begun to show interest in the Communist Party." As other factors aiding the membership drive the Communist writer listed loss of public confidence in Social-Democratic policies, progress shown by "democratic" Eastern European nations, "good impressions" created by Chinese Communists, and the "fine example" of Communist administration in Shiojiri. "The people have learned to put faith in the Communist Party," he added. (c)

(b) Revolution Delayed: One local cell official in Fukui Prefecture regretfully informed members that the party was obliged to try to postpone the impending revolution because of insufficient Communist Party members, a fairly reliable source told CIC. In a document bearing the formidable title "An Appeal Concerning the Triple Multiplication of Party Members," the cell called on Communists to "fulfill their responsibilities as members of the people's vanguard" and instructed each cell member to recruit three party candidates, source stated. (d) Meanwhile, Niigata party officials, reporting on a Communist area committee conference, stressed the importance placed on expanding Communist membership both from the standpoint of the revolutionary movement and the mending of party finances, CIC learned from a reliable source. Party membership must be doubled and redoubled by late spring, the committee reportedly ordered. (e) In Tokushima Prefecture, the committee treasurer relayed Central Committee instructions to have each member win five new party converts by May, according to another B-2 report to CIC. (f)

(c) Membership Doubled in 50 Days: Mito Area Communists doubled their number in the first 50 days of their membership drive, according to the party's Kanto Regional Committee newspaper, the "Kanto News." Of the new recruits, 44 per cent are farmers, 20 per cent are local citizens, 16 per cent

(a) Kyodo News Service, 13 Apr 48

(b) PIO Press Release, 12 Apr 48

(c) CCD/TOS/X-348

(d) S/I, "Communist Party Drive to Triple Membership by 15 March 1948,"
CIC Area 5

(e) S/I, "Report of Seventh Niigata Area Committee Conference of JCP,"
CIC Area 30

(f) S/I, "Expansion of Communist Party," CIC Area 6

are members of the Mito Branch of the Communications Workers' Union, eight per cent are teachers, and 12 per cent come from the Government Railway Workers' Union and the Electric Workers' Union, the Communist organ claimed. (g)

Comment: This membership drive report obviously has been prepared for propaganda purposes. While seeming to indicate tremendous gains, the percentages themselves, even if true, indicate little, since the article conveniently fails to mention any concrete figure, either of past or present membership.

(d) Awards: Cells will be honored with a "TOKUDA Kyuichi" or a "NOSAKA Sanzo" prize for outstanding contributions to the membership drive, "Akahata," official Communist organ, recently promised. The "TOKUDA" prize will be awarded to winning cells in the metal industries while the "NOSAKA" prize will go to a National Communications, Government Railways, or Electric Industries cell, the journal stated. As a further inducement, "Akahata" disclosed that these two prominent leaders will become honorary members of the victorious cells. (h) "New Life" (Shin Seikatsu), a West Shizuoka Communist District Committee publication, described these awards as red banners bearing the signature of either TOKUDA or NOSAKA. In addition to awarding these prizes to the winning cells the party will give a book to individual members with more than 10 converts to their credit, the journal revealed. It stated that the Communist recruiting timetable called for doubling membership by 15 Mar, redoubling it by 15 Jul, and effecting a further 150-per-cent increase between July and the end of the year. (i)

(e) To Recruit Repatriates: The 500,000 repatriates who will return from the USSR in the future must be drawn into the Communist camp by every possible means, a Communist Party Central Committee directive states. It explains that until recently repatriates have been mostly invalids or of a "reactionary nature" but adds that those returning this year are healthy and have been on-the-spot witnesses of "socialistic construction" for more than two years. "For this reason the repatriates have a big part to play in the expansion of the party," the document reasons. The directive, outlining recruiting strategy, orders regional committees to set up inquiry offices at landing ports and directs party units to organize welcome parties "for propaganda purposes" when repatriation trains pass through stations. At the returnees' points of destination, Communists must organize and control a Livelihood Protection League for Repatriates from the Soviet Union, according to the party document.

(j) The Kansai Regional Committee already has sent two organizers to the Maizuru repatriation center to recruit new members and maintain liaison with returning Communists, a reliable source told CIC. These organizers have succeeded in infiltrating into the rest center and freight section, the report adds. (k)

EIGHTH ARMY REPORT

4. Situation, IX Corps:

(a) Communist Rally, 1st Cavalry Division: The Western Area Committee of the Japan Communist Party held a rally in Tokyo, 10 Apr, for the announced purpose of "opposing the unjust tax assessment." Such protest rallies have occupied a primary position, during recent months, in the party's propaganda campaign to obtain public support. Speakers at the 10 Apr rally and demonstration were TOKUDA Kyuichi, secretary general of the Communist Party, and KAZAHAYA Yasuji. Observers reported that TOKUDA stated that U.S. moves to reinstitute the draft and possession of the atomic bomb are of little concern to Communists since the Soviets now have a weapon more powerful than atomic energy.

(b) Labor Activity, 1st Cavalry Division: Last-minute negotiations between management and representatives of the Tokyo Rapid Transit Workers' Union were successful in averting major strike action scheduled by that organization for 13 Apr (Intell. Summary 2079). Management acceded to the major portion of the workers' demands. Threatened strike action by the Kofu local of the All-Japan

(g) S/I, "Extract from Kanto News," CIC Area 28

(h) TIS Press Trans, 25 Mar 48

(i) S/I, "New Life (Shin Seikatsu) No. 1," CIC Area 14

(j) S/I, "Directive No. 221, 2 Mar 48," CIC Area 25

(k) S/I, "Communist Party Organizers Sent to Maizuru," CIC Area 10

Communication Workers' Union (AJCWU), Yamanashi Prefecture, proved to be of minor importance as only 70 union members participated in the 12-hour walkout, 13 Apr. Meanwhile, negotiations between representatives of the Government and the National Council of Government and Public Office Workers' Unions remained at loggerheads, with the All-Japan Communications Workers' Union continuing to offer the strongest opposition to Government proposals. Government pressure in the form of issuing an ultimatum demanding a union reply to its offer by 12 Apr and a threat to exclude from the newly-instituted Wage Adjustment Committee those unions which did not accept the Government's proposals has had little effect in lessening AJCWU opposition. Faced with the threat of disaffection among those unions affiliated with the National Council (several important member unions already have reached separate settlements with the Government) AJCWU leaders appear prepared to institute another strike program in an attempt to force concessions on the part of the Government, as well as to save face. AJCWU national headquarters is reported to have issued instructions to local branches which outline future union strategy in general terms. Union locals are to act independently in counteracting "oppression" by the Government, and are to "continue the conflict" during the current period of negotiations.

(c) Labor Activity, 11th Airborne Division: Such instructions may have formed the basis for 24-hour strike action scheduled by various local branches of the Miyagi Prefecture District Council during the period 13 to 17 Apr. Union members in six branches were slated to participate in this walkout. Such action, which was expected to be confined to postal installations, was not believed to present a serious threat to lines of communication. (1)

5. Situation, I Corps:

(a) Situation, 25th Division: More important than the strike action scheduled by the Miyagi District Council was that planned by the AJCWU Osaka District Council. Expected to affect 2,932 union members, the strike was to be conducted in two phases, 15 and 16 Apr. Strike orders called for the stoppage of all work except that connected with the Occupation Forces. Considered to be particularly serious were the work stoppages scheduled for the Osaka Carrier Project Bureau and the Osaka Central Post Office. Some inter-union opposition to this action, however, was evident in the formation, 14 Apr, of an Osaka Communications Bureau Democratization League. This action is in line with the small but growing movement within the AJCWU which opposes current union leadership and charges "Communist Party domination" of union policy. The Osaka Democratization League was unofficially reported to have announced its refusal to participate in strike action scheduled for 15 and 16 Apr and its intention to accept the Government's proposals for settlement of the current dispute. (m)

)] PRESS REVIEW

6. Editorial Analysis:

(a) Management's Authority Upheld: The low calibre of present-day business executives is brought up for discussion by the liberal "Mainichi," which suggests that these leaders restore to themselves their rightful authority in order to meet the expected influx of foreign capital. In this connection, the middle-of-the-road journal is the first to propose, although obliquely, that former purged business executives be utilized in post-war enterprises in different capacities. The well-written, concrete editorial based its rather astounding assertions on the assumption that foreign capital will be slow to enter the country if sound businessmen fail to assert themselves as dynamic leaders of a new Japan. (Intell. Summary 2075).

Taking post World War I Germany as a yardstick, this commentator noted that it was the ability of German business executives to command excellent

(1) IX Corps, G-2 Highlight, 14 Apr 48

(m) I Corps, G-2 Highlight, 14 Apr 48

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engineering skill and conduct industrial management with high efficiency which attracted foreign capital into the country. No matter how attractive other conditions may be, it is apparent to the paper that it would be dangerous to lend money to inefficient operators of businesses. It is with deep shame and regret that "Mainichi" admits the poor state of Japanese businessmen, not at all comparable to the reputation of German businessmen, and confides that the "immediate cause of this situation was the purge or retirement of competent executives under democratization movements." While this is termed an "inevitable" move, the inefficiency or incompetence of the new executives is by no means as inevitable in the opinion of this editor. Once these new men add conscientiousness and confidence to their intrinsic abilities, the writer is confident that their prewar pre-eminence can be restored. In this connection the business executives are advised to copy a leaf out of the Soviet book. According to this editor the Kremlin changed its policy of excluding all former executives soon after the revolution, and, realizing that the technical knowledge and abilities of businessmen were necessary for national rehabilitation, reinstated them. In other words, the paper advocates that the businessmen be reinstated, although possibly in a slightly different position (perhaps as advisors), which however, is not interpreted to mean that they should "cultivate the reactionary ideology of the old capitalists."

Asserting that management today is "weak-kneed and buffeted around by labor unions," this journal urges business executives to assert their rights instead of letting labor unions interfere with management's inherent rights. Painting a charmingly idyllic picture of management, the conductor, leading labor, the orchestra, in a beautifully harmonic composition, "Mainichi" reminds this assembly that it is time for the conductor to crack down somewhat on the prima donnas (labor unions).

(b) Intensification of Exposures Urged: Commenting on the testimony before the Illegal Property Transactions Investigation Committee which has developed into a mud-slinging contest, "Tokyo Shimbun" gives an encouraging pat on the back to the committee as far as it has progressed, but urges an expansion and intensification of its activities "for the purpose of punishing injustice and restoring order in this country." Since the committee was formed as a result of "the people's wrath" against blackmarketeering, this journal considers it decidedly inadequate should the culprits be excused with only an admonition not to repeat their errors of the past. Despite the opinion in some quarters that the illegal profits of these blackmarketeers cannot be taxed under existing regulations, this writer believes that it can be done if only the matter is pursued far enough. Apparently the paper is not satisfied to let the committee do the investigating, closing the matter with unearthing the damaging evidence; rather, it would like the committee to be instrumental in the creation of a "better and healthier society."

The bulk of "Tokyo Shimbun's" criticism is directed at the dilatory tactics of the Illegal Property Transactions Investigation Committee, charging that not all the shady dealings have been brought to light in the four months of committee activity. This lack of initiative on the committee's part has aroused the suspicions of the people that it is being cunningly utilized by some political circles, according to this editor's information, a charge that may well be based on an accurate analysis of the political mud-slinging contest. Concluding, the journal asserted, "In these days the politicians' integrity is viewed with misgivings. More far-reaching and stringent action than the unearthing of hoarded goods is desired." (n)

(n) TIS Press Transl, Ed S 2314, 14 Apr 48

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS FAR EAST COMMAND
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SECTION, GENERAL STAFF

SPECIAL EDITION

INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

INTELLIGENCE DATA
COVERING THE MILITARY
ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL

FIELDS IN:

JAPAN

KOREA

PHILIPPINES

CHINA-MANCHURIA

SOUTH EAST ASIA

N. E. I.

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**GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SECTION, GENERAL STAFF**

TABLE OF CONTENTS

NO	Selected Items for the Information of Commanders and Staffs of the Far East Command	DATE
Special Edition		28 March 1948

ESTIMATE OF THE CHINA SITUATION

G-2, GHQ, FEC, APO 500
28 March 1948

No: Special Edition

Map 1, CCF-CNA Relative Situation, 1 May 1947; Map 2, CCF-CNA Relative Situation, 26 Mar 1948; Map 3, General Situation, China-Manchuria, 26 Mar 1948; Map 4, Manchurian Front, 20 Mar 1948; Map 5, North China Situation, 20 Mar 1948; Map 6, Central China Situation, 20 Mar 1948.

1. SUMMARY OF THE CHINA SITUATION

a. Activities in Forward Areas:

Central and Southern Manchuria: CNA reduced to isolated cities, principally Mukden. CCF units engaged in regrouping for further assaults. Efforts of CNA to open corridor from Chihnsien area to isolated Northern cities have failed.

North-Central China: CNA units on Shantung Peninsula clinging to five coastal cities. CCF have captured Weinsien, 75 miles west of Tsingtao. CCF units south of Yellow River, disrupting lines of communication and withholding large numbers of CNA troops from more critical areas.

b. Activities in Rear Areas:

Northern Manchuria: Military operations practically nil.
West and South Central China: Military operations practically nil.

c. **Identifications:** See Maps 3 to 6 inclusive.

d. **Weather:** Spring thaws in Manchuria expected to slow military activities soon for both forces.

2. CONCLUSIONS

a. CCF Capabilities:

Operations in Manchuria:
Continue attacks on CNA-held cities; seizure of Hulutao port facilities.

Operations in North and Central China:
North China: Large-scale guerrilla action against lines of communication; attacks on Peiping and Tientsin.

Central China: Disrupting Yangtze water traffic.

b. Relative Probabilities:

Operations in Manchuria:
Large-scale attacks on cities currently held by the CNA.
Priorities: (a) Attack and seizure of Changchun. (b) Contain Changchun, attack on Mukden. (c) Contain Mukden, attack on Hulutao.

Operations in North and Central China:
Operations against Northern ports on the Shantung Peninsula, namely, Chefoo, Weihaiwei, Penglai, and Lungkou.

CHINA, MANCHURIA

Military, Political, Economic, Social Situation, Press Review, Civil Intelligence, Miscellaneous

Selected Items for the Information of Commanders
and Staffs of the Far East Command

G-2 ESTIMATE OF THE CHINA SITUATION

1. Summary of the China Situation.

a. Activities in Forward Areas:

Central and Southern Manchuria: May 1947 marked the turning point of Chinese Nationalist Army (CNA) operations in Manchuria. The demoralized CNA has steadily deteriorated since that date, while the resurgent enemy Chinese Communist Forces (CCF), taking advantage of their extreme mobility, have struck at will, cutting off garrisons, capturing towns and cities, and in general maneuvering themselves into a position from which an all-out drive can be launched which will wrest the remainder of Manchuria from CNA hands.

The guerrilla tactics of the CCF have successfully disrupted CNA communications, forcing the CNA to garrison every city and town along the Chinese-Changchun Railroad, thus overextending these forces. CCF raids usually have resulted in the capture of military equipment, food, and large numbers of CNA troops. Desertion of entire CNA units of battalion and regimental size is not uncommon.

CCF units in Manchuria, under the capable leadership of Gen LIU Piao, have maintained a continuous series of offensives throughout 1947 and up to the present date which gradually have forced the CNA into the perimeter defense of several isolated key cities, namely: Changchun, Mukden and environs, and Ihsien. Efforts on the part of CNA units to open a corridor from North China to these isolated cities have failed to date. As a result, supply for these units is limited almost entirely to supply by air, making the possibilities for a long period of resistance within the cities remote. (See Maps 1 & 2)

CCF pressure on CNA units in Manchuria has lessened considerably since the recent fall of Kirin and Saipingchich. However, the CCF is known to be regrouping and resupplying, indicating that the present lull in active operations is only a temporary one.

North-Central China: CCF successes in North China during the period of 1 Jun 47 to 28 Mar 48 were more or less minor until the first of March. They were limited to the capture of a section of the Pei-han Railroad from Paoting south to its juncture with the Lunghai, minor guerrilla action between Peiping and Tanka which periodically disrupted communications, and minor successful operations in Shansi and Shensi. These operations have kept a total of about 800,000 CNA troops committed in an effort to contain the CCF in North China.


CCF activities around Yen-an have stepped up considerably. Ichuan, south of Yen-an, fell to the CCF during the week of 13 Mar, and two CNA divisions moving to reinforce the garrison of the town were completely wiped out. The CNA garrison in Yen-an is isolated, and the entire CNA situation in the area may be termed critical.

CCF units in the Shantung Peninsula, formerly isolated from the rest of North-Central China, are now connected to other CCF units by a narrow corridor along the Lia-chou Gulf. CCF columns have driven along the Tsinan-Tsingtao railroad, have captured Weikhsien, and have continued on their march. Nationalist holdings on the peninsula now are limited to four cities in the north and the Tsingtao area in the south.


Columns of Gen CHEN Yi's forces have cut the Tsingpu Railroad north of Hsuehou and are driving on Tsinan from the south. Reports indicate that the Tsinan airfield is already under control of these columns.


The same can be said for the Nationalist position in North China as was said for their position in Manchuria--it grows more and more critical by the hour.


Since May 47 the CCF have spilled over the Yellow River in force



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and have occupied themselves in disrupting communications, occasional feints and attacks on important cities, and continual harassing of CNA units. Although the CCF numbers only 196,000 in Central China, they have been successful in withholding numerous CNA troops from more important areas. They have followed the guerrilla concepts of warfare whenever pressed to any extent by the CNA and have withdrawn in the face of the pressure or have dispersed. All attempts on the part of the CNA units under PAI Chung-hsi, Minister of National Defense, who was especially appointed to the task, to drive the Communists back north of the Yellow River have been in vain. Within the last week, the CCF operations in the area have seemed to grow in momentum and scope. Five of Gen CHEN Keng's columns in the west are concentrated between Yen-an and Sian, making the situation of the Nationalist garrisons in the towns mentioned precarious.

b. Activities in Rear Areas:

North Manchuria: Military operations, except for training and equipping of CCF units, are practically nil. More than 200,000 CCF troops are out of contact with Nationalist units in Manchuria. These troops consist of a large number of Korean units and units of the Inner Mongolian People's Self-Protection Army (IMPSPA). Although they must be considered a potential threat, they have not engaged in active operations for a considerable period of time. Their present use is confined to guarding railroads, lines of communication, and garrisoning rear area cities.

West and South-Central China: CCF in South-Central China are usually considered more as bandit organizations than actual military forces. Although on the increase, their activities may be considered negligible for the present. CCF activities in West China are of the same order of those in South-Central China.

c. Identifications:

All identified units are included in slip sheets which accompany order of battle maps. (See Map No. 3)

d. Weather:

Spring thaws in Manchuria are expected to slow down activity there at a near date.

2. Conclusions.

a. CCF Capabilities:

Operations in Manchuria:

- (1) General.
- (2) Large-scale attacks on cities held by the CNA.
- (3) Seizure of the port facilities of Hulutao.
- (4) Disrupting communications and denying their use to the CNA.
- (5) Launching of guerrilla attacks against CNA garrisons to capture men and materiel.

Operations in Manchuria:

(1) General: The CCF, using highly mobile hit-and-run units, have succeeded in maintaining the initiative in all active sectors. The CCF does not risk large-scale encounters with the more heavily armed CNA unless the assurance of a victory for the CCF is a foregone conclusion. The CCF move great distances, trading space for time, which is known to be in their favor. The CCF appears to be confident of ultimate victory through attritive warfare, economic collapse of the Nationalist Government, or a combination of both.

(2) Large-Scale Attacks on Cities Held by the CNA: CNA garrisoning of towns has long been characterized by inactivity and lack of initiative. Even aggressive patrol action is an unusual occurrence. This inactivity usually stems from the commanders themselves and results in stagnation of troops, lowering of their morale, and a corresponding drop in fighting

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INDEX TO MAP NO. 3

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CHINA and CCF ORDER OF BATTLE

MANCHURIA (NATIONALISTS)		MANCHURIA (COMMUNISTS)	
UNIT	STRENGTH	UNIT	STRENGTH
N. 1st Army	25,000	9th Column	11,000
N. 6th Army	25,000	8th Column	11,000
53d Army	25,000	4th Column	15,000
53d Army	20,000	11th Column	10,000
94th Army	35,000	2d Column	15,000
49th Army	25,000	3d Column	15,000
71st Army	15,000	7th Column	10,000
N. 3d Army	28,000	1st Column	15,000
54th Army	15,000	10th Column	15,000
35th Army	35,000	N. 8th Column	7,500
62d Army	15,000	6th Column	15,000
93d Army	20,000	3d Ind Div	3,000
N. 7th Army	20,000	2d Ind Div	3,000
60th Army	22,500	1st IMPSPA Div	5,000
26th Div	2,000	2d IMPSPA Div	5,000
T. 20th Div	11,000	3d IMPSPA Div	5,000
1st Brig (207th Div)	2,000	4th IMPSPA Div	5,000
U/I Units and Reserves	101,000	U/I Units and Reserves	278,500
<hr/>		<hr/>	
TOTAL		TOTAL	
447,500		444,000	

NORTH CHINA (NATIONALISTS)		NORTH CHINA (COMMUNISTS)	
UNIT	STRENGTH	UNIT	STRENGTH
R. 8th Army	25,000	13th Column	10,000
12th Army	34,000	7th Column	8,000
29th Army	21,000	9th Column	12,000
1st Army	15,000	L. K. Column	8,000
34th Army	30,000	8th Column	12,000
43d Army	30,000	1st Column	9,000
19th Army	30,000	2d Column	9,000
35d Army	30,000	3d Column	9,000
61st Army	30,000	4th Column	9,000
HEK Army	12,500	5th Column	9,000
Army Gp Hq	12,500	N. 3d Div	3,000
22d Army	12,500	120th Div	8,000
35th Army	21,500	N. 2d Div	5,000
92d Army	36,000	N. 3d Brig	4,000
16th Army	36,000	N. 6th Brig	4,000
T. 3d Army	36,000	7th Brig	4,000
N.T. 5th Army	32,000	8th Brig	4,000
13th Army	30,000	7th Ind Brig	4,000
35th Div	12,000	8th Ind Brig	4,000
R. 84th Div	14,000	N. 8th Brig	4,000
44th Div	7,500	1st Ind Brig	2,000
51st Div	7,500	2d Ind Brig	3,000
46th Div	15,000	3d Ind Brig	2,500
65th Div	15,000	4th Ind Brig	3,000
80th Div	25,000	Yenpi Brig	4,000

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NORTH CHINA (Cont'd)

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>
47th Div	12,500
75th Div	14,500
88th Div	14,500
201st Div	10,000
15th Div	5,000
20th Div	10,000
1st Div	5,000
86th Div	5,000
121st Div	10,000
GARR Hq	10,000
95th Div	10,000
GARR Hq	10,000
157th Div	20,000
U/I Div	15,000
TOTAL	802,000

NORTH CHINA (Cont'd)

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>
N. 4th Brig	5,000
5th Ind Brig	5,000
U/I Units and Reserves	152,000
TOTAL	335,500

CENTRAL CHINA (NATIONALISTS)

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>
GARR Hq	3,500
31st Army	19,500
GARR Hq	3,500
56th Army	16,000
44th Div	6,000
25th Div	5,000
202d Div	7,000
58th Div	10,000
10th Div	10,000
20th Div	10,000
48th Div	5,000
11th Div	4,000
65th Div	5,000
47th Div	3,500
57th Div	10,000
77th Div	10,000
68th Div	6,500
55th Div	5,000
104th Brig	1,500
64th Brig	5,000
U/I Units and Reserves	60,000
TOTAL	206,000


CENTRAL CHINA (COMMUNISTS)

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>
38th Army	7,000
11th Column	6,000
12th Column	6,000
2d Column	32,000
3d Column	9,500
6th Column	8,000
2d Column	8,000
10th Column	5,000
11th Column	5,000
1st Column	9,500
3d Column	15,000
8th Column	15,000
6th Column	5,000
4th Column	3,000
1st Column	5,000
10th Column	11,000
12th Column	11,000
4th Column	9,000
7th Column	10,000
9th Column	9,000
21st Div	4,000
U/I Brig	3,000
TOTAL	196,000

Note: Latest reports indicate Gen CHEN Yi's 1st, 4th, and 6th Columns (estimated strength of 13,000) have moved from Central China to North China, changing corresponding strengths and listed units.


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PDM MAP No. 23 4 AUG 1947 (1st REV. FEB. 1949)

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CHINA - MANCHURIA
SCALE
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400
250

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
Military Intelligence Section
General Staff
GENERAL SITUATION
CHINA-MANCHURIA
26 Mar 1943
Map No. 3
FOR SPECIAL EDITION

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efficiency. Thus, by keeping the Nationalist garrisons isolated, the CCF can throw large-scale attacks against individual cities and probably overcome the poorly conditioned CMA troops. Further, because Nationalist shifts of troops from one city to the other to aid in the defense of one seriously threatened are relatively rare, the Communists undoubtedly will have time to regroup after each large-scale attack against individual cities, and prepare for the attack on the next city at their leisure. This has been the procedure in the past and probably will be the procedure in this case. Because of the large garrison in Mukden, it possibly will be the last of CMA-held cities in Manchuria to feel the full force of a Communist attack.

(3) Seizure of Port Facilities at Hulutao: By regrouping powerful CCF columns further to the north, the Communists would be able to force Nationalist troops in the Chihhsien area to withdraw sufficiently to allow seizure of the port of Hulutao. With Yingkow already in CCF hands, the fall of Hulutao would give the Communists sufficient port facilities for taking waterborne supplies to troops on the Shantung Peninsula. In addition, these ports have been of great significance in previous CMA operations in Manchuria and have been the only entrance, other than air, for supplies to CMA units isolated in this area.

(4) Disrupting Communications and Denying Their Use to CMA: This is a Communist capability that can be carried out in conjunction with other activities. Since the start of the civil war, the CCF have continued to make swift guerrilla raids on important rail lines, destroyed bridges and sections of track, and withdrawn rapidly and efficiently. This constant harassing of lines of communications has been a serious factor in the already overburdened logistic system of the CMA. Special railroad destruction units have been identified in the CCF and have been used to great advantage in many instances. Even though the Nationalists may control the countryside and the cities, it must be expected that these and similar units will continue the efficient disruption of Nationalist lines of communications. Where the lines are of sufficient importance, disruption may be on a large enough scale that, instead of withdrawing, the CCF units may sit astride the lines to prevent their repair or reopening. They have done this several times in the past.

(5) Launching of Guerrilla Attacks Against CMA Garrisons to Capture Men and Materiel: This attritive type of warfare could be carried on against some cities in Manchuria while large-scale attacks are launched against others. This type of action has long been used by the CCF and serves further to lower the morale of CMA garrison troops as well as to furnish a means by which the Communists may replace their materiel with CMA equipment.

Therefore, in recapitulation:

(a) It is expected that capabilities 2 and 3 will be attempted in the near future.

(b) Capabilities 4 and 5 are a matter of course, will be conducted whether capabilities 2 and 3 are attempted or not, and undoubtedly will be concurrent actions if 2 and 3 are attempted. (See Map No. 4)

Operations in North and Central China:

North China:

(1) Continuing large-scale guerrilla action.
(2) Regrouping scattered forces for a large-scale attack against existing lines of communication.

(3) Launching co-ordinated attacks against Peiping and Tientsin.

North China:

(1) Continuing Large-Scale Guerrilla Action: This capability is an old one in the area of North China. Such action has succeeded in the past in withholding large numbers of Nationalist troops from action in other areas. This action keeps the population of Nationalist-held North China in a state of fear and excitement, adding to the Nationalist's burden of economic and political stabilization.

(2) Regrouping Scattered Forces for a Large-Scale Attack Against Existing Lines of Communication: Small-scale disruption of communications has been in progress for many months. Large-scale disruption by units of sizable force is a definite possibility if the CCF units in the area decide to regroup.

(3) Launching Co-ordinated Attacks Against Peiping and Tientsin: This capability will depend on several conditions. These cities will not be

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INDEX TO MAP NO. 4

ORDER OF BATTLE
COMPARISON OF STRENGTHS

Chinese Nationalist Army (CNA)
Immediate Mukden Area: Six armies - - - - -256,000

XXXX	
XX 1	Strength 25,000
XXXX	
XX 6	" 25,000
XXXX	
XX 52	" 25,000
XXXX	
XX 52	" 20,000
XXXX	
XX 21	" 25,000
XXXX	
XX 19	" 25,000

Unidentified units
and reserves 101,000

Heilinn: One army - - - - - 15,000

XXXX	
XX 71	Strength 15,000

Perchiku: One army, one brigade 30,000

XXXX	
XX 3	Strength 28,000
XX	
1 XX 207	" 2,000

Chingien Area: Four armies - - - - - 91,000

XXXX	
XX 21	Strength 15,000
XXXX	
XX 55	" 35,000
XXXX	
XX 62	" 15,000
XXXX	
XX 95	" 26,000

Hsien: Two divs - - - - - 13,000

XX	
XX 26	Strength 2,000
XX	
XX T-20	" 11,000

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INDEX TO MAP NO. 4 (Cont'd)

ORDER OF BATTLE
COMPARISON OF STRENGTH

Changchun: Two armies: (-) - - - -42,500

XXXX
N-7 Strength 20,000

XXXX
60 " 22,500

Total CMA Manchurian Forces = Fourteen armies - - 447,500

Note: Strength figures shown hereon represent the latest accurately reported strength of each identified unit.

Identification of the New 3d Army, now in Penchiu, and movement of the 60th Army from Kirin have been included.

Total figures shown do not take into consideration recent unreplaced battle casualties other than at Ssuningohieh (See Intell. Summary 2054).

Chinese Communist Forces (CCF):

Tahushan: One clm - - - - -11,000

XXX
Strength 11,000

Yingkou-Anshan Area: One clm - - - - -11,000

XXX
Strength 11,000

SW of Penchiu: One clm, one div - -18,000

XXX
Strength 15,000

XX
Strength 3,000

SE of Penchiu: One div - - - - -3,000

XX
Strength 3,000

SE of Fushun: One clm - - - - -10,000

XXX
Strength 10,000





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Total CCF Strength in Area Portrayed 165,500

Eleven clms and eight divs.
Note: Strength figures shown hereon represent the latest accurately reported strength of each identified Regular CCF Unit in the immediate area of current action with exception of the two Independent Division in the Changchun area which have recently been identified but to which no strength is given. Regular Manchurian CCF troops not in this immediate area total approximately 278,500, making a grand total of 444,000 identified Regular CCF combat troops in all Manchuria.

Changwu Area: Four Divs - - 20,000

-  1 IMPSPA Strength 5,000)
-  2 IMPSPA Strength 5,000) - - Inner Mongolian People's Self-Protection Army
-  3 IMPSPA Strength 5,000)
-  4 IMPSPA Strength 5,000)

Kaiyuan: One clm - - - -15,000

 10 Strength 15,000

E of Faku: One clm - - - - 7,500

 N-8 Strength 7,500


Hsian: One clm - - - -15,000

 3 Strength 15,000


Hsifeng: One clm - - - -15,000

 6 Strength 15,000


Ssupingchieh: One clm - - - -10,000

 7 Strength 10,000


Itung: One clm - - - -15,000

 1 Strength 15,000


Kangchuling: One clm - - - -15,000


 2 Strength 15,000

Fanchiatun: One Div - - - -Unknown

 9 Ind Strength Unknown


NE of Changchun: One Div - - - -Unknown

 7 Ind Strength Unknown



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attacked with a view of actual capture until the Communists feel secure enough to accept the large-scale administration of large cities. This move probably will not be made until the Manchurian situation has been stabilized and the entire northeast is in Communist control. However, with a view of furthering the fear and excitement of the Nationalist population, these attacks are both possible and feasible. As has been mentioned before, the civil war is growing less and less popular with Nationalist supporters, and a threat to two of the greatest cities in China would further the feeling among some that continuing the war is useless.

Therefore, in recapitulation:

(a) It is expected that capability (1) will continue to be utilized in North China.

(b) Capability (2) is considered more likely than capability (3) at the present time. (See Map No. 5)

Central China:

(1) Disruption of water traffic along the Yangtze River.

(2) Extending present areas of operation to the Yangtze and south of the Yangtze.

(3) Continuing large-scale guerrilla actions in the occupied areas, disrupting lines of communication.

(4) Regrouping in one major force for a co-ordinated attack on Nanking.

(5) Countering CMA offensive efforts by limited withdrawals and dispersal to remote regions.

Central China:

(1) Disruption of Water Traffic Along Yangtze River: This capability has been demonstrated several times, and CMA efforts to clear the river have involved the use of gunboats and other river craft, which could well be used in other localities. Disruption probably would be temporary, since CCF units in Central China have always withdrawn or scattered in the face of determined CMA efforts.

(2) Extending Present Areas to and South of Yangtze: The accomplishment of this capability of necessity would include the results of capability (1). No determined efforts have been made in this direction to date, only small-scale crossings having been attempted. Extension to the south of the Yangtze probably will be determined largely upon the successes of the CCF in North China and Manchuria.

(3) Continuing Large-Scale Guerrilla Actions in the Occupied Areas, Disrupting Lines of Communication: This capability is not contingent on any of the others in Central China, and undoubtedly will be continued. Should other capabilities be accomplished, this capability would be a concurrent one.

(4) Regrouping in One Major Force for a Co-ordinated Attack on Nanking: The same reasoning can be used for this capability as was used for the possible attacks on Peiping and Tientsin in North China. However, an attack on Nanking is a more remote possibility than attacks on Peiping and Tientsin.

(5) Countering CMA Offensive Efforts by Limited Withdrawals and Dispersal to Remote Regions: As in capability (3), this has been a practice of the CCF since it has started operations in Central China, and in all probability will continue to be.

Therefore, in recapitulation:

(a) Capability (3) is simply a continuation of what has taken place in the past. Capability (5) will be used in conjunction with (3) if pressure exerted by the Nationalists develops to a great enough extent.

(b) Probabilities for the utilization of capabilities (1) and (2) seem to be in reverse order. In other words, capability (2) seems the most likely, because, in its accomplishment, the effects of capability (1) also are attained in addition to other effects.

(c) At the present time, capability (4) seems to be the most remote of listed capabilities in this area. (See Map No. 6)

b. Relative Probabilities:

Operations in Manchuria:

(1) Large-Scale Attacks on Cities Currently Held by the CMA: CCF units presently are regrouping and resupplying to the west of Mukden, giving every indication that large-scale attacks on remaining major CMA-held cities in Manchuria will be resumed in the immediate future. Priorities: (a) Attack

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 INDEX TO MAP NO. 5
 ORDER OF BATTLE
 COMPARISON OF STRENGTHS


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Chinese Nationalist Army (CNA)
North Chantung Peninsula: One army (2 Divs) - 25,000


	2	Strength-	-- 25,000
	1	" 15,000	
	8	" 10,000	
<u>Tientsin:</u>		Two divs - - - - -	-25,000
		Strength-	-- 26,300
	35	" 12,000	
	44	" 14,000	
<u>E of Hanchow:</u>		Two divs - - - - -	-15,000
	44	Strength	7,500
	51	" 7,500	
<u>S of Hanchow:</u>		One div- - - - -	-15,000
	46	Strength	15,000
<u>SW of Hanchow:</u>		One div- - - - -	-15,000
	65	Strength	15,000
<u>W of Hanchow:</u>		One div- - - - -	-15,000
	75	Strength	15,000
<u>Hanchow:</u>		One div- - - - -	-25,000
	80	Strength	25,000
<u>Lin:</u>		One div- - - - -	-15,000
	7	Strength	15,000
<u>SE of Tsin:</u>		One div- - - - -	-15,000
	4	Strength	15,000
<u>Tsin:</u>		Two divs - - - - -	-15,000
	28	Strength	7,500
	83	" 7,500	
<u>Hotan:</u>		One div- - - - -	-13,000
	57	Strength	13,000

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Troops: One army (4 divs) = 34,000

 Strength - - - - 34,000


 11-36 " 8,500

 111 " 8,500


 112 " 8,500


 77 " 8,500

Divisions: One div - - - - - 15,000


 Strength - - - - 15,000


Half Divs: Two divs - - - - - 25,000

 Strength - - - - 12,500


 47 " 12,500

S. of Half Divs: Two divs - - - - - 29,000


 Strength - - - - 14,500

 48 " 14,500


Half Divs: One div - - - - - 10,000

 Strength - - - - 10,000


Divisions: One div - - - - - 5,000


 Strength - - - - 5,000


Plan Area: 2 armies (6 divs) = 40,000


 Strength - - - - 41,000


 16 " 7,000


 17 " 7,000

 19 " 7,000


 1 " 19,000

 37 " 7,000

 30 " 6,000

 306 " 6,000

Division: One div - - - - - 10,000

 Strength - - - - 10,000

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Kalran:

Four armies - - - - -50,000

XXXX
NF

Strength 12,500

XXXX
AG

" 12,500

XXXX
22

" 12,500

XXXX
35

" 12,500

Pointing Area:

Four armies (12 divs) -140,000

XXXX
92

Strength - - - - -36,000

XX
208

" 12,000

XX
21

" 12,000

XX
142

" 12,000

XXXX
16

" - - - - -36,000

XX
22

" 12,000

XX
24

" 12,000

XX
109

" 12,000

XXXX
T-3

" - - - - -36,000

XX
T-10

" 12,000

XX
T-11

" 12,000

XX
T-17

" 12,000

XXXX
T-T

" - - - - -32,000

XX
U/I

" 12,000

XX
U/I


" 10,000

XX
U/I

" 10,000


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Fooping area: One garr - One div - - 20,000

 121 Strength 10,000


 Garr " 10,000

Tientsin area: One garr - One div - - 20,000


 95 Strength 10,000

 Garr " 10,000


Nanch: One div - - - - - 5,000

 1 Strength 5,000

Taiwan area: Three armies (9 divs) - - 90,000

 34 Strength - - -10,000


 T-44 " 10,000


 T-45 " 10,000

 73 " 10,000

 43 " - - -30,000

 T-39 " 10,000


 T-49 " 10,000

 70 " 10,000

 49 " - - -30,000

 T-27 " 10,000

 T-10 " 10,000

 68 " 10,000

Yulin: 1 div - - - - -5,000

 65 Strength 5,000

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<u>Eastern:</u>		Two armies (6 divs)-60,000
XXV		Strength - - - -30,000
XXVI	75	" 10,000
XXVII	76	" 10,000
XXVIII	77	" 10,000
XXIX		" - - - - - 30,000
XXX	78	" 10,000
XXXI	79	" 10,000
XXXII	80	" 10,000
<u>Nuclear Detail Area:</u>		One div - - - - -20,000
XXXIII	81	Strength 20,000
<u>Southern Detail:</u>		One army (three divs) - -30,000
XXXIV		Strength - - - 30,000
XXXV	82	" 10,000
XXXVI	83	" 10,000
XXXVII	84	" 10,000
<u>Total All North China Forces-</u>		- - - - - 802,000
		18 armies (68 divs)

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
INDEX TO MAP NO. 5 (Cont'd)
ORDER OF BATTLE
COMPARISON STRENGTHS


Chinese Communist Forces (CCF):

N of Liayang: One clm- - - - -10,000

 13 Strength 10,000

E of Tsinan: Two clms - two divs - 20,000


 9-Clm(CHEN Yi) Strength 12,000

 13-Clm(Elms) " -----


19  7-Clm " 4,000

20  7-Clm " 4,000

S of Tehsien: One clm- - - - - 8,000

 LK Strength 8,000

SE of Paoting: Seven brigs- - - - -28,000

 N-3 Strength 4,000


 N-6 " 4,000

 7 " 4,000


 8 " 4,000


 7-Ind " 4,000

 8-Ind " 4,000

 N-8 " 4,000

E of Anyang: Three clms - - - - -13,000


 1-Clm(CHEN Yi) Strength 5,000

 4-Clm " 3,000


 6-Clm " 5,000

Hop-Shan-Shensi Border: Unidentified- - - -47,000

Kaoping: One div- - - - - 3,000

 N-3 Strength 3,000

SE of Anvi: One clm- - - - -12,000

 8-Clm Strength 12,000

Yenan-Sian Area:

- XXX
[X] 1-C1m
- XXX
[X] 2-C1m
- XXX
[X] 3-C1m
- XXX
[X] 6-C1m

Four clms - - - - UNCLASSIFIED
Strength - Unknown

Tungkuan Area:

- XXX
[X] 4-C1m

One clm - - - - -Unknown
Strength - Unknown

E of Yenan:

- XX
[X] 120
- X
[X] 1-Ind
- X
[X] 2-Ind
- X
[X] 3-Ind
- X
[X] 4-Ind
- X
[X] 5-Ind
- X
[X] N-4
- X
[X] 3-F Ops
- X
[X] 5-F Ops
- X
[X] 11-5

Ten brigs - - - - -48,500

Strength 8,000

" 2,000

" 3,000

" 2,500

" 3,000

" 3,000

" 2,000

" 3,000

" 2,000

" 2,000

Unidentified

18,000

Wuhsiang:

- XX
[X] N-2

One div - - - - - 5,000

Strength 5,000

Wutai:

- X
[X] 1
- X
[X] 2
- [X] Yenpei Det

Two brigs - One det 12,000

Strength 4,000

" 4,000

" 4,000

Kuangling-Yih sien: Two clms- - - - 18,000

XXX
☒ 1-Clm (NEIH) Strength 9,000

XXX
☒ 4-Clm " " 9,000

W. of Peiping-Pacting: Five clms - - - - 51,000

XXX
☒ 2-Clm (NEIH) Strength 9,000

XXX
☒ 3-Clm " " 9,000

XXX
☒ 5-Clm " " 9,000

XXX
☒ 6-Clm " " 12,000

XXX
☒ 7-Clm " " 12,000

E of Kalgan: Three brigs - - - 14,000

X
☒ N4 Strength 5,000

X
☒ 5-Ind " 5,000

X
☒ U/1 " 4,000

South Jehol: Unidentified - - -10,000


SE Jehol: Unidentified - - -14,000

NE Hopeh: Unidentified - - -27,000

S of Tientsin: Unidentified - - - 8,000


Total CCF North China Forces- - - - - 348,500

Note: Strength figures shown hereon represent the latest accurately reported strength of each identified Regular CCF unit in North China. It should be noted that the total estimated strength in this sector has been increased 23,000 over the previous estimate making a grand total of 348,500. This has resulted from the recent movement of CHEN Yi's 1st, 4th, and 6th Columns (13,000) north of the Yellow River and the movement into Northern Kiangsu of CHEN Yi's 2d Clm and elements of the 7th Clm (36,000).



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












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INDEX TO MAP NO. 4
ORDER OF BATTLE
COMPARISON OF STRENGTH

<u>Chinese Nationalist Army (CNA)</u>	
<u>Shanghai:</u>	Garr coord - - - - - 3,500
 2000	
<u>Shanghai (1-2iv):</u>	One army (1-2iv) - - - - 19,500
 21	- - 19,500
 200	- - 19,500
<u>Shanghai:</u>	Garr coord - - - - - 3,500
 2000	- - 3,500
<u>Shanghai:</u>	One div - - - - 6,000
 200	- - 6,000
<u>Shanghai (1-2iv):</u>	One div - - - - - 5,000
 200	- - 5,000
<u>Shanghai:</u>	One div - - - - - 7,000
 200	- - 7,000
<u>Shanghai:</u>	One div - - - - - 10,000
 200	- - 10,000
<u>Shanghai:</u>	Two divs - - - - - 20,000
 200	- - 10,000
 200	- - 10,000
<u>Shanghai:</u>	One div - - - - - 10,000
 200	- - 10,000

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Chumtien Area: One div - - - 4,000

XX
11 - - - 4,000

Tangien Area: One army (3 divs) - -16,000

XXX
56 - - - - 16,000

XX
R-17 - 4,000

XX
163- - 6,000

XX
164- - 6,000

W of Hankou: One div - - - - - 5,000

XX
65 - - - - 5,000

of Hainyang: One brig - - - - - 1,500

Y
104 - - - - 1,500

Hsuehchun: One div - - - - - 3,500

XX
47 - - - - 3,500

Pohsien Area: Two divs - - - - - -20,000

XX
59 - - - - 10,000

XX
77 - - - - 10,000

S of Hsuehou: Two divs-one brig - -16,500

XX
63 - - - - 6,500

XX
95 - - - - 5,000

Y
64 - - - - 5,000

Total CMA forces in area portrayed = 146,000
(Eighteen divs-two brig- two garr comd)

Note: Strength figures shown hereon represent the latest reported strength of each identified Regular Army unit in the immediate area of operations.

This total is supplemented by approximately 60,000 additional Regular Army troops garrisoning other areas of Central China and an undetermined number of irregular garrison and Peace Preservation Corps troops. The over-all total of CMA Regular forces in Central China is estimated at 206,000. It should be noted that CMA troops operating immediately along the Lunghai railroad come under the command of either the Hsuehou or Sian Military Headquarters and are included in the strength and disposition map of North China, (Intell. Summary 2061).

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INDEX TO MAP NO. 6
ORDER OF BATTLE
COMPARISON OF STRENGTHS

Chinese Communist Forces (CCF)

Coastal Area N. of Shanghai: Two clms - - - - 12,000

XXX
11 (CHEN Yi) Strength- - - 6,000

XXX
12 (CHEN Yi) " - - - 6,000

Shuyang Area: 1 clm-1 div - - - 36,000

XXX
2 (CHEN Yi) Strength- - - 32,000

XX
21 7 (CHEN Yi) " - - - 4,000

E of Hankou: Two clms- - - - 17,500

XXX
3 (LIU Po-chen) Strength- - - 9,500

XXX
6 (LIU Po-chen) " - - - 8,000

Fouyang Area: Three clms - - - - 18,000

XXX
2 (LIU Po-chen) Strength- - - 8,000

XXX
10 (CHEN Yi) " - - - 5,000

XXX
11 (LIU Po-chen) " - - - 5,000

Junan Area: One clm - - - - 9,500

XXX
1 (LIU Po-chen) Strength- - - 9,500

E of Hsuehchang: Two clms - - - - 30,000

XXX
3 (CHEN Yi) Strength- - - 15,000

XXX
8 (CHEN Yi) " - - - 15,000

- iii -

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S E C R E T

ORDER OF BATTLE
COMPARISON OF STRENGTH

E of kaifeng: Three clms- - - - 13,000

XXX ⊗	6 (CHEN Yi)	Strength- - - 5,000
XXX ⊗	4 (CHEN Yi)	" - - - 3,000
XXX ⊗	1 (CHEN Yi)	" - - - 5,000

SE of Hsinyang: 2 clms-1 brig - - -25,000

XXX ⊗	10 (LIU Po-chen)	Strength- -11,000
XXX ⊗	12 (LIU Po-chen)	" - -11,000
X ⊗	U/I (LIU Po-chen)	" - - 3,000

NW of Hsinyang: One clm - - - - - 9,000

XXX ⊗	4 (CHEN Keng)	Strength- - - 9,000
----------	---------------	---------------------

Chushan Area: One clm - - - - - 10,000


XXX ⊗	7 (CHEN Keng)	Strength- - -10,000
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Loyang-Yenshih Area: One army-one clm- - 16,000

XXX 38	(CHEN Keng)	Strength- - 7,000
XXX ⊗	9 (CHEN Keng)	" - - 9,000


Total CCF Strength--Central China - - - - -196,000
(One army-nineteen clms-
one div-one brig)

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and seizure of Changchun. (b) Contain Changchun--attack on Mukden. (c) Contain Mukden--attack on Hulutao.

(2) Seizure of Port Facilities at Hulutao: Priority of this capability on the CCF list will depend largely on whether or not the CNA tries to use the port extensively in its Manchurian operations. Unless the above does take place, the seizure of the port is not of immediate importance to the Communists since they now have control of the facilities at Yingkow which were left intact when the Nationalist garrison of the town capitulated without resistance.

(3) Launching of Guerrilla Attacks Against CNA Garrisons to Capture Men and Materiel: The Japanese weapons and materiel with which the CCF was largely equipped at the outbreak of the civil war are wearing out. One of the chief sources for essential supplies of war has been captured CNA equipment. Especially prized is United States equipment, with which many CNA units were formerly equipped. Unless the Soviets increase their contributions to the supply of the Chinese Communists, it may be expected that the CCF will resume their old practice of guerrilla raids for purposes of maintaining their supplies.

Operation in North and Central China:
North China:

(1) Regrouping Scattered Forces for Large-Scale Attack Against Existing Lines of Communication: The disruption of communications achieved by present small-scale actions has been so successful, that it is doubtful if the CCF would consider large-scale attacks essential to their immediate objectives. However, the strength of CCF units in this area makes the large-scale action a definite possibility, and it is not to be disregarded. This type of action probably will be the preliminary to all-out efforts on the part of the CCF to drive the Nationalists out of North China, as it was the preliminary to their efforts to annihilate the Nationalists in Manchuria.

(2) Launching Co-ordinated Attacks Against Peiping and Tientsin: Such action would aid greatly in the war of nerves against the people of Nationalist-occupied territory. This action easily could follow a successful conclusion of the Manchurian campaign.

Central China:

(1) Disrupting of Water Traffic Along Yangtze River: CCF units have succeeded in performing this action more than once in the past six months. Although disruption has been temporary, it has caused some concern to Nationalist circles. Such disruption has been more strategic in its aspects than tactical, and has contributed more to the war of attrition and creation of social unrest. Results of utilization of this capability are relatively minor, making the probability remote that it will be used again in the near future.

(2) Extending Present Areas to and South of Yangtze: The use of this capability depends largely on the development of the situation in Manchuria and North China. Should Communist successes develop in these two areas sufficiently, the CCF probably will start major efforts in the South China area, such efforts being aided by the so-called "bandits" in South China. Effects of utilization of this capability would include the effects of capability (1).

(3) Regrouping in One Major Force for Co-ordinated Attack on Nanking: Although this attack probably would have a great effect on the attitude of the people supporting the Nationalist Government, its accomplishment would be dangerous and not the guerrilla type of warfare which the Communists usually follow. The operation would be costly to the CCF in view of the fact that the city is rather well defended and that the CNA would make a determined effort in its defense. The capability should be considered remote in the immediate future, with possibilities for its accomplishment growing as the tide changes for the Communists in other areas.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SECTION, GENERAL STAFF

I-III: DAILY SUMMARY OF ENEMY INTELLIGENCE
IV: G-2 ESTIMATE OF THE ENEMY SITUATION
V: MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATION

No.	DATE
1177	24/25 Jun 1945

I GROUND:

SOLOMONS:

1. Bougainville: 23 Jun: Stubborn en resistance to continued advances to posns 3000 yds E Rusei along the Duin Rd.

NEW GUINEA:

2. Wewak: 23 Jun: Strong en resistance overcome as Mt Tazaki (2500 yds S of Koigin) capt'd.

BORNEO:

3. Brunei Bry: 24 Jun: No en opposn as forward elements entered Hiri Town; cont'd patrolling Klias Peninsula was negative.

PHILIPPINES:

4. Mindanao: 24 Jun: Light en resistance to capture of Tamogan R bridge; bitter resistance fr scattered en strongpoints overcome as Tamogan Town secured and advance cont'd 500 yds NW where strong en counterattack repulsed; PW capt'd vicin Tamogan stated no naval troops in area; minor en contacts to patrolling 6000 yds E Pulangi R crossing E Cabanglasan; patrol encountered intense sm arms fire fr undetermined nbr Japs 1500 yds E Lumintao.

5. Luzon: a) Central Sector: 24 Jun: Scattered en contacts as mopping up conts Marikina watershed; en strongpoint contacted 2800 yds NMI Santa Ines. b) Northern Sector: 24 Jun: Without contact advances cont'd S along Hwy 5 to posn 2½ mi ENE and 4 mi NE Lal-10; light en resistance form of sm arms fire encountered as advances made N along Hwy 5 to within 4½ mi Tuguegarao; 6 en arty pieces (10 cm and 15 cm) 2500 yds N Balasig dest by counter-battery fire; 15 MGs in defensive line across Hwy 4 generally 6 mi S Kiangsan obsvd by rcn patrols; against en MG, small arms and mortar fire our forces advanced to posns 3800 yds SE Bolog (10½ mi N of Bagabag); no enemy contacted as rcn patrols advanced E on Hwy 4 to Sabangan (6 mi S Bontoc).

II AIR:

CELEBES:

1. Limboeng: 23 Jun: 2 en Fs intercept 3 B-24s attacking the a/d; 1 F prob dest; 1 B-24 holed; 1119I.

2. Celebes Sea: Night 22/23 Jun: Navy search a/c followed by en a/c fr the equator to within 50 mi of Tawi Tawi; nil contact.

BORNEO:

3. Kuching: 24 Jun: 1 en F intercept search a/c; F dam & withdrew, search a/c dam; 3 dummy a/c & 3 S/E Fs obsvd on a/d area; 1210I.

PHILIPPINES:

4. Luzon: 24 Jun: 30 en a/c, condition unrptd, found at Aparri a/d (prob all dam or dest).

5. Batan Id: 23 Jun: Basco strip rendered u/s by 8 P-47s dropping 16 x 1000 lb bombs.

FORMOSA:

6. Heito A/D: 23 Jun: 30 a/c, serv doubtful, sighted on a/d by 8 P-51s.

CHINA:

*7. Canton Area: a) Photos 23 Jun: Total of 96 a/c on 6 a/ds (36 on White Cloud, 12 on White Cloud Satellite, 17 on Tien Ho, 9 on University, 11

on Whampoa, & 11 on Kaitak); 1545I. *b) Nil a/c visible on nor airborne in vicin of White Cloud or University during sweep by P-51s; 1700I.

MANSEI SHOTOS:

8. Okinawa: 23 Jun: 2 en a/c came in low & singly; undetected by radar until retiring; nil attack made on our forces.

EMPIRE:

9. Tokyo Area: 23 Jun: 90 P-51s attacked Hyakurigahara; Himodate, Kasumigaura, & Katori a/ds; in air, 19 en a/c dest, 1 prob, & 13 dam; on grd, 13 dest, 12 prob, & 10 dam; 3 P-51s lost; sub rescued 2 pilots.
10. Honshu: 22 Jun: Negligible F oppsn but intense, hvy AA met 403 B-29s attacking Okayama area, Osaka area, Kure, & Kagamigahara.
11. Kyushu: 22 Jun: 2 en Fs shot down by 32 F4Us on sweep over S Kyushu.

III NAVY:

CELEBES:

1. SW Coast: 23 Jun: 1 poss freighter (300/1000T), 10 mi E of Bira; 1 poss freighter (300/1000T) anchored SE of Bingkalapa.

BORNEO:

2. Kuching: 23 Jun: 8 freighters (300/1000T), 1 freighter (150/300T) under construction, 3 mi NE.
3. Pontianak Area: 23 Jun: 4 freighters (150/300T) (2 under construction), 1 power schooner destroyed; 7 freighters (150/300T), 2 power schooners & 2 riverboats damaged; 12 luggers, 2 power schooners & 1 passenger launch sighted.

FRENCH INDO CHINA:

4. General: 24 Jun: Search planes found Tourane, Cape St Jacques, Camranh Bay & Quinhon empty.

5. Tong: 22 Jun: 1 junk (150') & 1 launch (75') destroyed.

HAINAN:

6. Kiungshan: 24 Jun: 1 freighter-tpt (7/1300T), 3 freighters (150/300T).

FORMOSA:

7. SW Coast: 24 Jun: 1 freighter (150/300T) & 7 luggers destroyed, 1 freighter (150/300T) & 22 luggers damaged (at Ryuku Is).

8. NW Coast: 23 Jun: 1 u/i vsL.

CHINA COAST:

9. Nanking Area: 24 Jun: 1 poss freighter (3/850).
10. Shanghai: 24 Jun: 1 freighter-tpt (700/1300T), 20 mi SE.
11. HongKong: a) 24 Jun: 1 destroyer WAKATAKE class) on crs W, spd 10, 50 mi Ext. b) 24 Jun: 1 landing ship on crs WxS, spd 10, 30 mi ENE. (Poss same ship as above).
12. Hailing Is: 24 Jun: 2 sailing ships (3-masted) disintegrated by bomb hits, 10 mi SW.
13. Sanchau: 23 Jun: 1 merch vsL (est 1400T) sunk, 1 freighter (300/1000T) forced to beach or reef after 5 vicious strafing runs, 1 freighter (300/1000T) last seen with only stern out of water, 15 mi WSW.
14. Ft. Bayard: 21 Jun: 100 junks (in convoy) heavily dam; 1 launch (100') 1 freighter, 2 tugs damaged.
15. Taku: 22 Jun: 1 freighter, 2 tugs damaged.

MANSEI SHOTO:

16. Sakashima: 23 Jun: 7 or 8 LCI types anchored off SW tip Ishigaki.

17. Amami: 24 Jun: 1 poss med freighter-tpt anchored.

KOREA:

18. General: 22 Jun: 1 lrg schooner sunk, 1 freighter (150/300T) damaged.
19. W Coast: a) 24 Jun: 2 schooners (3-masted) strafed. b) 24 Jun: 1 med freighter-tpt, 1 lrg coastal freighter & 1 destroyer escort on crs N, spd 8. c) 24 Jun: 2 freighters (150/300T) strafed & bombed with unobsd results. d) 24 Jun: 2 freighters (150/300T) strafed but no damage seen.
20. Saishu Is: 24 Jun: 1 freighter (150/300T) left burning, 3 left sinking on crs E, spd 5.
21. SW Coast: a) 24 Jun: 1 med freighter-tpt, 1 sm freighter left listing & burning. b) 24 Jun: 3 freighters (150/300T) & 2 tug boats strafed & smoked.

JAPAN:

22. NW Coast Kyushu: 23 Jun: 6 destroyers, 1 hvy cruiser, 2 tankers, 3 lrg freighters at Fukwoka Wan.

23. Kure: 22 Jun: B-29 strike photos show direct hit on stern of battleship Haruna.
24. Iizuru Area: 21 Jun: B-29 photos show: 3 destroyers (1 outfitting) 1 old destroyer, 2 subs, 2 minelayers, 3 destroyer escorts (1 in drydock), 9 frigates (1 in drydock), 27 merch vsls (40,000T total) & Conte Verde (18,000T) with rigging stripped & super structure being cut away.
25. Shimonoseki Straits Area: 21 Jun: B-29 photos show: 1 destroyer, 1 sub, 1 destroyer escort, 2 frigates, 1 minesweeper, 1 subchaser, 61 merch vsls operational (107,000T total), 2 merch vsls repairing (8000T total).

IV G-2 ESTIMATE OF THE ENEMY SITUATION:

1. Summary of the Enemy Situation.

a. Activities in Forward Areas:Northern Philippines (Luzon):

East of Manila: Scattered enemy contacts as mopping up continues Marikina Watershed.

Highway 5: Continued advances made towards Tuguegarao from both the north, without opposition, and the south, where light resistance from small arms fire was overcome. Six large caliber enemy artillery pieces destroyed by counter-battery fire.

Kiangan: Against enemy MG, mortar and small arms fire, our forces continued to advance NW towards Kiangan along Highway 4, where the enemy possibly has established a strong defensive line generally 6 miles SE Kiangan. No enemy contacts to patrolling in vicinity Sabangan (18 miles NW Kiangan).

Luzon: 30 en a/c, serv unrptd, found at Aparri a/d.

Southern Central Philippines (Mindanao):

Davao: After capturing the Tamogan River bridge against light enemy opposition, heavy resistance from scattered enemy strongpoints was overcome and Tamogan Town captured. A strong enemy counterattack northwest of the town was repulsed.

Bukidnon: Minor enemy contacts made as our forces continued patrolling east of the Pulangi River crossing east of Cabanglasan. Intense small arms fire from an undetermined number of enemy encountered by one of our patrols east of Lumintao.

Borneo: Ineffective, single-plane intercept at Kuching.

b. Activities in Rear Areas:

Formosa: 30 a/c, serv doubtful, at Heito a/d.

China: 96 a/c photo'd at Canton area a/ds.

Nansei Shotos: Continued minor en air activ.

Empire: a) P-51s dest 32 en a/c, prob dest 13, & dam 20 in attacks agst 4 a/ds in Tokyo area. b) Meagre F oppns but hvy AA met 403 B-29s over Honshu.

*COMMENT: (7b) Use of "fly-away tactics" to conserve a/c.

c. Identifications: None.

d. Weather: Nil rptd adverse effect on air operations.

2. Conclusions.a. Enemy Capabilities:

Operations in the Philippines:

- 1) Delaying Action, Lower Cagayan Valley.
- 2) Withdrawal Northeast of Manila.
- 3) Remaining Defensive Potential on Mindanao.

Operations in the Empire:

- 4) Reduced Shipping Activity.

Operations in the Philippines:

1) Delaying Action, Lower Cagayan Valley: Virtually unopposed advance of 37th Division elements northward and the simultaneous move of 511th Airborne Infantry units southward, also uncontested, is as yet inexplicable and offers an opening for some speculation, particularly with a core of resistance developing at Tuguegarao between these two converging groups. Even though the enemy force in the Cagayan Valley is possibly more disorganized and perhaps fewer in number than available intelligence indicates, some units, at least capable of delaying action, remain in the

space of 40 miles separating our units. Although not his usual tactic in this sector, deployment of strength in successive lines of defense generally astride Highway 5 would be logical. Stubborn opposition, preceded by armor supported attacks at Tuguegarao, would indicate this key point as a possible first line of a series of successive defenses. The advantages gained from such a deployment are not the ultimate resultants he desires but would, at least temporarily, prolong the seizure of Cagayan objectives. By committing the strength of his tangled units in this 40 mile-long area of the Cagayan Plain, with the remainder of armor as an additional support, a nuisance delaying action, similar to that east of Ilagan, may develop.

It appears that the enemy has sufficient strength to delay the seizure of our objectives in the lower Cagayan Plain, but lack of combat essentials and the already demonstrated unwillingness to engage in open terrain make adoption of this capability quite doubtful and if attempted would eventually hasten his complete annihilation. (See Enclosure No. 1).

2) Withdrawal Northeast of Manila: The last so-called line of resistance of the enemy's 41st Army (Corps) northeast of Manila has slowly and definitely disintegrated into several isolated segments, most of which have been reduced, as a result of mopping up operations, to ineffectiveness. Several scattered groups, remnants of the former Ipo garrison, whose withdrawal northward with an aim of eventual arrival in the Cagayan Valley was rendered impossible by our interdiction of routes in the Dingalan Bay sector, have turned towards the Sibul Springs area and occupied positions most advantageous to prolonging their survival. Observed ground activity and statements made by PWs that supplies have been moved continuously into the Angelo Mountains, northeast of the Marikina Watershed, indicate the presence, although tactically insignificant, but nevertheless sizeable groups whose remaining mission dictated to them by the exigencies of the situation is prolongation of existence. Thus has Lt Gen Shizuo Yokoyama's entire Corps been reduced to ineffectiveness by offensive warfare culminating in the swift encirclement of enemy forces in the Ipo area and now through the steady attrition caused by our constant pressure against his weakened and harassed remnants. These remnants probably will continue moving deeper into the Angelo Mountains, but their arrival or even consolidation there will be of little tactical significance.

3) Remaining Defensive Potential on Mindanao: Graphically explaining the collapse of organized Mindanao defense is the enemy's estimated troop strength, now the equivalent of less than a division throughout the island. 30th Division remnants are now largely preoccupied with problems of bare survival in Agusan Valley, no further significant military capabilities having been salvaged from its scattered rout in Eastern Bukidnon. Numerically stronger remnants of 100th Division and naval units northwest of Davao have now irretrievably lost initial terrain advantages, and with them have gone any further integrated delaying actions. Daily combat attrition of these patently inadequate defense forces proceeds apace; over 800 enemy have been killed in the past 5 days.

Completing the pattern of defensive collapse is the isolation and lack even of communication between the enemy's remaining defense zones. Separating Agusan Valley from the area west and northwest of Davao is a considerable expanse of unexplored terrain; eventual consolidation or junction of enemy troops therein is deemed highly improbable, at this late date. The surrounded pocket at Basak and the remote Sarangani Bay garrison, being completely immobilized, face leisurely destruction in place.

The combined effect of seriously inadequate troop strength and their widely scattered geographic and tactical isolation, attest to an irretrievable collapse of organized Mindanao defense. (See Enclosure No. 2).

Operations in the Empire:

4) Reduced Shipping Activity: Photographs taken by the XXI Bomber Command on 21 June show how the mining blockade by the 313 Bomb Wing against the Inland Sea and the most important ports of the Empire has caused shipping to pile up in the Shimonoseki Straits and Malzuru areas.

Shipping of 112,000 gross tons consisting of 61 operational merchant vessels, 2 of which were under repair were in the Shimonoseki area and 36 ships totalling 59,000 gross tons were in the Maizuru area. Not only has the flow of raw materials, military forces, and food for the bombed-out civilian population of the major cities been greatly slowed down, but it is estimated that at least 150 ships have hit mines. Furthermore, as ships are rerouted to West coast ports of Honshu such as Niigata, Maizuru, and Fushiki, a greater burden is placed on the cross-island railroads, which are already loaded to capacity and which will become an important bombing target after higher priority industrial targets have been eliminated and as the date of invasion grows nearer.

The photographs also reveal a number of warships in the Maizuru area where the enemy probably feels they are somewhat safer than in the Inland Sea, and also the former 18,000 ton Italian luxury liner, Conte Verde. The fact that the Conte Verde is being stripped of all rigging and the superstructure being cut away lends credence to the Chinese report that she is to be converted to an aircraft carrier.

The mining operations have undoubtedly greatly decreased the enemy's capabilities both by sinkings and delays, and it is doubtful that the enemy has the means to break the blockade by more effective minesweeping, suicide boats, divers, or blanketing areas with explosives.

b. Relative Probabilities:

1) Delaying Action, Lower Cagayan Valley: It appears that the enemy has sufficient strength to delay the seizure of our objectives in the Lower Cagayan Plain, but lack of combat essentials and the already demonstrated unwillingness to engage in open terrain make adoption of this capability quite doubtful and if attempted would eventually hasten his complete annihilation.

2) Withdrawal Northeast of Manila: Northeast of Manila remnants probably will continue moving deeper into the Angelo Mountains, but their arrival or even consolidation there will be of little tactical significance.

3) Remaining Defensive Potential on Mindanao: The combined effect of seriously inadequate troop strength and their widely scattered geographic and tactical isolation, attest to an irretrievable collapse of organized Mindanao defense.

4) Reduced Shipping Activity: Allied mining operations in the Shimonoseki Straits and Maizuru areas have impaired the enemy's ability to wage war by greatly decreasing his shipping activities through sinkings and delays; it is doubtful that he has the means to break this blockade.

V MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATION:

Japanese Propaganda on Borneo:

Attempts to engender mutual distrust and suspicion among Allies engaged in joint operations are a well-known enemy propaganda device. The following leaflet, distributed in English by the Japanese on Tarakan, is a crude example of such an attempt:

"Bring this Leaflet to C-In-C of Allied Force.

We Lament over the death of Lieutenant General Terick C-In-C of Allied Force in Tarakan.

(T.N. Following in Japanese)
To the Australian Forces.

1. What do you think of the death in action of Lt Gen Terick? Further intense fighting will only bring you the same fate.

2. How many Australian Officers and men have been made to dance to the tune of the Yankees (T.N. Sic) and have been forced to shed their blood? Consider well the fact that even on Tarakan you have had more than 2000 casualties.

Don't be misled by the Yankees!!!

Pay Attention to world changes!!!

1. Think of the irresponsible and indiscriminate bombing by the Yankees. While you sacrifice yourselves are they not complacently taking a holiday?

2. Don't be misled by the false Yankee reports in regard to the fighting on Okinawa. In the waters around this island they had lost over

Miscellaneous Information - Cont'd

Summary 1177 - Cont'd

500 war and merchant ships by the end of April. And now, with the advent of the new weapon, the Oyako (T.N. Lit. parent and child) bomber (Rocket bomber) and the Special Attack Units, all vessels in the vicinity of Okinawa are on the verge of annihilation. In proof of this, is it not true that in spite of the pleas of your officers and men, not a single supply ship has been sent to Tarakan?

The Japanese Forces on Tarakan"

Full translation of carbon copy Jap propaganda leaflet issued by Japanese Forces on Tarakan. Undated. (Presumably refers to death of Lt Derrick VC.) Captured at Tarakan - 13 June 1945. Recd 1 Aust Corps ATIS Adv Ech - 16 June 1945.


Special care must be taken to insure the secrecy of this document. Information contained herein will not be circulated or reproduced beyond the Staff Section to which it is addressed. When not actually in use, this document is to be kept in a safe and is chargeable to the custody of an Officer. See AR 380-5, 15 March 1944, and Standing Operating Procedure Instructions No. 14, 14 March 1944, regarding security Classifications.

To Accompany Encl No 1
Daily Summary No 1177

EXPLANATORY NOTES:

On 23/24 June:

1. Heavy opposition continues after strong attack forced withdrawal of PA units from Tuguegarao to W bank of Cagayan River. Enemy employing armor, arty and mortar fire. Fortifications have been observed between Tuguegarao and 3 miles E to Penablanca.
2. Without opposition units of the 37th Inf Div advanced to a point $4\frac{1}{2}$ miles S of Tuguegarao, astride Highway 5, E of the Cagayan River.
3. Six large caliber (10 cm and 15 cm) artillery pieces were knocked out as a result of our counter-battery fire, $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles NE of Balasig.
4. Against enemy MG, small arms and mortar fire, forward elements of the 6th Div advanced over difficult terrain to a position on Highway 4, 2 miles SE of Bolog ($10\frac{1}{2}$ miles N of Bagabag).
5. Patrols of 6th Div probing enemy positions generally 6 miles S of Kiangon observed a defense position extending 1,500 yds NE-SW astride Hwy 5, 1,500 yds S of Bolog. Defenses consist of about 15 MGs and dug-in positions.
6. Patrols of 33rd Div moving north from Daklan and reaching Mt Obudan (1 mile N of Daklan), found no evidence of Japs in the area.
7. Observers report series of outposts and OPs on the SW and W extremities of the general Kiangon area.
8. Roving patrols of 121st PA Inf reached Sabangan (6 miles S of Bontoc) on Hwy 11, without enemy contact, locating an abandoned well-dug-in position astride Highway 11 (1,300 yds ENE Sabangan).



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To Accompany Encl No 1
Daily Summary No 1177

EXPLANATORY NOTES:


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





Enclosure No. 1

Military Intelligence Section
 GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
 UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC

COMBINED GROUND SITUATION
 TO: 24001, JUNE 45
 Msgs To: 12001, 25 June 45
 For Summary No. 1177



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To Accompany Encl No 2
Daily Summary No 1177


EXPLANATORY NOTES:

1. 16 Jun: The bulk of 30th Div remnants withdrawn from Eastern Bukidnon including the divisional commander, Lt Gen Morozumi, reportedly reached Walo area.
2. 24 Jun: Only scattered minor enemy contacts encountered E of Pulangi R, following the 30th Div disengagement and withdrawal.
3. 24 Jun: Stubborn enemy resistance continues to retard our advances along the Kibawe-Talomo Trail.
4. 24 Jun: Although bitter local resistance is still encountered against our northwestward advances up the Davao and Talomo R Valleys, organized enemy delaying actions throughout this area have collapsed.

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
ESTIMATED 1,000 EMERY
RESEARCHERS IN ZAMBOANGA
AND SULOS


MINDANAO

MORO GULF

MACKALLAN BAY

LILIBAY BAY





July 6th, 1942

G.H.Q., S.W.P.A.
Mil. Intell. Section, G.S.

SUBJECT: DIRECTIVE COVERING THE ORGANIZATION CO-ORDINATION AND OPERATION OF INTER-ALLIED UNITS KNOWN AS SPECIAL OPERATIONS, AUSTRALIAN SECTION, SECRET INTELLIGENCE SERVICE, AUSTRALIAN SECTION, COMBINED FIELD INTELLIGENCE SECTION AND MILITARY PROPAGANDA SECTION.

1. Information

a. General Headquarters, South West Pacific Area assumes, as of 1200 hours July 6, 1942, responsibility for the direction and co-ordination of the following Inter-Allied Units:

- 1) Special Operations, Australian Section (Inter-Allied Services Department).
- 2) Secret Intelligence Service, Australian Section.
- 3) Combined Field Intelligence Section.
- 4) Military Propaganda Section.

b. The combined organization will be designated Allied Intelligence Bureau, and the sub-units thereof Sections "A", "B", "C", and "D" respectively.

2. Mission

a. The mission of Allied Intelligence Bureau will be to obtain and report information of the enemy in the South West Pacific Area, exclusive of the continent of Australia and Tasmania, and in addition, where practicable, to weaken the enemy by sabotage and destruction of morale and to lend aid and assistance to local efforts to the same end in enemy occupied territories. Information of the enemy will be forwarded to the Controller of Allied Intelligence Bureau by the most expeditious means available, and the Controller will be responsible for its prompt report to this Headquarters and to other appropriate authorities interested.

3. Organization

a. The Bureau will be organized as outlined in Appendix "A", attached hereto.*

b. Colonel C.G. Roberts, A.M.F., is appointed Controller.

c. Major Allison W. Ind, U.S.A., is appointed Deputy Controller.

d. Chiefs of Sections are appointed as follows:

"A" Section: Lt. Col. G.E. Mott (British Army).

"B" Section: Commander R. Kendall, R.A.N.

"C" Section: (to be appointed)

"D" Section: Commander J.C.R. Proud, R.A.N.V.R.

e. Sub-section heads will be appointed by the Controller, after consultation with the appropriate Chief of Section.

f. A co-ordinating staff will be set up to aid and assist the Controller. Commander Allied Land Forces, Commander Allied Naval Forces, Commander Allied Air Forces and Admiral Coster will each appoint a liaison officer to serve on this co-ordinating staff. It is desired that the officers so appointed be chosen from the Operations Sections of the Headquarters concerned. The appointments will be subject to approval of General Headquarters. Their duties shall be from time to time to arrange for transport, supply and such other assistance as Allied Intelligence Bureau may require.

*APPENDIX "A" not included

g. The Controller will be responsible to this Headquarters for the efficient functioning of the Bureau and the execution of missions directed from time to time by this Headquarters.

h. The Deputy Controller, in addition to his other duties which may be prescribed by the Controller, will be the Finance Officer for the Bureau and will be directly responsible to the Commander in Chief for the proper expenditure of funds placed to his credit for the financing of the operations of the Bureau. His duties and responsibilities in this connection are further amplified in Annex "1", attached hereto.

i. The Chiefs of Sections, under the general supervision of the Controller, will have immediate charge of their respective sections and will be responsible for the execution of missions allotted thereto.

j. "A" Section is charged generally with obtaining information of the enemy and his activities and with the execution of acts of sabotage against the enemy. Special secret instructions will be issued from time to time.

k. "E" Section is charged with the collection of information of the enemy and his activities through certain special means and channels concerning which detailed secret instructions will be issued from time to time.

l. "C" Section is charged with obtaining all possible information about the enemy, his dispositions, movements, strength, etc., through such agencies as coast watchers, native agents and civilian operatives, now or hereinafter assigned to this Section. Its personnel in enemy occupied territories will co-ordinate closely with the Commanding Officer of Allied offensive operations in their territory. This Section will initially be sub-divided geographically into three (3) sub-units covering, respectively, (1) the North East Area (east of the eastern boundary of Dutch New Guinea, extended south to the coast of Australia and north to the boundary of South West Pacific Area); (2) the Philippine Archipelago Area; and (3) the Netherlands East Indies Area.

m. "D" Section is charged with the preparation of propaganda material, useful to the other sections and initially for dissemination by them. Its activities will be expanded as occasion requires, after plans have developed for co-ordination with other agencies which may be set up in this field.

n. Throughout the Bureau, excessive staff and complex organization will be avoided. The need for flexibility and mobility will be kept in mind. Office procedure will be kept as simple as possible, and paper work reduced to the absolute minimum.

4. Administration

a. The Controller will report to this Headquarters from time to time, as required, regarding the activities in which the Bureau is engaged and will obtain its concurrence before fresh activities are undertaken.

b. Section Chiefs will keep the Controller currently advised and will submit each week to the Controller brief status and activity reports.

c. Every effort will be made to expedite intelligence reports to this Headquarters.

d. Assignment of personnel to the Bureau and its sections from the Allied Services will be arranged through the Controller. Such personnel records, etc., as may be required by the appropriate Allied Services will be handled by the Section Chiefs. Effort will be made by the Controller and Chiefs of Sections to reduce to the minimum routine, personnel and property reports.

e. The Controller and his Co-ordinating Staff will be the sole Channel for requests of transportation, supply and such other assistance as may be required from the several commands for fulfillment of its missions.

For the Commander in Chief:

/s/ R. K. Sutherland
/t/ R. K. SUTHERLAND,
Major-General, USA,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

/s/ C. A. Willoughby
/t/ C. A. WILLOUGHBY
Brigadier-General, GSC,
Asst. Chief of Staff, G-2.

Encls: Annex "I" - Finance - Administration
Appendix "A" - Organization Chart*

Distribution:

1. G-2, G.H.Q.
2. The Prime Minister.
3. Commander, Land Forces, S.W.P.A.
4. Commander, Air Forces, S.W.P.A.
5. Commander, Naval Forces, S.W.P.A.
6. C.G., U.S.A.F.I.A.
7. 1st Naval Member, R.A.N.
8. Admiral F.W. Coster.
9. Col. C.G. Roberts.
10. Major A.W. Ind.
11. Lt. Col. G.E. Mott.
12. Commander R. Kendall, R.N.
13. Commander J.C.R. Proud, R.A.N.V.R.

*Appendix "A" not included

July 1st, 1942.

ANNEX I: FINANCE ADMINISTRATION:

1. The Allied Intelligence Bureau will be financed by credits made available by the United States, Australian and Dutch Governments, participating as equal partners, as heretofore arranged. The Commander in Chief, South West Pacific Area, will be responsible to the Governments concerned for the proper utilization of the funds so provided.

2. The initial appropriation agreed to is £45,000, payable by each Government in lump sums of £ 15,000 or installments thereof as required. This appropriation, initially made to cover the expenses of Inter-Allied Services Department may, by subsequent agreement, be utilized when, as and if required to meet the expenses of "A", "B", "C" and "D" Sections, or any of them as directed by the Commander in Chief. Additional sums for the same purpose will be requested by the Commander in Chief from time to time as required, based on budget estimates submitted by the Sections and transmitted by the Controller with his approval to this Headquarters.

3. All funds contributed by the said Governments for this purpose will be transferred to the Deputy Controller, who will be appointed an Agent Finance Officer, will be deposited in a bank approved by these Headquarters and will be subject to withdrawal by the Deputy Controller alone. The Deputy Controller will handle these funds in accordance with United States Army Regulations governing the expenditure of secret funds, and from time to time when required, will make to the Commander in Chief a secret report as to their disposition. To assist the Deputy Controller in accounting matters, suitable military or civilian personnel will be provided. Section Chiefs may provide their own accounting personnel, if a need thereof is apparent, and will account for sums appropriate to the Sections as directed by the Deputy Controller.

4. Budgets: From time to time, as required, Section Chiefs will submit to the Deputy Controller an estimate of funds required by them, together with a brief statement of the activities (in general) for which such funds are necessary. When satisfied as to the uses to which such money will be put, the Deputy Controller will make credits available. Section Chiefs will acknowledge by receipt such credit appropriations from the Deputy Controller. The receipt will state, in broad terms, the purposes for which the funds will be utilized. These receipts will be drafted in such manner as not to disclose secret operations. These receipts will be utilized by the Deputy Controller as "sub-voucher receipts," to support his primary vouchers to the Finance Officer.

/s/ R.K. Sutherland

OFFICIAL:

/s/ C.A. Willoughby
/t/ C.A. WILLOUGHBY
Brigadier-General, G.S.C.
Asst. Chief of Staff, G-2

CHARLES ANDRE WILLOUGHBY (04615)*

Major General Charles A. Willoughby is Chief of Intelligence, FEC, and Chief, Civil Intelligence Section, SCAP.

He is one of the handful of key officers who came out of Corregidor in March 1942 with General Douglas MacArthur, when the latter was ordered to take over in Australia, accompanied him throughout the Campaigns of the SWPA, and then continued on the staff of the occupation of Japan. He previously served in the Philippines as G-4 of the Philippines Department (1939-41). In August 1941, when General MacArthur took overall command, he was appointed G-2 on the new staff of USAFFE. As G-4, General Willoughby developed the Bataan Peninsula for defense in expanding the roadnet, particularly the Bagac-Mariveles road, the warehouse and depot installations and the wharves at Limay, Cababean and Lamao.

Charles A. Willoughby was born in Germany on March 8, 1892, the son of Baron T. von Tschepp-Weidenbach (Baden) and Emmy Willoughby (Baltimore, Md). He attended various continental colleges, particularly the University of Heidelberg and the Sorbonne, Paris. He majored in philology and modern languages: French; Spanish; German. After intermittent visits to the United States, he joined his American relatives, in 1910, to complete his American education and to obtain U. S. citizenship. Bent on a military career, he enlisted in the Regular Army, as a candidate for a Commission, and served as a private, corporal and sergeant of Co K, 5th US Infantry, in the interim period from 10 October 1910 to 9 October 1913. In 1913 he entered the senior class of Pennsylvania College, Gettysburg, Pa., and graduated with the degree of Bachelor of Arts in 1914. Later, he pursued post-graduate studies, for the degree of M.A., at the University of Kansas, Lawrence, Kansas.

In May 1914, he obtained a commission as Major, Officers Volunteer Corps, the fore-runner of the present ORC, which he vacated to accept a Regular Army Commission in August 1916. While awaiting this Army appointment, he taught at the Howe School, Howe, Ind., and at Racine College, Racine, Wis., in their modern language departments.

Promotions: Second Lieutenant: 27 Nov 1916; First Lieutenant: 27 Nov 1916; Captain: 30 June 1917; Major: 6 March 1928; Lieutenant Colonel: 1 June 1938; Colonel: 14 Oct 1941; Brigadier General (Temp): 20 June 1942, (Perm): 26 May 1944; Major General (Temp): 28 October 1944.

His first assignment, in December 1916, was with the 35th Infantry on border patrol duty at Nogales, Arizona. At the outbreak of the war, he was transferred to the 16th Infantry at Fort Bliss, Tex, and left for France in June 1917. He served initially with the 16th Infantry, 1st Division AEF, then joined the Air Corps, trained under the French, and was breveted as Military Aviator, flying the "Nieuport" and "Spad", pursuit types.

He served as Executive to General Karl Spaatz (the famous Air Force Commander of World War II), who was then Commandant of the Aviation Training Center at Issoudun, France, the largest in World War I. He later took command of the Aviation

*Prepared by War Department, Public Information Office

Branch School at Chateauroux until May 1918, when he was transferred to the Aviation Section, WD, Washington. He was placed in charge of the pioneer development of the first Aerial Mail Service, which he accomplished successfully, under Postmaster General Burleson, serving in that capacity until December 1918. On leaving the Air Service, he returned to his basic branch (Infantry) and took command of the demonstration machine gun units at Fort Benning, Ga., in the initial organization of the now famous Infantry School.

In October 1919 he was assigned to the 24th Infantry at Columbus, New Mexico, serving as Company and Battalion Commander in this famous border station, that was raided by Pancho Villa. Only officers of recognized disciplinary capacity, combined with great tact, are assigned command of Negro troops.

In February 1921, he was due for foreign service and was assigned to the 65th Infantry, San Juan, Porto Rico, where he served as a company and battalion commander, until May 1923.

He returned to the United States in May 1923 for temporary duty with the Military Intelligence Division of the War Department, in preparation for assignment as Military Attaché abroad. In July, he was ordered to Venezuela, for station, and for general duty as Military Attaché with the American Legations in Venezuela, Colombia and Ecuador. He served successively at Caracas (Venezuela), Bogota (Colombia) and Quito (Ecuador). He was very successful in this diplomatic post and received high decorations from the Governments of Venezuela and Ecuador. In this period, he published the "House of Bolivar" - a study of the great South-American statesman and soldier, native of Caracas, Venezuela.

In May 1927 he was transferred to Fort D.A. Russell, Wyoming, for duty with troops, and served there until September 1928 when he was ordered to Fort Benning, Ga., as a student in the Advanced Course at the Infantry School. He was graduated in June 1929 but remained at Fort Benning until August 1929, to prepare a "History of the Infantry School." In this period he published a monumental study on "The Economic and Military Participation of the United States in the War 1917-1918". This was translated in several foreign editions and did much to orient the Latin-American countries towards the United States and acquaint them with its tremendous military industrial capacity.

In August 1929, he was ordered to Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, as a student at the Command & General Staff School. He was graduated in June 1931 after completing the two-year course. He was retained for duty at the Command & General Staff School as Instructor, covering the subjects of Intelligence and Military History. He also became Editor of and brilliantly developed the "Command & General Staff School Quarterly", expanding particularly its coverage of the foreign field. In this period he published "The Element of Maneuver in War" which traced the art of war, through the principal campaigns of the XVIIIth Century. It was used as a textbook in the C.S.S.S., Leavenworth, and is now regarded as a standard reference work in its field. In August 1935 he went to Washington, D.C., to take the coveted course at the Army War College, from which he graduated in June 1936. This is the final step in the higher training of American staff officers.

In July 1936 he again proceeded to Fort Benning, Georgia, for duty as an instructor in the IId Section, at the now greatly expanded Infantry School. On completion of the four-year tour, he served briefly in New York City, N.Y., in February 1940, to initiate the ambitious War Department "Military Dictionary Project" which developed and published foreign language pocket-dictionaries that became of immediate practical value in the ensuing World War II, due to his farsighted planning. In June 1940,

he was again ordered to foreign service, at Headquarters, Philippine Department, Manila, P.I. as Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4. In that capacity, General Willoughby developed and expanded the Defense and Supply Installations on Bataan and Corregidor, that enabled MacArthur's forces later on to make the protracted defense, that is now history.

He was appointed A.C. of S., G-2, i.e., Chief of Intelligence of USAFFE (United States Army Forces in the Far East) in 1941, served throughout the initial operations on Luzon and the defense of Corregidor and Bataan, and was one of the key staff officers accompanying General Douglas MacArthur in his dramatic breakthrough to Australia in March 1942. He continued as MacArthur's Chief of Intelligence (AC of S, G-2) General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area, and remained to serve in the same capacity on all subsequent staffs, throughout the Campaigns of MacArthur from Papua to the Philippines, and to the Occupation of Japan.

DECORATIONS

In April 1942 he received the Silver Star with the following citation:

".....For gallantry in action in the vicinity of Agloloma Bay, Bataan, Philippine Islands, on January 24, 1942. During an attack to expel an enemy landing party, Colonel Willoughby, who was engaged in a reconnaissance of the general area, voluntarily joined in the attack when he learned that the company commander had been wounded and that the company was without an officer. This gallant officer assisted in reorganizing stragglers, and in the face of heavy enemy small arms and mortar fire, demonstrated courage and leadership in proceeding through heavy jungle terrain to a position within twenty yards of the enemy line. After the initial attack, Colonel Willoughby disregarded active enemy snipers in administering first aid to a wounded officer and assisted him to the rear. The example of courage and leadership displayed by this staff officer was a significant factor in the ultimate success of the attack....."

The unit involved was the Philippines Constabulary Battalion, holding a defensive sector on the China Coast. The Battalion was commanded by Col. M. Castaneda, who was a former pupil of Gen Willoughby's at the Infantry School. Brig Gen Castaneda (1947) now heads the Constabulary of the New Philippines Republic and was recently active in suppressing the subversive Hukbalahap movement on Luzon.

In 1943 he was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross with the following Citation:

".....For extraordinary heroism in action in New Guinea, during the Papuan Campaign, July 23, 1942 to January 8, 1943. As Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Southwest Pacific Area, Brigadier General Willoughby displayed extraordinary courage, marked efficiency and precise execution of operations during the Papuan Campaign....."

As personal representative of General MacArthur, General Willoughby frequently visited the Headquarters of the Australian and American Corps, in the operations against Buna-Gona. He was with General Eichelberger in the bloody capture of Buna Village in December 1942.

In 1944 he received the Distinguished Service Medal with the following Citation:

".....For exceptionally meritorious service to the Government in a position of great responsibility from 18 April 1942 to 1 September 1943. Upon the establishment of General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific area, General Willoughby (then Colonel) was assigned as Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, and was charged with the particularly complex and difficult task of organizing and coordinating intelligence activities in the theater. Speedily and with brilliant resourcefulness he planned and put into action necessary agencies for providing the command with reliable and comprehensive information concerning the terrain, the native inhabitants, enemy installations, dispositions, and movements in a vast and inaccessible area. During the containing operations which were necessary before an offensive could be launched, his assessment of enemy strengths and intentions was conspicuously accurate, and data were meanwhile assembled upon which sound plans of attack could be based. General Willoughby, by his noteworthy achievement as an organizer and by his penetrating analysis of the military situation, made an invaluable contribution to the success of military operations in the Southwest Pacific Area....."

In 1946 he received Oak Leaf Cluster (Distinguished Service Medal) with the following Citation:

".....Brigadier General Charles A. Willoughby, as Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area, performed meritorious and distinguished service from September 1943 to March 1945. He directed and coordinated intelligence activity in connection with operations in Salamaua, Lae and Finschhafen, New Guinea; Hollandia, Wakde-Sarmi and Biak, Dutch New Guinea; and in the Philippine Islands; collecting, evaluating and disseminating information for use in planning and executing a series of devastating blows against the enemy. Through his professional knowledge and resourcefulness, General Willoughby contributed materially to elimination of the enemy in the Southwest Pacific Area and to the liberation of the Philippine Islands....."


He was awarded the Medal of Honor (Affaires d'Etrangers) by the French Government (1921), for World War service, 1917/1918 and was previously breveted by the French and the A.C. as a "Military Aviator". The French Government awarded him the Legion of Honor, in the grade of officer (1943), for conspicuous service in the Pacific Theater, in a highly responsible Staff position.

He was awarded the Order of St. Maurice and St. Lazarus by the Government of Italy, for his assistance to the Italian Pan-American Flight, while he was Military Attaché in Venezuela (1924) and aid to the Italian Military Mission in Ecuador (1925). He was awarded the Order of Abdon-Calderon, a high decoration by the Government of Ecuador; the Order of Merit, a second decoration by the Government of Ecuador; the Order of the Liberator (Officer) by the Government of Venezuela.


The British Government awarded him the "Order of British Empire", in the grade of Commander, (1946) for his contribution to inter-Allied Intelligence during World War II.

Other Decorations and Citations, viz:


Legion of Merit.....	1941
American Defense w/One Star.....	1941
Asiatic-Pacific Theater w/Seven Stars.....	1941-1945
Victory Medal.....	1918 & 1945
Japanese Occupation.....	1945-1948
Unit Citation w/Three Clusters.....	1942-1945
Philippine Defense.....	1941-1942
Philippine Liberation w/Two Stars.....	1944-1945
Distinguished Service Star (Phil Rep).....	1945
Philippine Independence Ribbon.....	1946



Left to right Maj Gen Andrei E. Svirin Maj Gen C. A. Willoughby Lt Gen Robert L. Eichelberger
Lt Gen Kuzma N. Derevyanko



Maj Gen C. A. Willoughby Lt Gen Robert L. Eichelberger



Maj Gen C. A. Willoughby

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